



**FRIEDRICH
EBERT** 
STIFTUNG

VERA MESSING – BENCE SÁGVÁRI

STILL DIVIDED BUT MORE OPEN

MAPPING EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION
BEFORE AND AFTER THE MIGRATION CRISIS

THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY (ESS)

The European Social Survey (ESS) is an academically driven, cross-national survey that has been conducted across Europe since its establishment in 2001. Every two years, face-to-face interviews are conducted with newly selected, cross-sectional samples.



The survey measures the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of diverse populations in more than thirty nations. The main aims of the ESS are:

- to chart stability and change in social structure, conditions and attitudes in Europe, and to interpret how Europe's social, political and moral fabric is changing;
- to achieve and spread higher standards of rigour in cross-national research in the social sciences, including for example, questionnaire design and pre-testing, sampling, data collection, reduction of bias and the reliability of questions;
- to introduce soundly-based indicators of national progress, based on citizens' perceptions and judgements of key aspects of their societies;
- to undertake and facilitate the training of European social researchers in comparative quantitative measurement and analysis;
- to improve the visibility and outreach of data on social change among academics, policy makers and the wider public.

The ESS data is available free of charge for non-commercial use.

In 2005 the ESS was the winner of the Descartes Prize for Research & Science Communication.

Following an application to the European Commission which was submitted by the UK on behalf of 14 other countries, the ESS was awarded European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ERIC) status on 30th November 2013.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

- Based on data from the European Social Survey (ESS) the **analysis explores cross-national differences in perceptions of migration**, and discovers factors that may lie behind the immense differences in the acceptance versus rejection of migrants across European countries.
- **The results show how attitudes have changed from before to after the 2015 migration ‘crisis’, and also** draw a wider picture of attitude shifts in 15 European countries **between 2002 and 2016/17**.
- Overall, **the perception of migration in European countries remains neutral and stable** – respondents see as many advantages as disadvantages of worldwide mobility. In terms of behaviour, roughly one tenth of surveyed Europeans would unconditionally reject migrants arriving from poorer countries outside Europe and settling in their countries.
- Considering the immediate differences in attitudes before and after 2015 migration crisis, **the overall level of unconditional rejection has decreased from 15% to 10%**. People in the **UK, Ireland and Portugal have become significantly more positive** about migrants, while only **Hungarians and Estonians became significantly more negative**. Attitudes in other countries did not change in a significant manner.
- In contrast to long-term democracies, in Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, and Lithuania negative attitudes are more likely to be turned into negative behavioural or policy expectations. It is suspected that the **strength of norms as set by political and public discourse plays a decisive role in determining the degree to which negative attitudes are turned into explicit rejection and exclusion**.
- The conclusion of our previous study “*widespread and homogenizing anti-migrant attitudes in some countries have little to do with migrants*” has been further supported by the present analysis. **Anti-migrant attitudes are strongest and are likely to increase further in countries** where migrants are hardly present, where people don’t have personal experiences with immigrants but **where they lack the feeling of safety and control**.
- Looking into **which values are associated with certain attitudes**, two types of values show the strongest correlation: **security and humanitarianism**. Those who attribute great significance to security tend to be the most negative towards immigration, while those who value equality and respect of other people are least fearful of migrants.
- **In most countries** (with four exceptions) **humanitarian values are more dominant than security**. Especially in the Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway and Finland), the Netherlands, France, Germany, Switzerland and Belgium, humanitarian values are – in general – valued more highly than security.
- Looking at how support for certain political parties is associated with attitudes towards migrants, left-wing voters generally tend to have a positive attitude towards migration, centrist voters are broadly neutral, while right-wings voters generally have a negative attitude. **However, while those self-identifying with the left are equally positive about migration, irrespective of how left-oriented they feel, political right-wing extremism correlates with extreme anti-migrant attitudes**.

