

Annual Risk Analysis 2011

European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union



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Executive Summary

Irregular migration represents a small proportion of the total movement of persons across the borders, three quarters of which are EU nationals. Over 100 nationalities require a visa to enter the EU, accounting for more than 80% of the non-EU population, while about 1 billion nationals from 37 countries do not require a visa. As yet, there are no precise statistics available on passenger flows for 2010, but it is widely regarded to have recovered somewhat from the decline of 2009.

Regarding irregular migration, the sharp decreasing trend reported in 2009 stabilised in 2010; Member States and Schengen Associated Countries reported 104 049 detections of illegal border-crossing at the sea and land external borders, a total almost identical to 2009.

Irregular migration through western African, western Mediterranean and central Mediterranean routes continued to decrease, thus reducing the overall detection of irregular migration of West Africans who, in the past, used to be the most commonly detected migrants on those routes. By contrast, there was an abrupt increase in detections of illegal border-crossing at the land border between Turkey and Greece. Consequently, in 2010 the eastern Mediterranean route became the main channel of irregular migration into the EU, and Turkey – the main transit country for irregular migrants.

The sudden increase in detections of illegal border-crossings along a small section of the Greek-Turkish land border in October 2010 was due to facilitators exploiting variations in the vulnerability of the external border. This development triggered the first deployment of the Rapid Border Intervention Team (RABIT) in November 2010.

At EU level, refusals of entry decreased marginally in 2010; however, trends differed extensively between nationalities. Ukrainians continued to be the main nationality refused entry at EU Member States' external borders in 2010, mostly at the Ukrainian border with Poland which is one of the busiest border sections along the EU's external borders. Furthermore, Serbians became the second most frequently refused nationality at the external land borders, with more than an 80% increase, following the visa liberalisation process in the Western Balkans. At the external air borders, Brazilians continued to be the nationality most often refused despite the fact that these refusals declined by more than 20% compared to 2009.

At the end of 2010, the detection of false documents at entry points to the EU reached their highest level since data collection began in early 2009. Apart from this increase, there are reports of widespread abuse of authentic documents by unauthorised users known as impostors.



Looking ahead, regular passenger flows across the external borders will increase due to rising global mobility, possible visa-liberalisation procedures for the EU's eastern European partners and new local border-traffic agreements along the eastern borders. These developments will increase the workload of border-control authorities in preventing the use of legal channels for overstaying. In addition, Europe will host two major sporting events - the Olympic Games in London and the UEFA Euro 2012 in Poland/Ukraine.

Consistent with the increasing flow of passengers, the growing number of registered traveller programmes (RTP) should further facilitate *bona fide* passenger flows and will put additional emphasis on risk analysis-driven border checks in order to ensure the smooth flow of legitimate passengers.

There might be changes in the external Schengen and EU borders in 2011 or 2012, with the possible entry of Romania and Bulgaria into the Schengen area and Croatia's possible accession to the EU.

The most likely high-pressure points for illegal border-crossings in 2012 will be along the Mediterranean coast and the land border with Turkey. Migrants with relatively easy access to Turkey or North Africa will continue to typify the flow.

1. Introduction

The Frontex Annual Risk Analysis (ARA) 2011 has been developed to plan the coordination of operational activities at the external borders in 2012. The ARA combines an assessment of threats and vulnerabilities at the EU external borders with an estimation of their impact and consequences to enable the Agency to effectively balance and prioritise the allocation of resources against identified risks.

Frontex operational activities aim to strengthen border security by ensuring the coordination of Member States' actions in the implementation of Community measures relating to the management of the external borders. The coordination of operational activities also contributes to a better allocation of Member States' resources and to the protection of the area of freedom, security and justice.

The ARA 2011 concentrates on the current scope of Frontex operational activities, which are focused on irregular migration at the external borders of EU Member States and the Schengen Associated Countries. Central to the concept of integrated border management, border management should also cover security threats present at the external borders.

The Frontex Risk Analysis Unit would like to thank all FRAN members and in particular the staff in Member States for their efforts in providing data and information, as well as Europol, which contributed to the ARA 2011, and colleagues at Frontex involved in the preparation of the report.

2. Methodology

Data collection plan

The backbone of the ARA 2011 are the monthly statistics provided by Member States within the framework of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN). This regular data collection exercise was launched in September 2007 and refined in 2008. Thanks to the FRAN members' efforts, a much larger statistical coverage was achieved in 2009, focusing on six key indicators of irregular migration: (1) detections of illegal border-crossing, (2) refusals of entry, (3) detections of illegal stay, (4) asylum applications, (5) detections of facilitators and (6) detections of forged documents.

Member States were not addressed with specific questions for this assessment. Rather, bi-monthly analytical reports and incident reports produced by Member States routinely collected through the FRAN and Member States' contributions to several Tailored Risk Analyses conducted in 2010 were two important sources of information, especially as regards the analysis of routes and *modi operandi*.

Information gathered during Frontex Joint Operations also provided first-hand information on the irregular migration situation at the external border.

Open sources of information were also effectively utilised, especially in identifying the main push and pull factors for irregular migration to the EU. Among other things, these sources included reports issued by government agencies, international or non-governmental organisations, as well as official EU reports, such as the Commission's reports on third countries, and mainstream news agencies.

In addition, Frontex, together with experts from Member States' analytical units, organised an Annual Analytical Review to consolidate the risk analyses presented in the FRAN Quarterlies for 2010, as well as to gather knowledge on likely risks of irregular migration expected in 2011 and 2012 at the EU external borders.

The data collected by the FRAN are compiled and analysed on a quarterly basis. Priority is given to the use of the data for management purposes and to its rapid sharing among Member State border-control authorities. Member States' data that are processed by Frontex are not treated as official statistics, and thus may occasionally vary from data published officially by national authorities.

Throughout 2010, some FRAN members performed backdated updates to their 2009 data. These updates have been accounted for in this document, and thus some data presented here may differ from data presented in the 2010 Annual Risk Analysis.

Europol contributed to the ARA 2011 by providing information on facilitated illegal migration.

TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF FRAN INDICATORS

As reported by Member States

FRAN Indicator	2008	2009	2010	% change on a year ago
Illegal entries between BCPs	159 092	104 599	104 049	-0.5%
Clandestine entries at BCPs*	:	296	242	-18%
Facilitators	9 881	9 171	8 629	-5.9%
Illegal stay	441 230	412 125	348 666	-15%
Refusals of entry	121 294	113 029	108 500	-4.0%
Applications for asylum	223 180	219 814	203 880	-7.2%
False travel-document users	:	7 872	9 439	20%
Returns (for 10 Member States**)	:	65 828	74 110	12%
Other Indicators				
Issued visas (source: Council)	13 493 948	12 486 676	:	<i>n.a.</i>
Passenger flow (Commission estimate***)	713 000 000	660 000 000	:	<i>n.a.</i>

* Data for air borders and for the United Kingdom's internal sea borders with Belgium, France and the Netherlands have been excluded

** Belgium, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Switzerland and the United Kingdom

***Estimates from EBF indicators which do not include the United Kingdom and Ireland

Source: FRAN data received as of 25 February 2011

3. Situation at the external borders

3.1 Border controls (visas and passenger flows)

The Community Code on Visas, which entered into force in April 2010, sets out the common requirements for issuing uniform transit and short-term visas to enter the territory of the Member States.* As per the Community Code on Visas, the term 'uniform visa' means a visa valid for the entire territory of the Member States. There are currently over 100 nationalities that require a visa to enter the EU, covering more than 80% of the non-EU population of the world. About 1 billion nationals from 37 third countries do not require an EU visa. As indicated in the Visa Code, statistical data are an important means of monitoring migratory movements and can serve as an efficient management tool.**


* Except for the UK and Ireland

** (EC) 810/2009 (Visa Code), point 19 of recitals

At EU level, including the UK and future Schengen Member States***, the number of visas issued decreased from 14.5 million in 2008 to 12.5 million in 2009. The decrease was due to fewer uniform visas issued by Members of the Schengen area. In 2010, visa liberalisation for Serbia, Montenegro and the FYROM will certainly contribute to a further decrease, considering the fact that in 2009, 463 000 visas were issued in Serbia, Montenegro and the FYROM.

*** But excluding Ireland, for which no data were available

Figure 1: Visas issued



Source: Council of the EU, UK Border Agency

Among the Member States applying the visa code, the number of uniform visas (type C) issued in 2009 decreased in all countries except Poland (562 793 visas issued, up 16%). This atypical increase is linked with Poland's entry into the Schengen area, which necessitated visas for Ukrainians, who are the main nationality visiting Poland. In volume, the largest annual decreases were reported from Germany and France, which also ranked first and second among the Member States issuing uniform visas, together totalling 2.8 million visas issued in 2009 (30% of the total). The UK, which does not apply the Community Code, is the Member State issuing the largest number of visas, with 1 995 730 visas issued in 2009, which was an increase of 2% compared with 2008.

Member States applying the visa code mostly issued uniform visas of type C (no more than three months in any six-month period) that represented 84% (10 241 000) of all visas issued in 2009. Long-stay visas (type D) accounted for 9% (1 039 584) and airport transit visas (type A) – for less than 1% (29 107). Member States also issued about 4% of visas of Limited Territorial Validity (476 512), which according to the Visa Code should only be granted exceptionally.*

* (EC) 810/2009 (Visa Code), Article 25

There are no EU-level statistics regarding the number of visas issued for the purpose of work, but UK statistics for 2009 showed that the issuance of visas for work (163 000) decreased by 21% compared with 2008, while visas for study (341 300) increased by 24%. A somewhat similar trend was observed in France** with visas issued for work decreasing by 18% (17 700) but student visas (70 900) increasing by 3% relative to 2008.

** Source: French Ministry of Immigration

About 60% of the uniform visas were issued on the European continent, of which almost 3.5 million were issued in Russia (or 34% of the total). In 2009, 18 out of 28 Member States and Schengen Associated Countries applying the Visa Code reported the issuance of the largest number of EU visas in Russia, which might have been expected given its large population and links to the EU. In the UK, visas issued for Indian nationals ranked first, with 406 960 visas issued, which represented a 20% share of the UK total.

Per capita visa application rates probably provide a better comparison among third countries of their citizens' intention to travel to the EU. Before they were granted visa-free status at the end of 2009 and in 2010, Western Balkan countries (Serbia and Kosovo, Albania, Montenegro, the FYROM, Bosnia and Herzegovina) had the highest rate of EU visa applications per capita (4.4%). Excluding the Western Balkans, the highest per capita rates of visa applications were recorded in Belarus and Moldova, which are contiguous land neighbours of the EU. Per capita visa applications were also high in neighbouring Russia (2.6%, ranking fifth).

In 2009, 7% of the 11 310 000 EU visa applications were rejected (the rate for UK visas was 19%). This proportion rose to 22% for applications made in Africa (25% for UK visas) and to 14% in South America (14% for UK visas issued on the American continent). In percentage terms, the top ten countries where visas were refused were all African countries (83% in the Central African Republic, 71% in Djibouti, 63% in Congo, 50% in Senegal). In volume, most of the visa refusals were reported from Algeria (97 000), followed by Russia (71 400) and Morocco (46 600). Visa refusal rates varied widely between Member States, from 17% of 200 000 applications in Belgium to 1% of 602 000 applications in Bulgaria.

Passenger flow

Passenger flow is an indicator of the volume of checks that border guards have to perform. Citizens enjoying free movement are subject to minimum checks, while third-country nationals, whether they require visas or not, will be subject to more thorough checks, as defined by the Schengen Borders Code. Hence, the nature and extent of passenger flows are important for planning resources for border checks.

There is no estimate at the European level of total passenger flows through the external borders. However, the two main conclusions of a one-week counting exercise conducted by the Council in 2009 (excluding the UK and Ireland) were that: (1) 72% of the regular flow is EU citizens and (2) land and air border flows are much larger than flows through maritime borders. Flows at the land borders also include passengers commuting under local border agreements. This explains why the land border between Poland and Ukraine is one of the busiest border sections within the EU, together with the air borders of the UK and Germany.

Eurostat provides some more detailed statistics for passenger flows at the air borders. In 2009, the estimated annual number of international arrivals (on direct flights only, without distinguishing between EU citizens and third-country nationals) from outside the EU and Schengen Associated Countries decreased by 5% to 99 435 000*, a decrease mostly attributed to the economic crisis. Arrivals from the Americas decreased more (-9%) than arrivals from Asia (-2%) and at the end of 2009, Asia represented the largest proportion of international arrivals. Most arrivals from Asia were reported from Turkey (up 3% from 2008).

* Eurostat data

In 2009, some 63% of air arrivals from third countries took place in just three Member States: the UK, Germany and France. Most arrivals were on flights from



Picture 1: Eurostat estimates annual international arrivals on direct flights to the EU at 99 million in 2009

the USA to the UK, representing 8%, followed by arrivals from the USA to Germany. Arrivals from Turkey ranked third. One of the few air routes to actually increase in volume in 2009 was the route from the United Arab Emirates to the UK.

