
RETHINKING NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF MIGRATION

COUNCIL STATEMENT

By Demetrios G. Papademetriou
Convener, Transatlantic Council on Migration
President, Migration Policy Institute and MPI Europe

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The seventh plenary meeting of the Transatlantic Council on Migration

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Table of Contents

- Executive Summary** 1

- I. The Roots of Society’s Anxiety over Immigration**.....2

- The Five Principal Drivers of Anxiety* 4
 - 1. Culture and Loss of Identity..... 4
 - 2. Rapid Pace of Social Change..... 4
 - 3. Economics and Inequality..... 4
 - 4. Politics: Low Confidence in Government and Loss of Sovereignty..... 4
 - 5. Security and Social Unrest..... 5

- II. Conclusions: Creating the Conditions for Cohesive Societies**..... 5

- Ten Steps for Fostering Greater Cohesiveness* 6

- Works Cited** 9

- About the Author** 10



Executive Summary

Large-scale immigration has led to unprecedented levels of diversity around the globe, transforming communities in fundamental ways and challenging long and closely held notions of national identity. In recent years, this rapid transformation has coincided with a set of deeper challenges — first and foremost among them the most severe economic downturn in decades. Political leaders thus find themselves having to navigate a tangled web of complex policy dilemmas, from how to respond to economic insecurity; to how to continue to draw benefits from (and make the political case for) globalization; to coming to terms with hybrid identities — all challenges that have caused enormous anxiety and even social unrest.

In the past two years, the backlash against immigration has manifested itself in vocal criticisms of “multiculturalism.” A chorus of European leaders has claimed that the very policies that aimed to weave societies together have instead split them apart, emphasizing difference rather than building community. And as people feel the social fabric of their communities fraying, they have tightened their grip on the things they hold most dear — their identity, language, culture, and values. In response, many countries have narrowed the rights to residence and citizenship and attempted to more rigidly enforce cultural conformity, taking steps whose (predictable) effect has been to isolate — or in some cases penalize — those who fall outside these norms.

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The seventh plenary meeting of the Migration Policy Institute’s Transatlantic Council on Migration, which brought together high-level officials from Europe and North America in Berlin in November 2011, focused on what policymakers can do to mitigate the disorienting effects of rapid societal change — especially change tied or *perceived to be tied* to immigration — in order to create stronger and more cohesive societies. For governments, both the challenge and opportunity has become to create a new definition of “we” based on a more inclusive idea of national identity and belonging, and to convince the broader society that investing in integration is an investment in shared futures.

The Council’s key recommendations for fostering greater cohesiveness are as follows:

1. Leaders must hone their listening skills to truly understand their electorate’s anxiety about immigration (and related issues); not all concerns are illegitimate, and efforts to ignore or dispute these concerns will only inflame them.
2. Countries that emphasize a process of belonging and “becoming,” rather than a static sense of “being,” are better able to manage diversity to advantage.
3. One way of overcoming concerns that large-scale immigration has eroded national identity is to involve all citizens in shaping the identity of the new “we,” thus giving them a sense of ownership in the integration process.
4. Efforts to curb plural identities are beyond the reach of state authority and will be counterproductive; accepting such identities does not erode social cohesion, whereas limiting their expression can make them *more* salient.



5. States must create clear and transparent pathways to permanent residence and citizenship. This will encourage immigrants to make a long-term commitment to society.
6. Governments should offer practical integration assistance that genuinely helps immigrants negotiate their new environment more effectively and access the same opportunities as natives.
7. Even though some of the “fault lines” of the identity crisis may point to cultural “conflicts,” the *solution* may not be in the realm of culture. At their core, integration problems are socioeconomic in nature. Therefore, governments must make their most sustained investments in workplaces and schools.
8. When a state’s own citizens are suffering, it may be difficult to argue for investments in policies seen as benefiting newcomers. Instead, governments should consider gradually targeting *sets of circumstances*, like poverty and lack of education; such initiatives (if effective) will benefit immigrants disproportionately.
9. Legislating cultural practices should be a last resort, not a first impulse. States should create incentives for individuals to move toward certain norms rather than restricting or banning unwanted (but nonetheless legal) cultural practices.
10. States should signal, both with words and *body language*, that it is in the society’s interest for immigrants to be full, productive, and completely engaged members of the community in which they live.