3.2 Irregular migration

The sharp decreasing trend (of around a third) in the number of detections of illegal border-crossing between 2008 and 2009 did not continue in 2010. In 2010, EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries reported a total of 104 049 detections of illegal border-crossing at the sea and land borders of the EU. This total was almost identical to the 2009 total of 104 599.

Member States reported only a slight decrease (-4%) in refusals of entry, from 113 029 in 2009 to 108 500 in 2010. However the situation differs between border type, with an increase (+2.2%) reported at the land borders and a decrease (-11%) reported at the air borders. Consequently, and for the first time since data collection began at the EU level, the annual total for refusals of entry was higher at the land border than at the air border. This is explained by the impact of visa liberalisation in the Western Balkans that increased the passenger flow.

At the borders, the number of detections of forged documents increased by 20%, but the absolute number of detections (up from 7 872 in 2009 to 9 439 in 2010) remained low compared to the flow of passengers in the hundreds of millions. Spain was the Member State that reported the largest increase in detections of forged documents.



Picture 2: Irregular migrants in thermovision camera crossing the Greek-Turkish land border (Frontex JO Rabit 2010)

Detections of illegal stay Within Member States decreased from 412 125 in 2009 to 348 666 in 2010 (-15%), but there were large differences between particular countries. The largest absolute decreases were reported in Spain and France. In France, the decrease is mostly explained by fewer detections near Calais after the strengthening of law-enforcement measures in the area, as well as by the decision of the European Court of Justice* that led to fewer controls within a 20 km zone near the borders with other Member States.

There was an overall decrease in annual detections of facilitators, down 6% to 8 629 detections in 2010. However, due to differences in definitions among Member States, this trend is difficult to interpret.


In conclusion, at an EU level, indicators of irregular migration tend to indicate a decrease, but there is much variation among Member States, border type and nationalities, which are discussed in greater detail in the section devoted to analysis by routes and *modus operandi*.

* Cour de justice de l'Union européenne, Arrêt dans les affaires jointes C-188/10 et C-189/10 Aziz Melki et Sélim Abdeli, 22 juin 2010

3.2.1 Irregular migration routes

Irregular migration through the western African, western Mediterranean and central Mediterranean routes continued to decrease. Hence, the number of detections of West Africans, who in the past used to be the most commonly detected nationalities on these routes, was reduced at EU level. In contrast, there was an acute increase in detections of illegal border-crossing at the land border between Turkey and Greece. Consequently, in 2010 the eastern Mediterranean route became the main channel of irregular migration into the EU, with Turkey as the main transit country for irregular migration.

Figure 2: Migration flows by route and by quarter



Source: FRAN data received as of 25 February 2011

Eastern Mediterranean route

In 2010, irregular migration between Turkey and Greece on the eastern Mediterranean route (land and sea borders) was undoubtedly the main challenge at the EU level. At this border, detections of illegal border-crossing by migrants who invariably intended to transit Greece to settle in other Member States, increased by 45% between 2009 and 2010.

This was one of the largest single episodes of illegal border-crossing into the EU ever recorded. In 2010, the Greek authorities reported 47 706 detections at the land border with Turkey. For comparative purposes, previous peaks included around 30 000 detections of illegal border-crossing in the Canary Islands during the whole of 2006; and 31 300 detections in Lampedusa during the whole of 2008.

The increase in detections of illegal border-crossing at the Greek-Turkish land border started in March 2010 and peaked in October 2010, with about 350 detections a day recorded near the Greek city of Orestiada. The most commonly detected nationalities were citizens of Asian countries (Afghanistan and Iraq), but there was also an increasing number of citizens from northern Africa. Most Africans detected at the Greek border with Turkey had arrived at the Turkish airport of Istanbul by plane, taking advantage of low fares and the ease of obtaining a Turkish visa.

Table 2 :
ILLEGAL BORDER-CROSSING BY ROUTES AND NATIONALITIES

Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs by routes and main nationalities at the external borders

	2009	Share in total		2010	Share in total	% change on a year ago
Routes						
Eastern Mediterranean Route (BGR,CYP,GRC)	39 975	38.2%		55 688	53.5%	39%
<i>Eastern Mediterranean - sea</i>	28 848			6 175		-79%
Afghanistan	11 758	41%	Palestine	1 500	24%	
Palestine	6 353	22%	Afghanistan	1 373	22%	
Somalia	5 675	20%	Albania	665	11%	
<i>Eastern Mediterranean - land</i>	11 127			49 513		345%
Iraq	2 674	24%	Afghanistan	21 389	43%	
Palestine	2 565	23%	Algeria	6 335	13%	
Myanmar	1 286	12%	Somalia	3 807	8.0%	
Circular Route from Albania to Greece	40 250	38%		35 297	34%	-12%
Albania	38 017	94%	Albania	32 451	92%	
Afghanistan	908	2.3%	Afghanistan	854	2.4%	
Western Mediterranean Route	6 642	6.3%		5 003	4.8%	-25%
<i>Western Mediterranean - sea</i>	5 003			3 436		-31%
Algeria	3 190	64%	Algeria	1 242	36%	
Morocco	254	5.1%	Morocco	300	8.7%	
<i>Western Mediterranean - land</i>	1 639			1 567		-4.4%
Morocco	672	41%	Not specified	1 108	71%	
Not specified	503	31%	Algeria	459	29%	
Algeria	464	28%				
Central Mediterranean Route	11 043	11%		4 448	4.3%	-60%
Somalia	3 143	28%	Afghanistan	1 701	38%	
Nigeria	1 655	15%	Tunisia	652	15%	
Tunisia	1 624	15%	Egypt	567	13%	
Eritrea	1 084	10%	Algeria	295	6.6%	
Western Balkan Route	3 089	3.0%		2 371	2.3%	-23%
Serbia	1 683	54%	Serbia	687	29%	
Afghanistan	700	23%	Afghanistan	469	20%	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	188	6.0%	Palestine	254	11%	
Eastern borders Route	1 335	1.3%		1 043	1.0%	-22%
Moldova	396	13%	Moldova	393	38%	
Georgia	173	13%	Georgia	144	14%	
Afghanistan	163	12%	Afghanistan	132	13%	
Russia	121	9.0%	Ukraine	107	10%	
Western African Route	2 244	2.1%		196	0.2%	-91%
Mali	555	25%	Morocco	179	91%	
Guinea	304	14%	Sierra Leone	8	4.0%	
Côte d'Ivoire	275	12%	Mauritania	2	1.0%	
Others	21			3		-86%
Ukraine	16	76%	Russia	2	67%	
Total EU	104 599			104 049		-0.5%

Source: FRAN data received as of 25 February 2011

The sudden increase in detections of illegal border-crossing in a small area of the Greek border was due to facilitators exploiting the vulnerabilities in the external borders, in particular a 12.5 km stretch of land not delineated by the River Evros, which elsewhere marks and defends the land border between Greece and Turkey. This development triggered the first Rapid Border Intervention Team (RABIT) in November 2010. A total of 191 Guest Officers from 26 Member States and Schengen Associated Countries took part in the deployment, which was concluded on 2 March 2011.

With the exception of Pakistani nationals who are detected staying illegally and applying for asylum in Greece, most migrants who entered illegally through the Greek land border with Turkey immediately attempt to continue their journey to other Member States. Three routes have been identified: (1) through the Western Balkans, as indicated by detections at the land border between Serbia and Hungary, (2) through intra-EU ferry connections between Greece and Italy, as indicated by the detections of migrants hiding on ferries, before continuing to France and the UK and (3) by obtaining forged documents in Greece and boarding

Table 3 :

ILLEGAL BORDER-CROSSING BY TOP TEN NATIONALITIES


Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs at the external borders

	2008	2009	2010	Share in total	% change on a year ago
All External Borders					
Albania	43 956	38 905	33 258	(32%)	-15%
Afghanistan	19 222	14 539	25 918	(25%)	78%
Algeria	4 020	4 487	8 763	(8.4%)	95%
Somalia	11 543	9 115	4 619	(4.4%)	-49%
Palestine	4 252	9 189	4 276	(4.1%)	-53%
Pakistan	3 157	1 592	3 881	(3.7%)	144%
Iraq	8 648	4 134	3 628	(3.5%)	-12%
Morocco	8 932	1 710	1 959	(1.9%)	15%
Bangladesh	1 477	551	1 647	(1.6%)	199%
Not specified	3 543	1 067	1 593	(1.5%)	49%
Other	50 342	19 310	14 507	(14%)	-25%
Total EU	159 092	104 599	104 049		-0.5%

Source: FRAN data received as of 25 February 2011

At the end of 2010, media articles in the Bulgarian press pointed to the existence of a Bulgarian facilitation network which had connections with Turkish facilitators. The roles within the networks were strictly divided: Turkish facilitators were in charge of searching for those who wished to illegally cross the Bulgarian-Turkish border, while the Bulgarians provided migrants with safe houses and transportation further into the EU.

Map 1: Main areas of detections of illegal border-crossing in 2010



Until 2009, Afghans who had illegally crossed the external border between Turkey and Greece would head for the UK and were detected in high numbers in northern France. In 2010, Afghans were increasingly reported heading for Germany, Switzerland and Nordic countries.

Circular migration from Albania to Greece

Circular irregular migration between Greece and Albania has, for many years, been one of the most important irregular migration flows across the external borders. Detections on this route decreased in 2010 compared to 2009 and for the first time were outnumbered by detections at the Greek-Turkish border. This decreasing trend can be explained by fewer employment opportunities for Albanians in Greece due to the economic crisis.



Picture 3: Patrol at the Greece-Albania border

Upon detection, Albanians who are detected crossing the border illegally are immediately returned to Albania, but they quickly reattempt entry to Greece, especially since many already have employment and work contracts in place waiting for them in Greece. The fact that Albanian migrants can easily, cheaply and repeatedly attempt to illegally cross the border with Greece, and the fact that

Greek businesses which illegally employ Albanians are rarely prosecuted, combined to form pull factors for these migrants that are largely resilient to strengthened border controls.

The liberalisation of visa requirements for Albanians with biometric passports to enter the EU, which came into force in December 2010, is expected to decrease the number of illegal crossings at the green border. It is expected that only those who cannot obtain biometric passports or those who have already stayed for three months within a six-month period, as they are entitled to do under the visa liberalisation agreement, will continue to be detected at the green border.

Central Mediterranean route

In 2010, detections of illegal border-crossing along the Italian mainland coast and on Mediterranean Islands, including Malta, totalled 4 448; less than half the number of detections during the previous year. In fact, detections of departures from Libya practically ceased altogether, and most detections reported in the Central Mediterranean area as a whole were from the Italian coastline, presumably of migrants originating from Greece, Albania or directly from Turkey. Detections were mostly of nationals from North African countries (Tunisians, Egyptians, Algerians) but also of nationals of Afghanistan and Iraq. Some nationalities that were previously very commonly detected on this route were not present in 2010, including Nigerians and Somalis.

It is possible that established criminal organisations may be testing or reviving abandoned sea routes to the Italian coasts. In the second half of 2010, there were detections on the shores of the Ionian Sea (Calabria and Puglia) of migrants arriving on sail boats or speed boats piloted by Turkish nationals. The Turkish coast (Izmir, Antalya, Marmaris and Fathiya) was the starting point, though sometimes interviewed migrants claimed to have passed through the Greek Islands. The most commonly detected nationality was Afghan, followed by Iraqi and Syrian. In September, there was a landing in Puglia from Albania. Consistent with the theory of new criminal networks operating in the area, five boats that landed on the Ionian coast of Calabria in the second half of 2010 were driven for the first time by Ukrainian facilitators.

In July and August, the Italian authorities reported an increase in the number of detections of illegal border-crossing from Egypt. They were being transported on-board vessels, rather than makeshift craft, and travelling in groups of about 100 people. Most of the migrants were returned to Egypt in less than 24 hours under a readmission agreement.

A noteworthy development on this route is the reported increase in the proportion of unaccompanied minors, sometimes constituting up to a third of the total number of migrants on each vessel. The Italian authorities reported that among the migrants detected attempting to cross the border illegally on vessels departing from Egypt at the end of 2010, about 30% claimed to be minors.

Western Mediterranean route

In general, irregular migration to southern Spain has decreased massively since the beginning of 2006. Commonly cited reasons are Frontex Joint Operations in the area, increased and more effective patrolling and rising unemployment in Spain, particularly in sectors typified by migrants staying illegally.* The majority of detections were reported at the sea borders and mostly concerned Algerians (36% of the total).

* MPI, Migration and Immigrants, Two years after the collapse: where do we stand? 2010

Western African route

The cooperation and bilateral agreements between Spain and key western African countries (Mauritania, Senegal, Mali) continue to develop steadily and are one of the main reasons for the decrease in arrivals in this area, along with the presence of patrolling assets near the African coast. In 2010, just 196 illegal border-crossings were reported from the Canary Islands, compared to 2 244 in 2009.



Picture 4: Migrants smuggled on a boat detected during JO Poseidon 2010

In particular, in 2010, Mauritania strengthened its land border controls, introducing measures at the borders to limit the number of irregular migrants from the sub-Saharan region arriving in Mauritania with the intention to enter the EU illegally.

According to the Frontex Analytical

Briefing, the smuggling of drugs, particularly hashish, may be the primary purpose of some of the latest *pateras* arriving in the Canary Islands, in particular in Lanzarote, from Morocco. The relative small size of these boats and the low number of migrants in each boat both suggest drug smuggling as the primary goal, with some auxiliary benefits gained from the concurrent transport of migrants wishing to cross the border illegally.

Western Balkan route

In 2010, border-control authorities along the external land border with Western Balkan countries were confronted with two distinct phenomena, mostly affecting the land border with Schengen Member States. The first phenomenon was the visa liberalisation for holders of biometric passports from Serbia, Montenegro and the FYROM, the second was the use of the Western Balkans as a transit region for migrants who had illegally crossed the border between Turkey and Greece.

The visa liberalisation regime resulted in increased passenger flows at the land border with Slovenia and Hungary estimated to be about 10% higher than in the previous year. At the land border between Serbia and Hungary the number of refusals of entry also increased by some 50%. Compared to previous years, the number of alerts in the SIS or in national registers increased sharply and is now the main reason for refusals of entry at the land borders both in Slovenia (representing 24% of refusals of entry at the land border with Croatia) and in Hungary (representing 59% of refusals of entry at the land border with Serbia). Prior to visa liberalisation, consular authorities would have refused visas to those in the SIS or in the national register, but this check is now being performed and enforced by border-control authorities at the time of crossing.

There was also an increase in the number of refusals of entry for staying more than three months during a six-month period on the territory of the Member States. Indeed, many travellers claimed not to be aware that this rule still applied for biometric passport holders.

Another consequence of visa liberalisation for asylum authorities was the increase in asylum applications submitted in some Member States (Germany, Sweden, Belgium) by citizens of Serbia and the fYROM (much less by citizens of Montenegro) who had legitimately crossed the external border. The applications surged in two waves: the first at the onset of visa liberalisation (January–February 2010), and the second in September–October, although the timing of these waves also varied across Member States. Asylum authorities quickly considered most of the applications as unfounded and the applicants were then returned to their country of origin. Despite these high numbers (a total of 32 500 applications for Germany, Sweden and Belgium in 2010) asylum applications were only submitted by a marginal portion of the regular passenger flow of land passengers from the Western Balkan countries, which amounted to several million during the same period.

The second phenomenon affecting the Western Balkans was linked with the transit of migrants who entered illegally through the Greek-Turkish border. In this case, mostly migrants from Asia were detected while illegally crossing the green border between Serbia and Hungary or between Croatia and Slovenia. They arrived from Greece, and then illegally crossed the land border with the fYROM. The phenomenon is clearly significant and conspicuous as taxi services for migrants operate quite openly at the border in the fYROM to the Serbian borders. Slovenia reported some detections of illegal border-crossing of migrants arriving from Greece who stated that they had been transported hidden in vehicles (lorries).

In 2010, there were about 2 371 detections of illegal border-crossing at the land border with Western Balkan countries. This figure changed little with respect of the previous year (3 089). The most affected border was the land border between Hungary and Serbia. Throughout 2010, the number of detected Afghans decreased, while the number of detected Iraqis increased. Algerians and Moroccans were also increasingly being detected crossing this green border, which is consistent with the general displacement from north Africa to the eastern Mediterranean route, accompanied by an increase in the number of Maghreb nationals detected there.

The second most affected border section in the Western Balkans was between Slovenia and Croatia, mainly from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia. The number of Afghans detected illegally crossing the border between Slovenia and Croatia increased from just 5 in 2009 to 36 cases in 2010.

Regarding irregular migration along the land borders between Western Balkan countries and non-Schengen Member States (Serbia-Romania and Serbia-Bulgaria, the fYROM-Bulgaria) only few reports were received.

Eastern European route


In 2010, there were 1 043 detections of illegal border-crossing at the eastern land borders of the EU, which was only a small decrease on the previous year (1 335). Also consistent with the previous year, most of the detected illegal border-crossings were at the Slovak border with Ukraine, particularly in a 12 km border section passing through an urban area, the majority of which were detections of Moldovans, followed by Afghans and Georgians. Most migrants crossed the green border at night, in small groups. Nationals from this border region carried their own documents, while long-distance migrants were undocumented. Member State border-guard authorities have reported an increase in the proportion of unaccompanied minors. The Slovak authorities reported that of all detected migrants, between 20% and 30% were unaccompanied minors who crossed the green border illegally between Ukraine and Slovakia.

All Member States along the eastern borders reported sporadic detections of Asian nationals (mostly Afghans) and African nationals trying to enter the EU illegally, either at BCPs or along the green border. However, the number of cases remained low, with less than 500 detections.

Throughout 2010, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland reported occasional detections of Georgian nationals along the green border with Belarus. After having been detected, they invariably applied for asylum. However, the number of detections was much lower than in the summer of 2009 when several thousand Georgians claimed asylum at the Polish border and then promptly absconded from the asylum centre.

Refusals of entry along the eastern land borders decreased by 6% to 34 000, but remained concentrated at the Polish land border with Ukraine. Ukrainians continued to be the most commonly refused nationality at a stable 51% (17 336) of the total refusals along the eastern land border. Compared to the previous year, refusals of entry of Russians and Belarusians increased slightly, by 5% and 15%, respectively. The largest increase in refusals of entry was reported at the land border between Ukraine and Hungary, where the number of refusals of entry for having stayed for three months during a six-month period soared. This increase was due to the introduction of an electronic system of passport controls making it possible to rapidly and precisely calculate the period of stay within the EU.

Map 2: Main areas of refusals of entry in 2010



The German authorities reported that their consulate in Kiev registered one of the highest rates of rejection of uniform visa applications on the grounds of false pretence, and the Dutch authorities reported that Ukrainians applying for a Schengen visa often submit false documents to exaggerate the gravity of their economic circumstances. The Slovak authorities reported tourist agencies in Ukraine submitting false documents to obtain Schengen visas.

The Polish authorities reported an increase in the detection of forged Polish documents by Ukrainian nationals, mostly at the land border with Ukraine.

The air borders of the eastern European Member States, notably the Czech Republic, continue to be reported as important entry points for migrants from Vietnam entering with short-stay/transit visas, which enables them to travel to western Europe. By the time they reach France or the UK, their visas have expired and they are detected as illegal stayers.

A series of local border traffic agreements between Ukraine and most of its EU neighbours (Poland, Hungary and Slovakia) came into force in 2009. Additionally, in March 2010, a local border agreement became effective between Romania and Moldova, and in October 2010 – between Lithuania and Belarus. In addition, the Polish-Belarusian and Norwegian-Russian agreements on local border traffic were signed and are expected to enter into force by mid-2011. The agreements will allow certain groups of border-area residents to cross the border without visas but with special local border traffic permits. Holders of such permits will be entitled to stay on the territory of the other country (in the border zone of 50 km) for up to 90 days per half-year.

The results of several operations conducted along the eastern borders confirmed that incidents involving the smuggling of excise goods, especially cigarettes, occur much more often than incidents directly related to irregular migration.


Air routes

In 2010, the external air borders of the EU continued to be characterised by large passenger flows, by a large share of refusals of entry and by a substantial number of detections of forged documents.

At EU level, 2010 was the first year for which air flows from Asia were larger than air flows from America. This was due to slower growth on the flights from America than those from Asia, in particular from Turkey.

Refusals of entry decreased by 11% to 49 214 refusals, continuing the decrease of 17% reported between 2008 and 2009. Between 2008 and 2009, the decrease in refusals of entry at the air borders had been attributed to a decrease in air traffic. Statistics on passenger flows in 2010 are not available at the time of writing, but there are initial indications of an increase in 2010 compared to 2009.

Figure 3: Air borders, annual passenger flow and refusals of entry



Sources: Eurostat, FRAN data received as of 25 February 2011

The countries of origin of those refused entry at the air borders remained comparable to previous years, with South Americans, in particular Brazilians, representing the largest share of refusals of entry at the external borders (24% in 2010 compared to 28% in 2009). Migrants from South America tend to transit through Mexico, which only readmits Mexicans. The preferred final destinations for South Americans continued to be Portugal, Spain, but also Italy and Belgium.

Some Member States have a large network of Immigration Liaison Officers who are active at airports in countries of origin. This is notably the case of the Netherlands. The reasons for refusal of boarding were all related to travel document issues.

Western Africa is the second most common place of origin for refusals of entry made at the external border, mostly due to the refusals of entry of Nigerians. Nigerians continued to rank first for detections of forged documents at the air borders. This is in contrast to the relatively low flow of passengers, which totalled about 3 million entries from western Africa according to Eurostat, compared to almost 25 million passengers from northern Africa. In fact, many West Africans transited through North African airports, in particular through Casablanca. Several Member States reported Casablanca as an important hub to the EU for North Africans and West Africans travelling on false documents. For example, in late 2010, the German Federal Police reported the detection of one case from Casablanca airport involving 27 nationals from Congo travelling on Congolese passports with fraudulent Russian visas and Belgian stay titles. Casablanca airport is also known to be a hub for drug dealers smuggling cocaine out of western Africa to the EU, mostly traffickers with connection to Nigerian criminal organisations.

France and the UK reported increases in the use of Cairo airport as a hub for passengers travelling with forged EU documents, notably counterfeit German Schengen visa and resident permits. The cases mostly involved Afghans and Pakistanis.

Several Member States, for example France, Belgium and Germany, reported increased detections of forged documents on flights from Athens. In 2010, at Orly airport in Paris, Athens was the second main origin of forged document detections after Casablanca. These detections could be explained by the use of intra-Schengen flights from Athens airport by migrants, in particular Afghans, who had entered the EU illegally through the external land border between Greece and Turkey. Detections of passengers with forged documents were also reported on international (non-Schengen) flights from the Horn of Africa transiting through Athens.

Between 2008 and 2009, an increase was observed in the number of passengers from western Asia, in particular from Turkey. The increase likely continued in 2010. Most Turkish nationals are refused entry in Germany and Romania. Germany reported detections of many passengers travelling from Istanbul and Ankara airports using forged documents and later on applying for asylum in Germany. Most of them were from Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria. According to the German Police, about one-third travelled on falsified EU passports or IDs.

In 2010 Istanbul airport was also identified by the Spanish authorities as a hub for trafficking in human beings to Spain, mostly involving African women trafficked by Nigerian criminal organisations to Spain, Italy and Belgium. The victims were using false Belgian resident permits. Sweden continued to report the detection of Iraqi nationals travelling on forged documents from Ankara airport.

European airports continued to be used as transit for Chinese heading illegally to the USA and Canada. In many cases, they use transit flights through South American airports, in particular the Caracas airport in Venezuela. The UK reported an increase in detections of Iranians using a similar *modus operandi*, following the recent lifting of visa requirements for Iranians to Venezuela, as has been the case in Ecuador and Nicaragua for some time. In the Netherlands, strengthened controls on flights to Canada have been put in place with additional travel document controls staffed by security personnel working for the Canadian authorities. On those flights with additional controls there were higher numbers of detections of forged documents than on other flights.

3.2.2 Modus operandi

Shift in detections of illegal border-crossing from sea to land borders

Concurrent with the increase in detections of illegal border-crossing at the Greek land border with Turkey, the main change in *modus operandi* for illegal border-crossing between 2009 and 2010 was the shift from sea border detections, which represented 45% of the EU total in 2009, to the land borders, which rose from 55% in 2009 to 86% of detections in 2010.

Most detections along the green border took place in Greece at the border with Turkey and with Albania.

Irrespective of whether the illegal border-crossings took place at the Greek land border with Turkey, the Greek land border with Albania or at the land borders with Western Balkan countries, the main characteristic on this route was for migrants to cross on foot in small groups, usually at night. Generally, facilitators would not cross the border themselves but leave the migrants close to the border with instructions on how to cross, how to behave and how to continue their journey once on the other side of the border.

There were several reports indicating that migrants would take advantage of the change of border guards' shift to attempt crossing the border. However, there is no systematic data collection in place confirming these reports.

There were also reports of several small groups crossing simultaneously at different points of the border. It is unlikely that these attempts were coordinated, but this pattern made detections more difficult to patrol with limited resources.

The geographical analysis of data collected during the Frontex Joint Operation confirmed that crossing usually took place not too far from connections with the road networks on either side of the border. On the third-country side, a road connection enabled facilitators to easily and quickly drop off the migrants at a minimum cost, while on the EU side, the proximity of another road allowed migrants to continue their journey within the EU, or to be more easily picked up by counterpart facilitators.

Individual land border crossings were rare. The size of groups varied from a few individuals to large groups of about 50 (and in exceptional cases more than 50). Detections usually took place immediately subsequent to the actual border crossing. In general, migrants did not attempt to escape or avoid apprehension.

Currently there are no data or estimations of the number of migrants crossing the border undetected, but it is assumed that each detected attempt by Albanians is eventually successful as they managed to get to their place of employment in Greece. In this particular case, even if the number of detections is high and migrants quickly return, they rapidly attempt to cross illegally again until they succeed. There were reports of Asian migrants detected in Italy who claimed to have entered illegally into the EU from Turkey to Greece undetected.