I. The Roots of Society’s Anxiety over Immigration

Skepticism about immigration — and, in particular, negative public reactions to it — do not always dovetail with the arc of large-scale immigration: extreme reactions have occurred in places *without* large or sudden increases in the immigrant population. The opposite is also true: not all places with sizeable or unexpected inflows of immigrants have experienced social disorder. Nor is illegal immigration the main culprit across societies. In fact, anti-immigrant expressions in some countries — e.g., the United States — continue to flourish even in the face of evidence of all-time lows in illegal flows.

For example, the foreign-born population in the Netherlands has increased by less than 2 percentage points in the past decade, yet the Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) has become the third largest in the country while campaigning on an anti-Muslim platform.¹ In the same vein, the Swiss referendum to ban minarets passed by over 50 percent in a country with a Muslim population of less than 6 percent.² And in the United States, the state of Alabama, whose immigrant population hovers under 4 percent,³ recently passed one of the country’s most restrictive immigration laws. (This may be evidence of the fact that it is the *pace* of change, not the *magnitude*, which has the greatest effect. Though the state’s immigrant population of 168,596 ranked it 33rd among US states in 2010, Alabama experienced *the* fastest rate of growth in its foreign-born population in the United States between 2000-10 — with

1 See Eurostat, *Migrants in Europe: A Statistical Portrait of the First and Second Generation* (Brussels: European Commission, 2011), http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-31-10-539/EN/KS-31-10-539-EN.PDF; Muslims make up 5.5 percent of the Dutch population — see Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, *Muslim Networks and Movements in Western Europe* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2010), <http://features.pewforum.org/muslim/number-of-muslims-in-western-europe.html>.

2 Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, *Muslim Networks and Movements in Western Europe*.

3 Alabama’s foreign-born population increased from 43,533 in 1990 (1.1 percent of the population) to 168,596 in 2010 (3.5 percent of the population). See MPI Data Hub, “2010 American Community Survey and Census Data on the Foreign Born by State,” www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/acscensus.cfm.



92.1 percent growth compared to the national average of 28.4 percent. A significant share of the state's immigrant population is unauthorized.)⁴

Elsewhere, however, unprecedented rates of growth in immigration have not given rise to the kinds of anti-immigration reactions one might have expected. In Spain, the foreign-born share of the population soared from 3.6 percent in 2000 to 14 percent in 2010;⁵ and in Ireland it increased from 7 percent in 1995 to 12.8 percent in 2010;⁶ yet neither country has produced a political party with an anti-immigrant platform on the national stage.

Finally, immigration itself is not necessarily the only, or even the most prominent, driver of the anxiety, social unease, and occasional unrest in our societies today. In fact, immigration's effects on society must be understood through several different frames at once:

- **A cultural frame:** the sense of loss of control of the markers of one's identity, namely language, cultural norms, and a basic societal ethos;
- **A social frame:** the costs to the relative social "constancy" and familiarity brought by large influxes of newcomers — especially the visibly different — and fears that neighborhoods cannot quickly adapt to new needs;
- **An economic frame:** concerns over the redistribution of public goods and resources, and the high perceived costs of immigration *and* integration;
- **A political frame:** the public's loss of confidence in the ruling classes, as well as the sense of loss of sovereignty to supranational bodies like the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the European Union (EU); and
- **A security frame:** the fear that society's newest members might contribute to social unrest, illegality, crime, and even terrorism.

It is how these different concerns interact with one another, and become *activated* in specific national contexts, which gives rise to the anxiety that often surrounds immigration, and disturbs social cohesion and fuels extremist political views. In this context, immigration has become a target for something over which to exercise control in a time of great uncertainty.

Skepticism about immigration — and, in particular, negative public reactions to it — do not always dovetail with the arc of large-scale immigration.

4 MPI Data Hub, "States Ranked by Percent Change in the Foreign-Born Population: 1990, 2000, and 2010," www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/files/MPIDataHub_ACS_2010-NumericDifferenceForeignBorn.xlsx. Measuring the unauthorized migrant population is an inexact science, especially at the state level. Jeffrey Passel estimates that in 2010 there were between 75,000-160,000 immigrants illegally resident in Alabama. With such a broad range, combined with a high margin of error, we cannot be sure what percentage of the foreign born in the state is illegally resident. See Jeffrey S. Passel, *Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State Trends, 2010* (Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, 2011), www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf.