Along the external borders, the main sections for illegally border-crossing the green border were the border sections between Greece and Turkey, Greece and Albania, as well as the Hungarian border with Serbia. Reports from the Bulgarian border with Turkey tend to indicate that most illegal border-crossing took place through BCPs, although crossing through the green border might not be excluded. The Bulgarian authorities reported few illegal border-crossing on the land border with Western Balkan countries.

Along the eastern land borders, detections at the green border are concentrated at the land border between Slovakia and Ukraine. This border section is rather short (97km) but is situated close to the road connections from Ukraine directly to the Schengen area. It has been equipped with a 24/7 electronic surveillance system, which contributes to the high levels of detection. Detections along the borders with Belarus and Russia remained very low, partly due to the strict border control in these third countries.

In 2010, detections at the fenced green border between Spain and Morocco remained limited to a few incidents.

Detention and travelling undocumented as part of overall *modus operandi*

At the borders with Turkey, migrants detected crossing the border illegally tended to use different strategies depending on their nationality in order to inhibit return procedures. Those who are unlikely to be readmitted to Turkey or their country of origin, for example Afghans and Palestinians, do not fear being detained by the Hellenic Police and consider detention as a stopover on their journey into the EU. In fact, detection and detention are taken into consideration as an expected part of the overall *modus operandi*. After crossing the border illegally, many migrants do not hide, but rather tend to walk in groups to the nearest town, where they wait to be picked up by the police.

Migrants are well aware of the asylum and return policies existing in Greece when they cross, so it is clear to them that some nationalities may be detained for lesser time and have smaller chances of being returned to their country of origin than others, therefore a key element of their *modus operandi* is destroying documents of their respective country and claiming to be of the nationality which is least likely to be detained for an extended period and to be subject to return.

Unfounded international protection

Several Member States reported cases of migrants who entered the EU illegally, attempting to reach their final destination, often a western Member State, and only claiming asylum if apprehended by border guard authorities or other law-enforcement authorities. Some Member States reported that once they had registered the migrants in asylum centres, many absconded only a few days later, continuing to their intended final destination. This was particularly the case for Serbians and Afghans detected at the border between Hungary and Serbia.

According to the German authorities, Dusseldorf, Frankfurt and other German airports were targeted by Turkish, Iranian, Syrian, Iraqi and Afghan nationals arriving from Turkish airports, one-third of whom were using falsified EU documents or falsified documents of their own nationality. Thereafter around 75% applied for asylum in Germany. Asylum applications by Afghans increased sharply in Germany in 2010, in particular after the ruling of the German Court on suspending returns to Greece, where migrants had originally crossed the EU border illegally.

Other Member States (among others Norway, Sweden and Belgium) also reported an increase in asylum applications, that were later determined unfounded by asylum authorities, submitted by Serbians and FYROM nationals, following visa liberalisation. Although they crossed the border legally with their biometric passports, it seems that they applied for asylum in order to prolong their stay and to benefit from social services. Most were returned to their country of origin.

Type of water craft used for illegal border crossing in the Mediterranean Sea

On the eastern Mediterranean sea route, while there was a drastic reduction in the number of detections of illegal border-crossing between 2009 and 2010, reports from the Greek and Italian authorities suggested a shift from the use of makeshift vessels for short crossings to the use of larger vessels like sail boats or merchant boats for longer sea crossings. These vessels were often offered by criminal organisations with international ramifications, as shown by the detections of Ukrainian facilitators transporting Asian migrants from Turkey to the EU.



Picture 5: Rubber boat carrying migrants detected during Frontex JO Poseidon 2010

Towards the end of 2010 there were increasing reports of migrants attempting to illegally cross the external border on direct routes from Turkey to Italy and, to a lesser extent, from Albania to Italy. As regards clandestine movement across the EU internal borders by sea, there were increasing reports of migrants hiding on boats crossing between Greece and Italy.

In contrast, on the western Mediterranean route, between northern Africa (Morocco and Algeria) and Spain, migrants were detected using more and more often very small and unseaworthy craft (including jet skis and inflatable dinghies), thus putting their lives at risk. This type of method is most likely to be used on a short passage, like the one between Morocco and the southern coast of Spain, between Tunisia and the Italian islands of Pantelleria and Lampedusa, as well as between the Turkish coast and the Greek Islands of the Aegean Sea, where the distance between shores is often shorter than one kilometre.

Clandestine migrants hiding in vehicles

At the land and sea borders, detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs (which mostly involved clandestine entry by migrants hiding in vehicles) remained relatively low compared with 296 detections in 2009.

In a bi-monthly report, Austria also reported detections of clandestine entrants from Afghanistan on a Greek tourist bus that transited through Bulgaria and Romania. Romania reported the detections of Asian and African nationals hiding in vehicles coming from Turkey and going to other EU Member States.

Clandestine entry often occurs with migrants concealed within hidden areas of lorries. The concealed areas are often sophisticated compartments, an indication that the facilitators could use the vehicles several times. For example, in July 2010, 73 detections for clandestine entries attempted by Afghans and Pakistani were discovered at the Greek-Bulgarian border in a refrigerator lorry with a purpose-built compartment equipped with ventilators and accumulator batteries. There were also several accounts of clandestine migrants found in lorries within the EU.

A second type of clandestine entry was reported by the Bulgarian authorities and involved the clandestine crossing by Turkish nationals in private cars during holiday periods. In this case, the drivers were often EU citizens of Turkish origin returning home after holidays in Turkey.

Overstaying the legal length of stay

Overstaying the length of the visa period is probably a common *modus operandi* for migrants staying illegally in the EU. It is very difficult to establish at the border, because in this case the migrants have genuine travel documents and presumably some proportion do not intend to overstay at the actual moment of entering the EU. Border guards can nevertheless refuse entry on nine distinct grounds. The main reason for border guards to refuse entry to the EU in 2010 was the lack of appropriate documentation justifying the purpose of stay. Most refusals of entry were reported from the Polish border with Ukraine and at the air borders.

A distinction should be made between refusals of entry to those nationals who require a visa, like Ukrainians, and those nationals not requiring a visa, like Brazilians. Throughout 2010, Ukrainian was the nationality most often refused entry at the external border, with most refusals taking place at the land border between Poland and Ukraine, despite the local border agreement introduced in 2009 allowing permit holders to cross the border without a Schengen visa and stay in Poland within 50 km of the border. The local traffic agreement renders this border section one of the busiest border sections of the EU.


In 2010, border-control authorities reported an increase in the number of refusals of entry on the grounds of having stayed for three months during the previous six-month period. This increase was linked with the visa liberalisation procedure in the Western Balkans whereby many travellers were not aware that this condition of staying for a maximum of three months remained valid after visa liberalisation.

One of the *modi operandi* often associated with irregular migration from Vietnam consists in entering eastern Member States on a short-term visa and then moving on to western Member States. By the time they reach western Member States, their visas have expired and once detected they are reported as illegal overstayers.

Forged travel documents

At EU level, the number of forged documents detected increased from 7 872 in 2009 to 9 439 in 2010 (+20%). The vast majority of detections (75%) were at the EU air border.

Detection rates per legitimate document traveller are minuscule. For example the number of detections of false documents is in the order of a few hundred per 90 days at each major air border, while the number of international air passengers arriving at each of these air borders is counted in millions.



Picture 6: Most forged documents were detected at air borders

Impersonation ranks high among methods of abuse encountered at the border. This is likely to be because improvements to the security features of passports mean that alteration and counterfeiting are much more difficult. Impersonators use other people's legitimate and genuine documents, which do not show signs of tampering and thus can be potentially used on many occasions.

According to the German authorities, Dusseldorf, Frankfurt and other German airports were targeted by Turkish, Iranian, Syrian, Iraqi and Afghan nationals from Turkish airports, one-third of whom were using falsified EU documents or falsified own-nationality documents. Thereafter around 75% asked for asylum in Germany.

The Belgian and German authorities reported an increase in detections of forged or counterfeit documents on passengers arriving from Greek airports. They mainly used French, Belgian, Greek and Portuguese ID-cards or passports. The migrants entered the EU through Greece, and may have obtained their forged documents in Turkey or in Greece.

The Spanish authorities reported the largest increase in detections of forged documents used by Moroccan nationals, from 133 detections in 2009 to 524 detections in 2010. The increase was reportedly linked with the forgery of EU travel documents in Ceuta and Melilla.

Authentic documents obtained with false supporting documents

False documents in support of visa applications or resident permits are being widely reported. There is a degree of organised criminality associated with document provision but intelligence on criminal networks behind this type of fraud is difficult to obtain because it often involves forgeries made in third countries. Those associated with this abuse are able to adapt rapidly to increasing controls in a given area.

Bogus marriages are increasingly being used to obtain permission to live within the EU and they were mentioned with increasing frequency in FRAN bi-monthly reports and in the media in 2010. This suggests that this *modus operandi* may be on the rise, particularly involving females from the new 2004 EU Member States (Latvia) and males from Africa and Asia.

According to Polish and British bi-monthly reports, Nigerian males are commonly being detected attempting to obtain EU residency permits by means of bogus marriages mostly with Polish females. The Czech consular office in Nigeria reported an increase in bogus marriages and the submission of false documents to obtain long-term residence permits. Also, Czech and Slovak females were reported travelling to Pakistan to marry Pakistani males and there were also many reports of bogus marriages of Czech nationals with foreigners coming from African countries. Also cases of false paternity claims were commonly investigated in the Czech Republic.

The use of the internet, and in particular social networking sites, was increasingly cited as a means of online recruitment. For example, many Latvian women were recruited online through what looked like job adverts, offering free accommodation in Ireland, for exactly the amount of time it takes to register new marriage.

Registration in schools or universities is also a *modus operandi* reported to be on the rise by several Member States. France reported an increased number of cases of students detected staying illegally in France who had enrolled in Cypriot or Romanian schools and applying for a Schengen visa from there. According to information from Swedish authorities for the year 2010, out of the 15 000 persons who received a uniform visa from Sweden on the grounds of studying in Sweden, only 20% actually showed up at schools and universities. It is assumed that the remaining 12 000 are staying illegally within the EU, a total roughly comparable to the 14 258 detections of illegal sea border-crossing in 2010.

3.3 Other illegal activities

Frontex mandate is related to irregular migration; however, border guards in cooperation with customs officers and other police forces are also engaged in combating other criminal activities. This section is an overview of cross-border crime affecting the work of border guards at the external borders of the EU which were identified during Frontex operations in 2010. It aims to provide an overview of the points of entry, routes of trafficking and the *modus operandi*.

3.3.1 Drugs

Routes of drug trafficking vary depending on the kind of drug, its origin and the specific criminal organisation involved. During Frontex Joint Operations drug seizures were reported mainly on the Western Balkan and western African routes.

In the Western Balkans, most detections of drug trafficking were recorded at the borders of Slovenia-Croatia, Bulgaria-Turkey, Greece-Turkey and Hungary-Serbia. These border sections are predominantly affected by trafficking of heroin from Afghanistan. The Western Balkan route is used to transport heroin through Pakistan, Iran and Turkey and then across a range of other transit and destination countries (Albania, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, former Yugoslav republics, Romania, Slovakia, Austria and Italy).



Picture 7: During Frontex Joint Operations drugs were detected mainly on the western Balkan and western African routes

The second most important route for heroin is the 'silk route' via central Asia and Russia, and then through Belarus, Poland and Ukraine to, among others, Scandinavian countries via Lithuania.* However, during Frontex Joint Operations in 2010 only small amounts of drugs were detected at the Slovakia-Ukraine border.

* INCB annual report 2010

The main point of entry for cannabis to the EU is the coast of the Iberian Peninsula via the sea border to Spain. Cannabis is trafficked from western African countries, mainly Morocco, Nigeria, Cape Verde, Senegal by Southern West Criminal Hub** and to a lesser extent from the Americas (Caribbean Islands), the Middle East (Lebanon) and Asia (Thailand).

** Europol OCTA 2009

Frontex Joint Operations at the Spanish coast, both at the blue border and in ports, confirmed the widespread occurrence of drug trafficking. Within Joint Operation Minerva 2010 over 2.5 tonnes of hashish were detected with the final destination thought to be Spain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal and Italy (mainly hidden in ferries, cars, and for smaller amounts either internally or attached to the traveller's body). In turn, at the blue border large amounts of drugs were transported to international waters off the Spanish coast by high-speed inflatable boats and then smuggled to the southern sea border of Spain.

Recently, a growing number of indoor cannabis plantations have been detected in Europe. Criminal organisations in the UK were reportedly using young migrants staying illegally, mainly Vietnamese and Chinese victims of human trafficking, for operating such plantations.

There are three main routes for cocaine smuggling to Europe. The northern route leads from the Caribbean Islands via the Azores to Portugal and Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands. The central route runs from South America via Cape Verde or Madeira and the Canary Islands to continental Europe. The most recent African route leads from South America to western Africa and from there mainly to Spain and Portugal. Spain,



Picture 8: Rubber boat carrying drugs detected during JO Indalo 2010

the Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal appear to be the main points of entry for cocaine smuggled into Europe.* The Netherlands is perceived as the centre for the redistribution of illicit drugs (cocaine, heroin and marijuana) to central Europe, Germany, the Scandinavian countries and the UK. Schiphol

* UNODC World Drug Report 2010

Airport in Amsterdam and seaports of Rotterdam and Amsterdam are the key vulnerable infrastructure points. Smugglers are able to take advantage of the high volumes of traffic in those points of entry.

The *modus operandi* of cocaine smugglers is mostly based on trafficking through maritime and air borders. For example, at the sea borders they use tourist boats, cargo freighters and container ships, while at the blue borders they also use high-speed inflatable boats in cases involving smuggled hashish, as well as aircraft dropping cocaine bundles to international waters that are then picked up by vessels or speedboats. On the western African route, cocaine is also transported through air borders from western African countries to European airports, by small aircraft or commercial flights, by couriers or by air-freight. Cocaine traffickers intentionally overflow airport detention facilities with 'swallowers' (travellers who have swallowed cocaine for smuggling), expecting that border officers would not be able to check everyone, thus some of them do enter Europe.

Some synthetic drugs were seized at the borders, but not in significant quantities, which might suggest that domestic production in Europe was meeting demand.

3.3.2 Stolen vehicles (on exit)

Stolen vehicle detection is, by its nature, reported by control at border-crossing points on the land borders and, to a lesser extent, the sea borders (transported by ferries). Border guards are authorised to verify vehicles crossing the border and for that purpose they have access to the SIS and Member State national databases, which significantly facilitates the identification of stolen vehicles.

Joint Operations coordinated by Frontex in 2010 indicate an increase (10% compared to 2009) in detections of stolen vehicles at the external land borders. This increase could be a result of many factors, such as strengthened border controls or better equipment. A more systematic reporting of cases detected in all Member States would be the first step to providing a more detailed analysis of the situation.

From the limited amount of data obtained, it was noted that vehicles were mainly stolen in Belgium, Germany, France and Italy. They were trafficked from the EU through the eastern European route via Hungary, Poland and Slovakia (to Belarus, Ukraine and Romania) and the Western Balkan route across Slovenia and Hungary (respectively to Croatia and Serbia) and also via Bulgaria and Greece to



Picture 9: Stolen vehicles detected at the Greek-Turkish border in 2010

Turkey. Information collected during field visits at Kipi BCP (Greek-Turkish border) indicated an expanding market for second-hand luxury vehicles smuggled via Turkey from western European Member States in countries such as Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Western Balkan countries also remain markets with a significant purchasing power and high demand for second-hand vehicles.

The fact that the number of stolen vehicles is not very high at some border-crossing points does not mean that trafficking did not occur. The small number of detections of stolen vehicles might be linked to many factors such as shortage of equipment, staff which are insufficiently trained or prepared to identify cases of car theft, limited human resources at border-crossing points, as well as cases of corruption. Thus detections may not represent the actual situation.

The *modi operandi* of criminal groups trafficking vehicles across the external borders of the EU evolve quickly in response to the legal and economic situation, and to the degree of expertise of border guards and customs officers in identifying various *modi operandi*. The most common strategy used by traffickers is altering vehicle identification numbers and the transit of vehicles with falsified documents (e.g. Ukrainian documents; the main obstacle to verifying the document results from difficulties in consulting Ukrainian databases in real time), and transportation of vehicles on a platform trailer.

Interpol forecasts an increase in the theft of vehicles in general and of heavy vehicles and trailers in particular, a trend that is likely to affect the situation at the border controls and in further operations undertaken by Frontex.

3.3.3 Smuggling of excise goods (tobacco, alcohol, oil products)

Several Frontex Joint Operations reported the smuggling of excise goods as a threat for the management of the borders of the EU. Smuggling is thought to be predominantly at the land and sea borders. This is a diverse phenomenon determined by customs regulations in both of the bordering countries and the price differentials that exist between them for particular excise goods. The most common excise goods smuggled through the external borders are cigarettes, alcohol and petroleum products.


The price differentials and data collected by Frontex indicate that the biggest market suppliers of cigarettes smuggled to the EU are Belarus, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, Moldova.

It is estimated that 99 billion cigarettes are smuggled annually into the EU, of which 80% were legally produced and 20% were counterfeit. Seizures are estimated to account for only 3% of the illicit trade in the EU, which implies lost tax revenues for European governments of about EUR 10 billion.* The substantial number of seizures of cigarettes in Poland, Hungary and Romania are probably the result of changes in customs regulations that limited the amounts of cigarettes and alcohol allowed. However, the introduction of local border traffic agreements, allowing residents of borderland regions to enjoy a visa-free regime, might encourage small-scale cigarette smugglers to more frequently cross the EU borders with Ukraine.


* Center for the Study of Democracy, Examining the links between organised crime and corruption, 2010

The *modi operandi* used by cigarette smugglers are diverse and they depend on the natural conditions of the border and the infrastructure of BCPs. In most cases cigarettes enter the EU concealed in cars, lorries, buses and trains (hidden in the floor, walls or seats of the vehicle, as well as in its wheels or petrol tank) by small-scale traders as well as smugglers cooperating with organised crime groups. At river borders inflatable boats are used to drop bundles of cigarettes onto the European bank side of the river (e.g. on the River Nemunas or the River Bug). Cigarettes that are smuggled via the northern and southeastern border of the EU are further trafficked to Scandinavian and western European countries where prices are higher.

Map 3: Average cigarette prices in Member States and selected third countries in December 2010



Map 4: Average prices of 95-octane petrol in selected Member States and third countries in December 2010



The smuggling of alcohol has become a less profitable activity for traffickers, due to stricter EU regulations and a lower price disparity across borders (except Scandinavian Member States). Nevertheless, some seizures of alcohol were reported during Frontex operations, especially luxury brands of cognac and whiskey. The biggest seizure of alcohol at the external borders of the EU was reported in Slovakia (Vysne Nemecke BCP).

Trafficking of petroleum products is mainly reported at the eastern European borders with Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, as well as with Western Balkan countries (e.g. Serbia). This kind of smuggling is motivated by the price difference between EU Member States and their immediate third-country neighbours.

Smuggling of petroleum products is believed to have only a limited and local impact on the European economy. However, queues created by fuel smugglers with extended fuel tanks do have an impact on the management of border-crossing points by increasing waiting time and raising the security risk.

3.3.4 Trafficking in human beings

Trafficking in human beings is probably one of the most profitable cross-border crime, often associated with other criminal activities. However, it is not easily detected at the borders, because at that moment of the trafficking process, the victims themselves are either unaware of their fate or afraid to collaborate with law-enforcement authorities. Nevertheless, this criminal activity is closely related to the movement of people, including movement across borders, and thus border-control authorities can be instrumental in preventing it.

While many victims come from Member States themselves, this analysis focuses on victims from third countries, as they are more likely to have crossed the external border at some point of the trafficking process. The statistics come from inland reports, as there are no comprehensive statistics available at the EU level on victims reported at the borders.

According to the data provided by Member States, 3 023 potential victims of trafficking from third countries were reported in 2009, an increase of 27% as compared to 2008. Most of the third-country potential victims came from western African countries, for which Member States reported a 75% increase in 2009 compared to 2008. Member States also reported a large number of victims among South Americans, eastern Asians and North Africans.

Most of the potential victims were trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation, but trafficking for forced labour or services is also reported as increasing. The reports of male victims are also on the rise, though it is not clear whether this trend is due to an actual increase in the trafficking in males, or rather reflects a growing awareness that has led to more frequent reporting of such victims. Most of the men were Pakistani, Chinese and Vietnamese.

Box 1: Suspected African sex slave export

Most identifications of trafficking victims are made inland, as many victims cross borders with genuine documents and are still unaware of the exploitation they will be submitted to. At times, however, border-control authorities are alerted by small details and manage to stop persons from being trafficked.

A recent case involved a Somali girl who went to a Maltese airport to buy an air ticket to Denmark. She was arrested for possessing a counterfeit Italian travel document, but the guards became suspicious regarding the true nature of her situation due the fact that she could not name her final destination or the people she was supposed to meet there. She informed the police that the travel document as well as the money for the plane ticket had been given to her by a Somali man living in Malta (whom she refused to name for fear of reprisals), who assured her someone would pick her up at the Copenhagen airport.

Similar stories of African girls being lured by the promise of arranged marriages in northern Europe and then being forced to work in the European sex market have led the authorities to suspect that the country is being used as a transit point for human trafficking (based on the *Times of Malta* of 4 July 2010).

Member States also reported a larger proportion of minors among potential victims of trafficking. Most came from Nigeria and Guinea. Minors are mostly trafficked for sexual exploitation or used by criminals for begging.

* It should be noted here that a look-alike passport is considered to be genuine document.

Many victims are travelling with genuine documents*, often obtained under false pretences. Many victims are recruited by answering fake job advertisements in their country of origin. The internet also plays an increasing role in the recruitment of victims.

4. Environmental scan

4.1 EU-related factors influencing irregular migration

4.1.1 Economic factors

Labour demand picking up in Member States

Labour-market conditions saw a push towards stabilisation during the second part of 2010. According to the European Commission*, job losses are coming to an end in the EU, with unemployment rate more or less steady at 9.6% in the EU and at around 10% in the Euro area. The situation, however, remains highly differentiated across Member States, with the rate of unemployment ranging from 4–5% in the Netherlands and Austria to some 17–20% in Spain and the three Baltic Member States.

* European Economic Forecast – autumn 2010

Taking into account the usual lag between output and employment growth, the European Commission believes that a gradual modest improvement in labour markets is likely in 2011. Still, the Commission warns of the potential for unemployment levels to remain high for some time to come. In addition, improvements are unlikely to be uniform between Member States, in particular with expected employment gains in Germany and a continuation of the difficult situation in Spain.

Increasing air passenger traffic in the EU

Most of the major EU air carriers reported growth in passenger numbers in 2010. According to IATA, passenger demand increased by 5.1% in 2010 compared to 2009 and was a direct result of improved global economic conditions.

These increases occurred despite the April 2010 closure of European air space (volcanic ash) and severe winter weather in January and December 2010.

4.1.2 Legal factors

Return Directive

An effective return policy is necessary to complement a well-managed and credible migration policy. The deadline for the transposition of the Return Directive** provisions expired on 24 December 2010.

** Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008

The Directive provides for clear, transparent and common rules concerning the return and removal of persons identified as illegal stayers. The systematic issuing of EU entry bans for certain categories of returnees is foreseen by its Article 11. In addition, Member States are now obliged to issue return decisions of all detected persons identified as illegal stayers (Article 6). Both the provisions would serve to deter potential migrants from entering the EU illegally.

The Return Directive prioritises voluntary departures, which may lead to a reduction in the number of forced removals, a fact that may have consequences for Frontex-coordinated return operations.

Visa liberalisation process

In November 2010, in addition to lifting visa requirements for biometric passport holders from two Western Balkan countries, i.e. Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU also extended the same privileges to Taiwan (irrespective of the fact that Member States do not recognise Taiwan as a sovereign state). The EU agreed to lift the visa requirements after Taiwan granted the same rights to Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania. The decision followed a similar decision taken by the UK and Ireland in 2009.

As for other third countries, visa dialogues are not expected to lead to a visa waiver in the 2011–2012 period. Constructive dialogue is ongoing with Russia, Ukraine and Moldova. The European Commission will draft an impact assessment of possible migratory and security impacts of future visa liberalisation in the framework of this visa liberalisation dialogue.

Visa dialogue with Turkey has not yet been opened. There are no discussions underway about launching such a dialogue with Belarus.

Georgia signed a visa facilitation agreement with the EU, which will substantially simplify the visa application procedure for certain categories of persons and make the whole process cheaper and quicker. It entered into force on 1 March 2011 (together with the EU-Georgia readmission agreement).

Box 2: Abuse of visa liberalisation in the Western Balkans

Visa liberalisation dialogue between the European Commission and the Western Balkan countries (excluding Croatia) started in early 2008 and culminated in December 2009, when visa obligations were lifted for all biometric passport holders of Serbia, Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM).

Unfortunately, throughout 2010, several Member States were confronted with alarming increases in the number of unfounded asylum applications submitted by nationals from Serbia and, to a lesser extent, from the fYROM. These applications are thought to be one result of the visa liberalisation.

In the meantime, the visa liberalisation dialogue continued and the JHA Council of 8 November 2010 decided to also lift visa obligations for nationals from Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, given the clear pattern of asylum abuse in 2010, the European Commission introduced the concept of a post-visa liberalisation monitoring mechanism for the Western Balkan countries (excluding Croatia), broadly consisting of two elements: regular progress monitoring and abuse prevention.

The Commission stressed the importance of the issue and proposed that Frontex play a pivotal role in the setting-up and management of the abuse-prevention monitoring mechanism.