5 Migration Policy Institute (MPI) Data Hub, "Spain Country Profile," www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/countrydata/country.cfm; and Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Madeleine Sumption, and Aaron Terrazas, eds., *Migration and the Great Recession: The Transatlantic Experience* (Washington, DC: MPI, 2011).

6 Papademetriou, Sumption, and Terrazas, *Migration and the Great Recession*.



The Five Principal Drivers of Anxiety

1. Culture and Loss of Identity

Most publics fear that the common norms and values that bind societies together will be weakened irretrievably if newcomers do not adapt to the host-country language, culture, and identity — and, worse, if they harbor illiberal cultural practices. On both sides of the Atlantic, the concentration of seemingly homogeneous populations of “newcomers” (e.g., Muslims in Europe or Latinos in the United States) are seen as more threatening — and more likely to emphasize their own subculture rather than integrate into the mainstream — than a genuinely multiethnic wave of immigrants. Visibly and religiously different newcomers are thus thought to challenge closely held notions of who the “we” is in society, even when they comprise small portions of the foreign-born population.⁷

2. Rapid Pace of Social Change

Many feel that too much change has occurred too fast, with negative consequences for neighborhoods and entire cities, especially for their overburdened education, health, transportation, and public safety systems. Countries that had very small foreign-born populations two decades ago (like Spain, Ireland, or Greece) became massive immigration destinations seemingly overnight, with inadequate and/or uneven legal and institutional preparation. And even in countries more accustomed to immigration (e.g., the United Kingdom), workers settled in new parts of the country that had not experienced much new immigration since the inter-war period. Anxiety about immigration in fact correlates less to the *absolute numbers* of newcomers than to the *speed of change* and its geographic concentration. As the second generation comes of age in these societies, the question of *who gets to define* societal norms is paramount. While certain mechanisms exist to compel the newly arrived to adapt to the host-country culture and identity (civic integration and citizenship tests, for instance), there are fewer mechanisms to govern how the second and third generations “redefine” the national ethos.

3. Economics and Inequality

Unease over the unequal distribution of public goods and resources — especially in the face of sometimes grossly uneven outcomes between the “winners” and “losers” of globalization — have placed new strains on communities, particularly those unaccustomed to accommodating immigrants and minorities. A critical driver of public opinion about immigration is whether immigrants are seen as economic assets or liabilities. But while it is almost impossible to quantify all the economic contributions of immigrants, it is far easier to count fiscal expenses — and to confuse them with economic effects. Immigrants are often depicted as a financial burden on the host society, contributing to greater unemployment and wage depression, and straining the welfare state — in other words, taking more than they are contributing. Further, publics feel they shoulder not only the short-term costs of immigration, but also the long-term costs of *integration* — and lose sight of the totality of long-term benefits, which are almost always very significant.

4. Politics: Low Confidence in Government and Loss of Sovereignty

With hardly any exceptions, there is extraordinary dissatisfaction with the government elites on both sides of the Atlantic. Even publics with favorable views of immigration in general have negative views about those in charge of managing it, who are seen as either unaware of or indifferent to the effects of

⁷ Some recent legislation governing Muslim cultural practices, for example, reflects this: the 2011 ban on wearing burqas that went into effect in Belgium is estimated to apply to as few as 30 women; and even in France, with a Muslim population of approximately 4.7 million, the ban on burqas and niqabs is estimated to apply to 300-2000 people. See “Belgian lawmakers pass burka ban,” BBC News, April 30, 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8652861.stm>; “Le voile intégral banni de la rue,” *Le Parisien*, April 11, 2011, www.leparisien.fr/societe/le-voile-integral-banni-de-la-rue-11-04-2011-1402496.php, and “France’s burqa ban: women are ‘effectively under house arrest,’” *The Guardian*, September 19, 2011, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/19/battle-for-the-burqa?intcmp=239.



immigration on local communities — and on those whom globalization leaves behind. The fact that, as a rule, politicians are deeply reticent to hold regular conversations with their publics about immigration — only engaging the issue when things go wrong — leaves the impression that no one is in control. Finally, the steady loss of sovereign control over the issue to seemingly “unaccountable” supranational bodies with a growing reach on immigration decisions further fuels popular distrust, at least in some quarters.