EU readmission agreements with third countries

Currently, there are 12 third countries (mostly in Europe) with whom the EU has a working readmission agreement. Pakistan is the latest addition to the list, following the agreement which entered into force on 1 December 2010 (ten years after the European Commission received the mandate to start negotiations). The agreement applies to Pakistani nationals who entered the EU illegally after 1 December 2010. Readmission to Pakistan of nationalities other than Pakistani, can take place but only under certain strict conditions. In both cases, if a request for readmission is not answered by Pakistan within 60 days, it is considered as accepted.

A readmission agreement with Georgia was signed on 22 November 2010 and entered into force on 1 March 2011. Similar in scope to the agreement with Pakistan, the agreement covers nationals of Georgia and those of third countries or stateless persons that have a clear link with Georgia (e.g. visa or resident permit). Importantly, persons detected illegally crossing the border in common border regions will be returned within a few days due to an accelerated procedure.

The European Commission continues negotiations with Cape Verde (on visa facilitation and readmission), Turkey (readmission) and Morocco (readmission).

PNR Directive

At the beginning of February 2011, the European Commission published its proposal* for a new directive on the use of Passenger Name Records (PNR). The proposal is a follow up of the 2007 proposal, however, the scope and purpose of PNR has been widened. For instance, in addition to preventing and combating terrorist offences and organised crime, the European Commission proposes that PNR should be extended to 'serious crimes' (offences which carry a minimum custodial sentence of 3 years).

If adopted, the directive will require airlines flying into and out of the EU to provide personal information on each traveller to the national authorities in the Member State of departure and arrival. Compared to Advanced Passenger Information (API), PNR data are much more detailed, since they include, *inter alia* home address, mobile phone number, frequent-flyer information, email address and credit card details.

Furthermore, even though PNR are passenger data linked to travel, they are mainly used as criminal-intelligence rather than as a border-control instrument. According to the European Commission, the main aim of using PNR data is to fight terrorism and serious crime rather than to fight irregular migration and/or facilitate border controls (as is the case with API).

* Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, SEC (2011) 132 final

Schengen and EU enlargement

The Schengen evaluations for Bulgaria and Romania were ongoing throughout 2010. According to the Council of the EU, both Member States are yet to fulfil requirements as regards efficient control of their external borders.

In addition, during the 24 February 2011 JHA Council meeting, Member States failed to agree on a compromise as to the way to proceed, both in terms of enlarging the Schengen area and introducing amendments to Schengen mechanism. The earliest possible date for Romania and Bulgaria to join the Schengen area has therefore been pushed back to the autumn of 2011.

The process of EU enlargement continues with Croatia planning to complete negotiations during the first half of 2011. Signing of the Accession treaty and Croatian referendum are both expected to take place in the second half of 2011. The earliest possible time for Croatia's accession to the EU is mid 2012.

Implementation of the Internal Security Strategy

The European Commission proposed on 22 November 2010 put into action the Internal Security Strategy (ISS), which had been adopted by the Council during the Spanish Presidency in February 2010. The ISS is based on European values enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty and in the Charter for Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and it aims to involve all the relevant sectors, especially the relevant EU Agencies.

Objective Number 4 of the ISS aims at strengthening internal security through border management, in particular by addressing deficiencies caused by the lack of coordination among competent bodies at the external borders (whilst fully respecting their mandates). In addition, according to the European Commission, this objective will also contribute to setting up the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR).



Picture 10: Internal Security Strategy is based on European values enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty

Legislative proposal to set up EUROSUR in 2011

The European Commission will present a legislative proposal, to be tabled by the end of 2011, establishing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR). The proposal will define the objectives and scope of the information exchange at the initial stages of EUROSUR, and in particular, set out the tasks and competences of the National Coordination Centres and Frontex.

In anticipation of this proposal, a pilot project has been launched in 2011 with the involvement of six Member States and Frontex. It is designed as part of the development of integrated and operational action at the southern and eastern land and maritime external borders of the EU. The pilot project will be extended to include 22 participating Member States by the end of 2011.

Presently, the Commission plans for EUROSUR to become operational by 2013. At that point, it should consist of both an information exchange system and a cooperation mechanism, which will enable Member States and Frontex to improve common situational awareness at the EU external borders and in the pre-frontier area, and improve the reaction capabilities of national authorities responsible for controlling the EU external borders. This should reduce the number of irregular migrants entering the EU undetected and, consequently, significantly reduce the death toll of migrants at sea. Once the EUROSUR framework has been established, it may be extended to all Member States.

4.1.3 Technological factors

Developments for border management

A number of Member States are currently upgrading or building new earth-based surveillance systems with the aim of acquiring and deploying modern 'integrated' systems. The deployed equipment is usually a combination of unmanned static and mobile sensors, fixed seismic sensors, and fixed and mobile cameras and radars. The main expected result of these upgrades is a reduction in the number of undetected illegal border-crossings.

Box 3: Setting up of the Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice

The amended proposal of the European Commission of 19 March 2010 stipulates that the Agency will assume its responsibilities from 1 January 2012. This date is increasingly being seen as unrealistic, since the proposal itself is not expected to be adopted before mid-2011.

Given that these different delays act sequentially (SIS II, VIS), the Commission currently believes that the new Agency could be able to take over operational management of VIS and EURODAC by mid-2012. Nevertheless, this tentative schedule is likely to be adjusted further still.

Main trends in biometric technologies

Face-recognition technology is increasingly being used in automated border-crossing systems, mostly for EU nationals. Identity verification through facial recognition technology for third-country nationals (using the biometric identifier embedded in the travel document) is presently only taking place during manual border checks.

Currently, two different approaches regarding travel documents and their security are observed. In the EU, major emphasis is put on the security of the travel document itself. A different approach is applied outside the EU, where governments are aiming to create large databases to store fingerprints and/or other biometric data of individuals (third-country nationals) crossing their borders. Hence, this methodology relies significantly less on travel documents and their security features.

4.1.4 Factors directly affecting Frontex

Amendments to ILO Network Regulation

The European Parliament and the Council reached an agreement on the European Commission's proposal to amend Council Regulation (EC) No 377/2004 that originally created immigration liaison-officer networks (ILO networks).

Importantly, the amendments will provide a legal basis for cooperation between Frontex and the ILO networks, will promote the use of ICONet and will harmonise reporting within already-established networks.

In practical terms, the amendments will come into force in April 2011 and will thus facilitate the integration of Frontex into activities of different ILO networks already active in 2011. This will enhance the Agency's capacity to implement its mandate with regard to the provision of risk analysis and the facilitation of operational cooperation between Member States and third countries

The concept of RABIT, following the first deployment in Greece

The very first deployment of a Rapid Border Intervention Team (RABIT), took place in Greece and lasted from November 2010 to 2 March 2011, and provided firm evidence of the efficiency of the RABIT mechanism. Practical experience gathered so far confirms that this measure should be regarded as only auxiliary to Member States' border and migration management systems.

In addition, the RABIT deployment clearly reinforced the position of Frontex in relation to third-country authorities; the potential of Frontex in practical coordination in emergency situations is now clear to many third-country authorities.

Frontex Working Arrangements with third countries (in particular with Turkey)

The Working Arrangement with the Turkish authorities, if concluded in 2011, has the potential to limit transitory irregular-migration flows through enhancing the effectiveness of joint operations in Greek-Turkish border areas.

In 2011, a cooperation agreement with the Coordination Service of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is planned. The agreement will offer improved contacts and cooperation with several CIS countries.

The conclusion of the Working Arrangement with the Cape Verdean authorities in January 2011 may encourage other African countries to consider formalising their cooperation with Frontex.

Amendments to Frontex Regulation

The legislative proposal to strengthen Frontex, as requested by the Stockholm programme, was presented by the European Commission on 24 February 2010. If accepted, the amendments will significantly improve the operational capacity of the Agency. For example, by revising the mechanism for compulsory contributions of equipment from Member States combined with the gradual acquisition/leasing by Frontex of its own equipment, the Agency will be able to act more efficiently and quickly.

Likewise, the possibility for Frontex to make direct use of EU funds or develop capacity-building projects in third countries could have a positive effect on the consolidation of the cooperation with competent authorities. Moreover, the proposed deployment of Frontex liaison officers in third countries or the hosting of foreign Liaison Officers at Frontex Headquarters would also foster better cooperation across the entire Agency's remit.

According to the EC, it remains uncertain when a formal adoption of the proposal will take place. Therefore, it is not expected that any or all of these changes will impact the capacity of Frontex before 2012.

4.2 Geopolitical factors influencing irregular migration

4.2.1 Institutional, legal, political and economic developments in relevant third countries

North Africa and Middle East

In the ARA 2010, it was argued that economic crises increase the risk of regime-threatening instability if they persist for longer than a one-year period. Some countries of the region (Lebanon and Algeria) were identified as being of high risk of instability.

Political unrests and the subsequent overthrowing of Tunisia's and Egypt's authoritarian leaders in January and February 2011 have somewhat confirmed this reasoning. In addition, these events have exposed significant vulnerabilities of the autocratic regimes in North Africa, largely resting on institutional pillars, like the Army and/or Police. Importantly, the ensuing institutional vacuum in Tunisia and the February 2011 surge of Tunisian irregular migrants arriving in Lampedusa, has clearly demonstrated the importance of third-country efforts against maritime irregular migration.

Box 4: Tourism industry in Tunisia and its impact on opportunity-driven migration

The tourism industry in Tunisia employed roughly 400 000 people in 2010 (or 13% of the entire workforce), making it the second biggest employer after agriculture. During the January 2011 unrests, thousands of tourists were evacuated, leading to a reduction in the industry's earnings by as much as 40%. The decrease has mostly affected southern regions of Tunisia, where a lot of young people lost their incomes and have illegally migrated to the EU (Lampedusa) as a result.

The new interim authorities are trying to re-establish the image of Tunisia as a safe and secure travel destination, as was the case prior to the unrest. However, the longer it takes for tourism to restart, the more likely the continuation of the social unrest. This in turn will further increase the risk of opportunity-driven irregular migration from Tunisia to the EU.

The political situation in Tunisia remains volatile. The country is going through a transition period that will last until at least July 2011, at which time elections for the constitutional assembly are planned. Institutional consolidation is expected to remain fragile throughout 2011.

In Egypt, the Army has taken charge in what has been described as a 'soft military coup'. A prolonged period of political uncertainty is expected, however, the election of a new president and parliament will likely take place by the end of 2011. Importantly, the regime change has had little effect on Egypt's ability to maintain maritime controls of its borders in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the situation in Sinai Peninsula seems to be deteriorating as a result. Likewise, reorganisation and internal purges within the Egyptian police force and security services will continue to render these institutions weak.

The threat of further civil unrests still exists in Algeria and Morocco. In the latter case, the protestors are not (yet) openly challenging the monarchy's existence. Importantly, however, Algerian authorities have lifted a 19-year-old 'state of emergency', in response to mounting pressure from several sectors of society.

Of increasing concern, the open conflict between regime supporters and opposition groups is ongoing in Libya. The conflict has already prompted many Member States to evacuate their nationals.* Likewise, some third countries with a large migrant workforce in Libya are doing the same.

Most migrant workers are escaping violence in Libya by going to Tunisia or Egypt. By the beginning of March 2011, roughly 100 000 migrants had arrived in Tunisia alone. Importantly, the rapid provision of transport assets by Egypt and several Member States and the successful evacuation of a significant share of arriving migrant workers (mostly to Egypt) have reduced the size of this ongoing humanitarian crisis.

At the Tunisian border with Libya, accommodation conditions for the remaining migrant workers remain inadequate. The build-up of stranded migrant workers from southeastern Asia (mainly Bangladesh) and to a much lesser extent from sub-Saharan Africa continues as a result. However, at the time of writing there were no indications suggesting that these stranded workers were illegally migrating to the EU. Maritime arrivals in Lampedusa also remain almost exclusively limited to Tunisian nationals.

* The EU Military Staff's planning and movement cell is liaising with Member States and the Monitoring and Information Centre to facilitate the coordination of military assets for evacuation or humanitarian purposes. The EU Situation Centre is monitoring the situation and assisting member states in their efforts. The EU's consular on-line system is contributing to the exchange of information between Member States. The EU Satellite Centre is providing imagery to support evacuation efforts.

Box 5: Previous refugee crisis – the case of Kosovo

The launch of the NATO air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in March 1999 produced a refugee crisis which remains unique in terms of its unprecedented magnitude. Namely, the neighbouring former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM), a country with slightly more than 2 million inhabitants, received almost 350 000 refugees from Kosovo in a very short period of time.**


Importantly, by July 1999 more than 220 000 Kosovar refugees returned to Kosovo. The remainder either stayed in fYROM or returned to Kosovo at a later stage. Consequently, this, the largest single refugee crisis in Europe (after the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina), did not result in significant secondary movements of Kosovar refugees from fYROM to the EU.

** *Refugee Crisis in Macedonia during the Kosovo Conflict in 1999*, Donco Donev, Silvana Onceva, Ilija Gligorov, 2002

Turkey's liberal visa policy continues

The Turkish government continues to pursue its so-called visa-free neighbourhood policy. There are currently more than 60 countries whose nationals are exempt from visa requirements to enter Turkey.