5. Security and Social Unrest

Publics want to believe there is a steady hand holding the reins of the immigration system. What is most destabilizing is when public expectations of how much — and what kind — of immigration to expect diverge from reality, which in turn leads people to perceive the immigration system as “out of control.” Highly publicized and often inflated accounts of illegality are brandished by opportunistic politicians, especially on the far right. Meanwhile, hard data demonstrating the success of enforcement efforts tend to fall on deaf ears. Immigration’s perceived link to crime, and even more worrisome, to terrorism, completes the circle of fear and anxiety. Trust in the system can only be restored if everyone in society can see and understand the rules governing immigration *and* be confident that they will be enforced.

II. Conclusions: Creating the Conditions for Cohesive Societies

Integration will have “succeeded” when immigrants and their children have equal opportunities to compete for the same economic outcomes and can participate in social and political life on the same basis as their native counterparts. To achieve this, states must invest in both targeted and mainstream policies in the two most important loci of integration: workplaces and schools. But there is also an intangible factor in all this: the *feeling* of belonging. States, working closely with civil society, have the responsibility to lay the foundation for immigrants to be seen as important contributors to society and to consistently and systematically reinforce this message; to create level playing fields in which everyone is treated equally and no one faces barriers to school or work; and to identify and reinforce shared values and norms.

Governments have to take anxiety about immigration seriously.

In pursuing these ends, states must think and act strategically, using a surgeon’s scalpel rather than a butcher’s cleaver: efforts to legislate cultural practices or suppress objectionable views often backfire, further triggering the impulse to reject mainstream values. States should instead strive to be active facilitators, providing factual information and resources to create the virtuous cycles of desirable behavior. When tensions in society inevitably erupt, the state must protect free speech and encourage a robust debate: efforts to suppress people’s ability to voice their real fears and anxieties will only foment extremism.



Ten Steps for Fostering Greater Cohesiveness

1. Leaders must listen to and demonstrate that they understand the concerns of their electorate

Policymakers and politicians must listen carefully to the legitimate concerns and fears of their electorate. While some apprehensions about migration — particularly those concerning jobs and loss of national identity — may be overstated, policymakers will only work to further entrench these anxieties by ignoring or dismissing them. Governments have to take anxiety about immigration seriously, and communicate thoughtfully and on an ongoing basis with their publics, in an honest, direct, and fact-supported manner, about how immigration is affecting everyone’s lives — and what policymakers are doing to address its downsides.

2. Build a sense of “ownership” in the integration process

Rapid change can be destabilizing for communities, especially when people feel they have little control over things that greatly influence (or are *perceived* to greatly influence) their daily lives. Chief among these is the fear that large-scale immigration, and the resulting expansion of who the “we” is in society, are chipping away at the markers of national identity to which people have become accustomed. One way of assuaging this concern is to involve *all* citizens in shaping the next generation of cultural norms and values, giving them a sense of ownership over the integration process. This will become ever more important as the second generation comes of age in new countries of immigration, yielding a new pool of citizens who will contribute to molding and redefining social and political life.

3. National identity is now more than ever about becoming rather than being

Countries like Canada and the United States that emphasize a process of belonging and “becoming,” rather than a static sense of “being,” are better able to embrace, “digest,” and benefit from diversity than societies whose very actions betray a fear that newcomers will dilute the nations’ core identity. In a world that is changing as fast as it is, such fears — whether openly expressed or clearly implied through governments’ public policy choices — foster the very forces of “exclusivity” that undermine social cohesion and prevent newcomers from being accepted by the host community. Such forces in turn become the real barrier to immigrants’ social and political participation, especially for the visibly different and those who practice certain minority religions.

Immigrant integration cannot succeed unless national identity is redefined in an inclusive way, focusing on shared values and on experiences that bind people together — including work — rather than on exclusive characteristics, like shared ancestry, that newcomers cannot possibly acquire. Articulating a dynamic nation-building narrative — and an inclusive national identity — that incorporates immigrants is critical to creating a pragmatic definition of “we.” This should be reinforced in the public square, through school curricula (telling the story of minority contributions, as in Canada), and in the narratives of leaders of public and private institutions, so that immigrants see themselves as accepted by the society’s institutions and those who lead them.

4. Allow multiple identities to coexist

Efforts to restrict plural identities are counterproductive. Empirical studies in Canada, France, and the Netherlands show that strong ethnic ties and national pride are not mutually exclusive: 47 percent of immigrants to France, for example, say they “feel French,” despite maintaining ties (and even citizenship) to their country of origin.⁸ This indicates that the choice to have dual citizenship is more of a practical consideration than evidence of split loyalties. The same French study finds that 90

⁸ Patrick Simon, *French National Identity and Integration: Belonging and Rejection from the National Community* (Washington, DC: MPI, forthcoming 2012).



percent of those found to have a “minority identity” (that is, who say their ethnicity is an important feature of their identity) say they “feel at home in France,” pointing to a robust new generation with “hyphenated” identities. Evidence further shows that policies circumscribing the expression of these identities produce the opposite effect: “symbolic” ethnic ties become more salient precisely *because* they are restricted. The conclusion of this and similar studies makes the compelling case that immigrants integrate most smoothly when they are able to *combine* their ethnic identity with a new national identity (as opposed to having to choose between them).

5. Create clear pathways to permanent residence and citizenship — and implement them impartially

The existence of a clear *pathway to permanent residence and citizenship* that is applied dispassionately is critical. Even if not all immigrants will become citizens, the fact that they are viewed as *potential* permanent members of society after an initial (but finite) period in the migration process can serve as a powerful incentive for greater engagement in community life on the part of both natives and newcomers alike. The government should also find ways to encourage publics to picture a shared future with their neighbors. Doing so successfully will make both parties more likely to make long-term investments in building community.

6. Offer practical, nonpunitive integration assistance

States should provide robust, subsidized integration mechanisms (such as language classes) to help newcomers negotiate their new environment more effectively and develop a stake in the future of the community in which they settle. Canada’s policy may be an outlier, but nonetheless makes a strong case that language and civics courses that are voluntary, free, and not punitive in intent (i.e., not tied to continuing access to residency or social benefits) are most successful. However, this does not mean that there are “no strings attached” in terms of the host society’s expectations of newcomers. Both Canada and Australia have insisted on shared liberal values by formally defining the range of “legitimate cultural traditions” in their constitutions. Moreover, ensuring that integration and naturalization processes are meaningful (asking immigrants to demonstrate their knowledge of host-country language, civics, and values) exist alongside efforts to assist applicants in successfully meeting these requirements. Governments must thus strike an often delicate balance between requirements that are aggressive enough to further social cohesion, yet restrained enough that they do not become exclusionary.

7. Focus integration efforts on the places where integration takes place most naturally: workplaces and schools

While some immigrant groups seem to succeed everywhere they go (university-educated Asian immigrants often outperform natives on both sides of the Atlantic, for example), far too often the story is one of integration failures. Many immigrants (and their children), as well as longstanding minorities, lag behind their peers in educational and labor-market attainment. In several countries, immigrant unemployment rates are close to double those of natives, and the poor outcomes of some groups (like certain Turkish, North African, Caribbean, or Southeast Asian immigrants) stubbornly persist across generations. Even though some of the “fault lines” of the identity crisis may point to cultural differences, the *solution* may not be cultural. At the core of most failures in integration lie social and economic breakdowns. It is thus more useful (and less controversial) to emphasize investment in practical areas, like employment or education, than to legislate norms and values. And for programs in these areas to succeed, immigrants themselves will have to believe that education is the basis of their future success.

The benefits of emphasizing *work* amount to much more than earning a living: employment is a vehicle for contributing to society, and thus a way of belonging. And it can help change the perceptions of the receiving community about various immigrant groups and thus, by extension,



about immigration itself. Moreover, there is a “culture of work” that is itself a critical form of participation in society and can build a shared identity — and common cause — that does not pivot around ethnicity. Moreover, as integration efforts take hold and mature, politicians should gradually break the habit of structuring their relationships with immigrants and their children on the basis of their ethnicity or religion. It may in fact be more productive to engage with individuals based on their economic contributions — often the glue that binds them to the entire community — rather than their ethnicity, which sets them apart.

8. Focus on all disadvantaged populations, not just immigrants

As both great affluence and great poverty continue to grow, the question of how increasingly scarce public resources are distributed will divide societies. When a state’s own citizens are suffering, it may be difficult to argue for investments in policies seen as disproportionately benefiting newcomers. This will become ever more problematic as resources become scarcer. Instead, governments should consider gradually honing in on *sets of circumstances* that apply to broader swaths of society (particularly poverty and lack of education) as a means of building larger coalitions of support. In the United States, for example, the gap in educational outcomes between poor and rich children is now twice as large as the gap between black and white children. In these circumstances, it may be both politically smart and wise in policy terms for investments in integration to be reframed so as to apply to all disadvantaged populations in society, rather than focusing exclusively on the newest arrivals (or those perceived as “newcomers”). Further, since different immigrant groups (and subgroups within them) have widely different outcomes, designing policies for immigrants *as a group* is unlikely to be effective and alienates natives.