Map 5: Visa policy of Turkey



In June 2010, Turkey agreed to establish a cooperation council with Jordan, Syria and Lebanon in order to create a zone of free movement of goods and persons. This free trade agreement follows earlier visa-liberalisation agreements between the four countries.

The latest additions to the Turkish visa-free list are Yemen, a country with an active Islamic insurgency and Kyrgyzstan a country that underwent a violent regime change in April 2010. In addition, a visa-free regime could be introduced between Russia and Turkey in April 2011.

In March 2011, Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq have agreed to start issuing joint visas. The measure, would allow travellers to visit all four countries with a single visa. In practical terms this agreement probably amounts to additional expansion of the already liberal Turkish visa policy. Iranian, Iraqi and Syrian visa policies will now become part of the Turkish one, thus increasing the number of nationals from risk countries able to travel to Turkey. Likewise, Turkish authorities have expressed their wish to conclude a visa-free agreement with Egypt.

Turkey's visa policies provide additional indications of a possible shift in Ankara's foreign-policy goals and could further complicate its already difficult negotiations with the EU on a readmission agreement and the possible start of visa discussions.

Local Border Traffic agreements at the eastern external borders of the EU

During 2010, several agreements of Local Border Traffic were signed between Member States and Eastern Border neighbouring countries: Norway with Russia, Poland with Belarus and Lithuania with Belarus.

The working Local Border Traffic Agreements between Ukraine and several Member States, show that the threat of misusing local border traffic procedures is low (in Poland 6% of the total number of border traffic is used by persons travelling under the LBT agreement rules).

China's specific situation

The internal situation in China continues to be determined by several key economic, social and demographic factors. Namely, internal migration of an estimated 130 million Chinese citizens continues to increase.

Changing demographics will significantly affect the Chinese labour market. According to a study by China's Youth Research Commission, the young labour force (aged 16–24) will continue to expand until 2020, but the yearly addition to the labour pool will be significantly reduced from 22 million per year between 2005 and 2010 to less than 500 000 per year after 2015.

* Article in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: *Annual Meeting of China Development Forum on 22 March 2010*

A spokesman from the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of China stated that the registered urban unemployment rate stood at 4.2% at the end of June 2010. At the same time the Premier of the State Council in March 2010 commented that China was facing unemployment figures in the region of 200 million jobless citizens.*

** Europol's contribution to ARA 2011

According to Europol**, 'the most important pull factors the Chinese irregular migrants to the EU are to reunite with family members already legally or illegally residing in the EU, the perceived possibilities of making money in the EU and the status it lends a family to have a family member resident in the EU'.

Box 6: Approved Destination Status (ADS) – JO Hydra preliminary results

The Joint Operation Hydra (Extended) 2010 was launched to identify the extent of abuse of the ADS visas issued by Member States to Chinese tourist groups. It took place from mid September to mid-October 2010 with an additional data-collection phase which ran for two weeks immediately subsequent to the operation.

Out of a total of 7 344 Chinese citizens in possession of ADS visas whose arrival and departure were monitored, a total of 109 (1.5%) failed to depart according to their set schedule. There were no signs of a high degree of specialisation and organised abuse of the ADS system. In fact, the most detected *modi operandi* during the operation were the abuse of valid Schengen visas (visa type C and D) and of transit without visa concession (visa type A).

The results of the Joint Operation provide a valuable snapshot of the situation and thus further substantiate the 2010 ARA assumption that ADS would not be the most often abused visa for Chinese irregular migration coming to the EU.

Global food prices approach historic highs of 2008

The World Bank food-price index rose steadily throughout 2010, almost surpassing the peak reached in June 2008, when the average price of staple food more than doubled in a relatively short time. Since June 2010 higher food prices have pushed an estimated 44 million additional people in developing countries into extreme poverty.



Picture 11: High food prices and unemployment were the two main factors fuelling the protests in Egypt and Tunisia

As seen in 2008, the effects of price increases in third countries depend mostly on factors like local production conditions and the extent of governmental price subsidies.

Although higher food prices were not the main cause leading to regime changes in Egypt and Tunisia, they were a significant aggravating factor. In most cases, the Middle East and North African governments tried to offset the rising price of staple foods either as a response to, or in prevention of, protests breaking out.

For example, Algeria and Jordan relaxed food taxes or duties on food imports or cut prices of staple foods, while Morocco's government has promised to keep food and fuel prices heavily subsidised.

Importantly, however, good harvests in sub-Saharan Africa have so far spared that region from rising food prices.

4.2.2 Regional conflicts

Afghanistan-Pakistan

Over the past two years the situation in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region has worsened significantly. The 'surge' in US troops in Afghanistan in 2010 and some recently announced tactical gains are no reason to believe that the troubling situation in the region is going to change for the better. Additionally, the 2010 flooding in Pakistan, which affected approximately 14 million people, will inevitably reduce food and agricultural output in 2011, and may also aggravate economic and political problems.



Picture 12: During conflict situations, refugees are among the most vulnerable group

According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) the security situation has continued to deteriorate in many parts of the country. The overall number of security incidents has significantly increased in comparison to 2009, which at the time was considered to be the peak of escalating violence and widening disorder across the region.

Coalition forces fatalities in Afghanistan continue to increase and reached 711 in 2010 (a 36% increase over the 521 fatalities in 2009). The 2009 numbers were already more than 76% higher than the 295 killed in 2008. The Interior Ministry of Afghanistan was quoted as stating that 2 043 civilians were killed and 3 570 wounded in 2010.

Other areas of concern

The population in Afghanistan is increasing at a dramatic rate. The annual average population growth stood at 3.5% between 2000 and 2008. Further population growth will exacerbate the unemployment crisis and increase the frustration of the youth, among which unemployment rates are well above 50%.

Afghanistan remains the world's largest producer of opium with an estimated 90% of global supply. In addition to its opium production, Afghanistan has now also become the world's largest producer of cannabis. Drugs from Afghanistan are mainly trafficked to Europe and Russia.

The continuous terrorist and insurgent threats together with the devastating floods of 2010 are currently the main concerns in Pakistan. There, at least 7 435 persons were killed in terrorism-related violence in 2010. Additionally, at the end of July 2010, heavy rains triggered floods in several parts of Pakistan, resulting in the loss of life, widespread displacement of people and enormous infrastructural destruction of the agricultural sector.

Worryingly, more than 1.5 million of the 1.7 million registered Afghan refugees in Pakistan were located in the flood-affected provinces. Nevertheless, Afghan return rates have dropped drastically over recent years, mainly due to the deteriorating security situation and socio-economic problems in Afghanistan. The goal to voluntarily repatriate all registered Afghan refugees in Pakistan by the end of 2012 now seems to be unachievable.

According to a 2010 census, there are approximately 1.5 million undocumented Afghan nationals irregularly residing in Iran. The number of registered Afghan refugees opting for voluntary repatriation from Iran back to Afghanistan has declined over the last several years. However, according to the UNHCR, Iran forcefully deported 286 000 Afghans in 2010, adding to over one million already forcefully deported during the previous two years.

Côte d'Ivoire

According to the United Nations (UN), at least 247 people have died in political violence since 16 December 2010. The crisis started after the incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo refused to concede power to Alassane Ouattara, who won 54% of the vote. Gbagbo, backed by the Constitutional Court, named himself the winner, declared a curfew and closed all borders.

The crisis continues and Côte d'Ivoire is increasingly being partitioned into two parts; mostly Muslim north and predominately Christian south. The situation resembles that of an earlier civil conflict. Internal displacements and refugee flows to neighbouring Liberia are increasing.

Conflict in North Caucasus

The situation in the North Caucasus republics of the Russian Federation still remains tense. The number of attacks by militant groups against the Russian security forces and officials in 2010 remained at the same level as in 2009.

Russian troops and border guards deployed in South Ossetia are also causing additional tensions in Georgia. The Federal Security Service (FSB) is planning to deploy more troops and border guards to the border with Georgia (in South Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia and Chechnya) as its answer to Georgia's border activities.

These moves come after the President of Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili signed a decree allowing all Russian citizens living or registered in the Russian Republics of Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Cherkassy and Adygeya, to travel to Georgia without a visa requirement as from 13 October 2010.

Somalia


For the past 20 years, ever since the fall of Siad Barre in January 1991, Somalia has been ravaged by violence. Somalia is, in effect, a failed state and its insecurity has overflowed into the immediate region and beyond. The major push factors continue to be the volatile security situation coupled with the unstable political, social, economic and famine situation on the ground in Somalia.

Somalia is the country displacing the highest number of migrants globally, after Afghanistan and Iraq. UNHCR figures indicate that at least over 600 000 are living in Somalia's neighbouring countries, which include Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Tanzania, Uganda and Yemen. This figure is in addition to the over 1.4 million internally displaced people within Somalia.

UNHCR figures for 2010 suggest that 200 000 people were internally displaced within Somalia, while another 70 000 fled to neighbouring countries.

The north of Somalia has fared better than the rest of the country. South and central Somalia are the most ravaged violent areas. However armed militias have cropped up in Somaliland and Puntland. This development is assessed to have a negative impact on both of these respective generally more stable secessionist and semi-autonomous Somali provinces.

In January 2011, Puntland withdrew its cooperation with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Puntland has indeed asked the UN to reconsider its position towards the TFG. This is assessed to have direct implications on Puntland's possible future aspirations and political options.



Officially Puntland states that it wants to stay within Somalia's sphere, but it also asked the TFG to end any representation for Puntland. This implies that Puntland could be moving towards a secessionist policy similar to that of the self-proclaimed independent state of Somaliland.

The region of Puntland is crucial in regard to both migration and maritime piracy. Bossaso is the most prevalent departure point for migrants to cross the Gulf of Aden to Yemen. Since 2007, the number of migrants arriving on the Yemeni shores has been on the increase.

This is a mixed flow of migrants; however it is predominantly Somalis who make the perilous crossing, as well as Ethiopians (together with ethnic Somalis from Ethiopia), Eritreans, Ugandans, Tanzanians and Sudanese.

5. Statistical annex

Legend: Symbols and abbreviations **n.a.** not applicable
: data not available

Source: FRAN data received as of 25 February 2011

Table A1 :
ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSING BETWEEN BCPs

Detections at the external borders by top ten nationalities

	2008	2009	2010	Share in total	% change on a year ago
Total All External Borders					
Albania	43 956	38 905	33 258	(32%)	-15%
Afghanistan	19 222	14 539	25 918	(25%)	78%
Algeria	4 020	4 487	8 763	(8.4%)	95%
Somalia	11 543	9 115	4 619	(4.4%)	-49%
Palestine	4 252	9 189	4 276	(4.1%)	-53%
Pakistan	3 157	1 592	3 881	(3.7%)	144%
Iraq	8 648	4 134	3 628	(3.5%)	-12%
Morocco	8 932	1 710	1 959	(1.9%)	15%
Bangladesh	1 477	551	1 647	(1.6%)	199%
Not specified	3 543	1 067	1 593	(1.5%)	49%
Other	50 342	19 310	14 507	(14%)	-25%
Total EU	159 092	104 599	104 049		-0.5%
Land Border					
Albania	41 195	38 088	32 592	(36%)	-14%
Afghanistan	1 224	2 410	22 844	(25%)	848%
Algeria	558	676	6 961	(7.8%)	930%
Somalia	537	259	4 102	(4.6%)	1 484%
Pakistan	2 640	1 328	3 675	(4.1%)	177%
Iraq	6 064	3 351	3 245	(3.6%)	-3.2%
Palestine	2 735	2 791	2 661	(3.0%)	-4.7%
Bangladesh	1 078	305	1 506	(1.7%)	394%
Morocco	5 343	737	1 319	(1.5%)	79%
Not specified	1 617	565	1 304	(1.5%)	131%
Other	11 158	6 930	9 582	(11%)	38%
Total Land	74 149	57 440	89 791		56%
Sea Border					
Afghanistan	17 998	12 129	3 074	(22%)	-75%
Algeria	3 462	3 811	1 802	(13%)	-53%
Palestine	1 517	6 398	1 615	(11%)	-75%
Egypt	2 583	545	713	(5.0%)	31%
Tunisia	7 602	1 643	711	(5.0%)	-57%
Albania	2 761	817	666	(4.7%)	-18%
Morocco	3 589	973	640	(4.5%)	-34%
Somalia	11 006	8 856	517	(3.6%)	-94%
Eritrea	4 928	2 195	507	(3.6%)	-77%
Iraq	2 584	783	383	(2.7%)	-51%
Other	26 913	9 009	3 630	(25%)	-60%
Total Sea	84 943	47 159	14 258		-70%

Table A2 :

CLANDESTINE ENTRIES AT BCPs

Detections reported by top ten nationalities at the external land and sea borders