9. Legislating cultural practices should be a last resort, not a first impulse

The state’s responsibility is to create incentives for society to move toward certain goals. However, it should do this with a soft touch. States should focus on encouraging *and enabling* the kinds of measures discussed here — not *requiring* them unless strictly necessary (for instance, for public safety reasons). In other words, states should be facilitating and encouraging good practice, and creating alternatives, rather than using coercive means to stop unwanted (but otherwise not illegal) practices. For instance, states can foster dialogue and support institutions through which groups can negotiate their differences, rather than attempting to curb practices through coercive means, which can backfire. In a small minority of cases involving violence toward others, stronger action will be necessary (for example stopping practices of genital mutilation, spousal abuse, or honor killings), but these interventions should be very narrowly targeted.

10. States should set the tone about immigration, both through measured political language and body language

Government officials should signal to their citizen constituents that immigrants and their families *belong*, and policies should aim to help them become fully engaged members of society. At the same time, they need to signal to immigrants that they *can* belong. “Body language” — or things that are expressed through action rather than political language — is often more important than words. Importantly, the government’s narrative must *match* its actions on the ground to be believable (for instance, telling people they belong equally in society will lose its meaning if immigrant-dense neighborhoods have chronically inferior access to quality services). The manner in which this vision is communicated is critical. Countries, such as Spain, that weave antidiscrimination into their national identity and public discourse are better equipped to combat emerging anti-immigrant political groups than Greece, where the gap between political rhetoric and practice is at times impossible to bridge.



About the Author



Demetrios G. Papademetriou is President and Co-Founder of the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), a Washington-based think tank dedicated exclusively to the study of international migration. He is also the President of Migration Policy Institute Europe, a nonprofit, independent research institute in Brussels that aims to promote a better understanding of migration trends and effects within Europe; and serves on MPI Europe's Administrative Council.

He is also the convener of the Transatlantic Council on Migration and its predecessor, the Transatlantic Task Force on Immigration and Integration (co-convened with the Bertelsmann Stiftung). The Council is composed of senior public figures, business leaders, and public intellectuals from Europe, the United States, and Canada.

Dr. Papademetriou is also Co-Founder and International Chair Emeritus of *Metropolis: An International Forum for Research and Policy on Migration and Cities*. He has served as Chair of the World Economic Forum's Global Agenda Council on Migration (2009-2011); Chair of the Migration Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); Director for Immigration Policy and Research at the US Department of Labor and Chair of the Secretary of Labor's Immigration Policy Task Force; and Executive Editor of the *International Migration Review*.

Dr. Papademetriou has published more than 250 books, articles, monographs, and research reports on migration topics and advises senior government and political party officials in more than 20 countries (including numerous European Union Member States while they hold the rotating EU presidency).

His most recent books include *Migration and the Great Recession: The Transatlantic Experience* (co-author and co-editor, 2011); *Immigration Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany: Negotiating Membership and Remaking the Nation* (co-author, 2010); *Gaining from Migration: Towards a New Mobility System*, OECD Development Center (co-author, 2007); *Immigration and America's Future: A New Chapter* (2006, co-author); *Europe and its Immigrants in the 21st Century: A New Deal or a Continuing Dialogue of the Deaf?* (2006, editor and author); *Secure Borders, Open Doors: Visa Procedures in the Post-September 11 Era* (2005, co-author), *NAFTA's Promise and Reality* (2003, co-author), *America's Challenge: Domestic Security, Civil Liberties, and National Unity after September 11* (2003, co-author); and *Caught in the Middle: Border Communities in an Era of Globalization* (2001, senior editor and co-author).

He holds a PhD in comparative public policy and international relations (1976) and has taught at the universities of Maryland, Duke, American, and New School for Social Research.

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www.MPIEurope.org

Residence Palace
155 Rue de la Loi
5th Floor
1040 Brussels
Belgium

Tel: +32 (2) 235 2113