	2009	2010	Share in total	% change on a year ago
Border Type				
Land	137	168	(69%)	23%
Sea	159	74	(31%)	-53%
Top Ten Nationalities				
Turkey	73	93	(38%)	27%
Algeria	30	35	(14%)	17%
Morocco	20	14	(5.8%)	-30%
Pakistan	2	12	(5.0%)	500%
Afghanistan	18	8	(3.3%)	-56%
Philippines	0	8	(3.3%)	n.a.
Iraq	21	7	(2.9%)	-67%
Albania	3	7	(2.9%)	133%
Iran	6	6	(2.5%)	0%
Croatia	3	6	(2.5%)	100%
Other	120	46	(19%)	-62%
Total EU	296	242		-18%

Table A3 :

FACILITATORS

Detections reported by top ten nationalities

	2008	2009	2010	Share in total	% change on a year ago
Top Ten Nationalities					
Italy	580	875	1 367	(16%)	56%
China	713	731	554	(6.4%)	-24%
Albania	641	670	430	(5.0%)	-36%
Morocco	503	475	413	(4.8%)	-13%
Romania	134	292	398	(4.6%)	36%
France	207	230	365	(4.2%)	59%
Greece	358	461	308	(3.6%)	-33%
Turkey	502	405	305	(3.5%)	-25%
Bulgaria	282	344	287	(3.3%)	-17%
Spain	259	286	285	(3.3%)	-0.3%
Other	5 705	4 402	3 917	(45%)	-11%
Total EU	9 884	9 171	8 629		-5.9%

ILLEGAL STAY

Detections reported by Member State, place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2008	2009	2010	Share in total	% change on a year ago
Top Ten Nationalities					
Morocco	30 525	25 816	22 131	(6.3%)	-14%
Afghanistan	29 058	38 637	21 104	(6.1%)	-45%
Albania	33 547	28 810	20 837	(6.0%)	-28%
Serbia	6 488	9 361	14 985	(4.3%)	60%
Algeria	13 367	12 286	14 204	(4.1%)	16%
Brazil	29 232	17 067	13 369	(3.8%)	-22%
Iraq	30 046	18 618	12 459	(3.6%)	-33%
China	11 924	12 424	10 966	(3.1%)	-12%
Pakistan	7 857	9 058	10 469	(3.0%)	16%
Somalia	6 962	11 737	10 346	(3.0%)	-12%
Other	242 597	228 311	197 796	(57%)	-13%
Total EU	441 230	412 125	348 666		-15%

APPLICATIONS FOR ASYLUM

Applications for international protection reported by top ten nationalities

	2008	2009	2010	Share in total	% change on a year ago
Top Ten Nationalities					
Afghanistan	13 600	24 699	21 552	(11%)	-13%
Serbia	9 388	11 778	20 731	(10%)	76%
Somalia	18 853	19 529	15 348	(7.5%)	-21%
Iraq	31 008	17 601	15 037	(7.4%)	-15%
Russia	16 987	15 063	13 059	(6.4%)	-13%
Iran, Islamic Republic of	6 574	7 950	9 691	(4.8%)	22%
Pakistan	10 828	8 358	7 129	(3.5%)	-15%
Not specified	22 002	8 906	6 906	(3.4%)	-22%
Eritrea	8 556	7 910	6 897	(3.4%)	-13%
Nigeria	11 343	9 122	5 320	(2.6%)	-42%
Other	74 041	88 898	82 210	(40%)	-7.5%
Total EU	223 180	219 814	203 880		-7.2%

Table A4 :

REFUSALS OF ENTRY BY NATIONALITY

Refusals reported by border type at the external borders

	2008	2009	2010	Share in total	% change on a year ago
Total All External Borders					
Ukraine	15 394	18 964	18 743	(17%)	-1.2%
Russia	7 957	7 608	9 165	(8.4%)	20%
Serbia	3 274	3 946	6 990	(6.4%)	77%
Brazil	11 121	8 062	6 178	(5.7%)	-23%
Belarus	4 337	4 965	5 662	(5.2%)	14%
Croatia	5 693	4 944	4 305	(4.0%)	-13%
FYROM	1 177	2 084	4 073	(3.8%)	95%
Turkey	4 104	3 859	3 656	(3.4%)	-5.3%
Georgia	358	6 045	3 328	(3.1%)	-45%
United States	2 773	2 946	2 446	(2.3%)	-17%
Other	65 106	49 606	43 954	(41%)	-11%
Total EU	121 294	113 029	108 500		-4.0%
Land Border					
Ukraine	14 473	17 963	17 658	(33%)	-1.7%
Russia	6 444	6 048	6 389	(12%)	5.6%
Serbia	2 781	3 386	5 720	(11%)	69%
Belarus	4 223	4 828	5 555	(10%)	15%
Croatia	5 430	4 684	4 067	(7.5%)	-13%
FYROM	1 086	1 926	3 307	(6.1%)	72%
Georgia	119	5 841	3 098	(5.7%)	-47%
Turkey	2 300	1 885	1 754	(3.3%)	-6.9%
Moldova	4 956	1 582	1 427	(2.6%)	-10%
Albania	278	771	1 263	(2.3%)	64%
Other	3 733	3 825	3 677	(6.8%)	-3.9%
Total Land	45 823	52 739	53 915		2.2%
Air Border					
Brazil	10 926	7 956	6 072	(12%)	-24%
United States	2 650	2 834	2 338	(4.8%)	-18%
Nigeria	2 634	2 141	1 717	(3.5%)	-20%
China	4 835	2 741	1 610	(3.3%)	-41%
Turkey	1 437	1 695	1 599	(3.2%)	-5.7%
Paraguay	2 467	1 663	1 495	(3.0%)	-10%
India	1 135	1 443	1 492	(3.0%)	3.4%
Not specified	7 288	1 854	1 434	(2.9%)	-23%
Russia	1 321	1 310	1 363	(2.8%)	4.0%
Venezuela	1 732	1 838	1 183	(2.4%)	-36%
Other	30 466	30 131	28 911	(59%)	-4.0%
Total Air	66 891	55 606	49 214		-11%
Sea Border					
Russia	192	250	1 413	(26%)	465%
Philippines	648	403	589	(11%)	46%
Albania	234	377	437	(8.1%)	16%
Morocco	2 933	1 249	329	(6.1%)	-74%
Turkey	363	279	303	(5.6%)	8.6%
India	1 261	223	227	(4.2%)	1.8%
Ukraine	217	144	194	(3.6%)	35%
Serbia	61	77	133	(2.5%)	73%
Tunisia	81	74	108	(2.0%)	46%
FYROM	18	21	91	(1.7%)	333%
Others	2 548	1 587	1 547	(29%)	-2.5%
Total Sea	8 556	4 684	5 371		15%

Table A5 :

REASONS FOR REFUSAL OF ENTRY

Reasons for refusal of entry reported by top ten nationalities

	2010									Total Refused persons
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	
	No valid doc	False doc	No valid visa	False visa	No justification	Over 3 mo. stay	No subsistence	Alert issued	Threat	
Top Ten Nationalities										
Ukraine	116	96	4 803	74	8 251	2 212	1 586	1 289	101	18 743
Russia	250	34	6 626	154	868	57	756	360	256	9 165
Serbia	72	39	1 388	46	332	595	838	3 528	139	6 990
Brazil	16	33	572	11	2 428	211	405	675	56	6 178
Belarus	8	1	2 571	6	1 372	35	1 505	110	94	5 662
Croatia	1 067	11	81	2	94	1 007	232	751	937	4 305
FYROM	66	7	394	25	624	497	529	1 906	57	4 073
Turkey	213	132	2 090	102	487	71	290	271	56	3 656
Georgia	7	14	2 926	34	94	11	23	217	0	3 328
United States	53	6	33	1	34	105	10	57	23	2 446
Other	2 898	2 542	9 774	1 263	11 401	790	2 402	3 478	842	43 954
Total EU	4 766	2 915	31 258	1 718	25 985	5 591	8 576	12 642	2 561	108 500

Descriptions of the reasons for refusal of entry

- (A) has no valid travel document(s);
- (B) has a false/counterfeit/forged travel document;
- (C) has no valid visa or residence permit;
- (D) has a false/counterfeit/forged visa or residence permit;
- (E) has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay;
- (F) has already stayed for three months during a six months period on the territory of the Member States of the European Union;
- (G) does not have sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period and form of stay, or the means to return to the country of origin or transit;
- (H) is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of refusing entry in the SIS or in the national register;
- (I) is considered to be a threat for public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of one or more Member States of the European Union;

Table A6 :

REASONS FOR REFUSAL OF ENTRY

Refusals of entry at the external borders by reason for refusal*

	2009	2010	Share in total	% change on a year ago
Total				
C) No valid visa	36 447	31 258	(28%)	-14%
E) No justification	29 736	25 985	(23%)	-13%
H) Alert issued	7 556	12 642	(11%)	67%
G) No subsistence	7 105	8 576	(7.7%)	21%
F) Over 3 mo. stay	2 010	5 591	(5.0%)	178%
A) No valid doc	5 960	4 766	(4.3%)	-20%
B) False doc	3 099	2 915	(2.6%)	-5.9%
I) Threat	2 329	2 561	(2.3%)	10%
D) False visa	1 599	1 718	(1.6%)	7.4%
Reason not available	17 862	14 798	(13%)	-17%
Total EU	113 703	110 810		-2.5%
Land Border				
C) No valid visa	24 990	19 668	(36%)	-21%
E) No justification	12 240	11 523	(21%)	-5.9%
H) Alert issued	5 167	8 901	(16%)	72%
G) No subsistence	5 121	5 298	(10%)	3.5%
F) Over 3 mo. stay	1 149	4 633	(8.5%)	303%
I) Threat	1 625	1 752	(3.2%)	7.8%
A) No valid doc	1 962	1 747	(3.2%)	-11%
B) False doc	170	420	(0.8%)	147%
D) False visa	326	410	(0.8%)	26%
Reason not available	54	3		-94%
Total Land	52 804	54 355		2.9%
Air Border				
E) No justification	17 230	14 350	(3.9%)	-17%
C) No valid visa	10 268	8 871	(28%)	-14%
G) No subsistence	1 933	3 190	(17%)	65%
H) Alert issued	2 002	2 988	(6.2%)	49%
B) False doc	2 754	2 380	(5.9%)	-14%
A) No valid doc	2 292	2 175	(4.7%)	-5.1%
D) False visa	1 211	1 269	(4.3%)	4.8%
F) Over 3 mo. stay	828	919	(2.5%)	11%
I) Threat	649	790	(1.8%)	22%
Reason not available	17 050	14 127	(1.5%)	-17%
Total Air	56 217	51 059		-9.2%
Sea Border				
C) No valid visa	1 189	2 719	(50%)	129%
A) No valid doc	1 706	844	(16%)	-51%
H) Alert issued	387	753	(14%)	95%
B) False doc	175	115	(2.1%)	-34%
E) No justification	266	112	(2.1%)	-58%
G) No subsistence	51	88	(1.6%)	73%
D) False visa	62	39	(0.7%)	-37%
F) Over 3 mo. stay	33	39	(0.7%)	18%
I) Threat	55	19	(0.4%)	-65%
Reason not available	758	668	(12%)	-12%
Total Sea	4 682	5 396		15%


* One person can be refused for several reasons

Table A7 :

PERSONS USING FALSE DOCUMENTS

Detections on entry at the external borders by top ten nationalities of persons and documents used

	2009	2010	Share in total	% change on a year ago	Highest share
Border Type					
Air	6 344	7 046	(75%)	11%	Not specified (23%)
Land	1 166	1 733	(18%)	49%	Poland (32%)
Sea	361	660	(7.0%)	83%	Not specified (83%)
Not specified	1	0			
Top Ten Nationalities of Persons					
Not specified	709	1 165	(12%)	64%	Morocco (22%)
Ukraine	521	993	(11%)	91%	Ukraine (85%)
Morocco	213	619	(6.6%)	191%	Not specified (14%)
Nigeria	581	472	(5.0%)	-19%	Albania (9%)
Turkey	356	416	(4.4%)	17%	Albania (21%)
Iran	298	404	(4.3%)	36%	Turkey (25%)
China	354	321	(3.4%)	-9.3%	Ukraine (95%)
Algeria	64	278	(2.9%)	334%	Nigeria (78%)
Sri Lanka	248	249	(2.6%)	0.4%	Congo (13%)
Albania	246	232	(2.5%)	-5.7%	Turkey (88%)
Other	4 282	4 290	(45%)	0.2%	Not specified (16%)
Top Ten Nationalities of Documents					
Not specified	1 893	2 423	(26%)	28%	Morocco (22%)
Poland	305	686	(7.3%)	125%	Ukraine (85%)
France	458	590	(6.3%)	29%	Not specified (14%)
Italy	420	475	(5.0%)	13%	Albania (9%)
Greece	164	414	(4.4%)	152%	Albania (21%)
Germany	207	350	(3.7%)	69%	Turkey (25%)
Ukraine	201	272	(2.9%)	35%	Ukraine (95%)
Nigeria	232	229	(2.4%)	-1.3%	Nigeria (78%)
Belgium	257	203	(2.2%)	-21%	Congo (13%)
Turkey	189	198	(2.1%)	4.8%	Turkey (88%)
Other	3 546	3 599	(38%)	1.5%	Not specified (16%)
Total EU	7 872	9 439		20%	



FRONTEX
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