-
- Right-wing populist parties gather and feed that part of the population which is very negative towards migrants and migration in general. **They seem to provide a terrain on which to openly express the rage fuelled by uncertainty, and to blame migrants.** In almost all countries one or two such parties exist, the difference lies rather in how powerful they are.
 - When looking at the profile of those expressing homogeneously negative attitudes towards migrants we see that it is not the basic demographic profile that makes them unique from the rest of the population but rather their subjective perceptions. **Those who feel politically disempowered, financially insecure and without social support are more likely to have homogeneously anti- migrant attitudes** compared to the rest of the population.
 - The analysis of attitudes towards migration by supporters of right-wing populist parties demonstrates that although their perceptions of the consequences of migration are quite similar (very negative) across countries, the rejection of migrants is very different. **These data show the degree to which dominant norms, set by mainstream politics, matter in terms of transforming aversion into extreme rejection of migrants.** Hence, the political power such parties wield – whether in government or in opposition – plays a critical role in determining the degree to which anti-migrant narratives are allowed to become the norm within a society.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1	Introduction	4
2	Conceptual and theoretical framework	6
2.1	Construction of attitudes	6
2.2	How do we measure attitudes towards migration and migrants?	7
2.3	Who are the ‘migrants’ in our study?	8
2.4	Factors likely to influence attitudes	9
3	Results	12
3.1	Snapshot on attitudes. The relationship between perception and rejection	12
3.2	Attitudes before and after the 2015 mass inflow of refugees	14
	Change in the rejection of migrants	14
	Change in perception of migration	15
	Whose attitudes have changed? Drivers of attitude change	16
3.3	Birds’ eye view: analysis of the changes attitudes across time	19
3.4	The role of regions	24
3.5	Personal values that feed pro- and anti-migrant attitudes	26
3.6	Anti-migrant attitudes and political populism: which is the chicken and which the egg?	30
	Extreme negative attitudes on migration	33
4	Summary and concluding remarks	35
5	References	38
6	Appendix	40
	Perception and Rejection indexes by party preferences in selected countries	40
	Results of the logistic regression explaining extreme negative perception of migration	41

1 INTRODUCTION

We are experiencing a tectonic shift in terms of growing populism and xenophobic political and public discourse in Europe and its wider environment. According to a recent study “the number of Europeans voting for populist parties in national elections has surged from 7% to 25%” since 1998.”¹ Fear of migration is embedded in the above process; its narratives may be understood as a crystallization of wider uncertainties within populations. These uncertainties are brought about by rapid technological and global challenges which are difficult for individuals to follow or explain, especially those with weak educational backgrounds or low levels of interest in grasping the complexities these issues entail. Quite a number of political forces in Europe (and the world) benefit from people’s growing insecurity by offering simplistic explanations for extremely complex phenomena. One of the main topics polarising Europe’s political landscape is the evaluation of migration and its consequences for domestic economies and societies.

This report aims to contribute to this discussion with fresh empirical evidence and sober interpretations. Our aim is to explore cross-national differences in perceptions towards migration, and discover factors that may lie behind the immense differences in the acceptance or rejection of migrants across European countries. This paper is a continuation of our previous study, published in March 2018 and entitled *‘Looking behind the culture of fear. Cross-National Analysis of Attitudes towards Migration in Europe’*.² We aim to fill in some of the gaps that our previous analysis did not cover, and to provide a wider time-frame: instead of focusing on one point of time, we show how attitudes have changed from before to after the 2015 migration ‘crisis’, and also draw a wider picture about the changes of attitudes in 15 European countries between 2002 and 2016/17. The key question is whether the arrival of large numbers of refugees and the challenges that they posed to the societies and institutions of Europe’s states have significantly transformed general attitudes, and if so, in what ways did this occur? Has the map of Europe changed in terms of people’s attitudes, and if so, what are the main factors heightening or dampening anti-migrant sentiments? In addition, we aim to extend our explanation of why individuals and certain social groups fear migrants more than others, and to examine whether differences may be explained primarily within the framework of country groups, nation states or sub-national regions.

In our earlier analysis of factors triggering the acceptance or rejection of migrants we referred to data from before the mass arrival of refugees at the borders of the EU in 2015. Based on these we established that *“people in countries with a large migrant population, with a high level of general and institutional trust, low level of corruption, a stable, well performing economy and high level of social cohesion and inclusion (including migrants) fear migration the least. To put it in simple terms, people are fearful in countries where the basic tissue of society is damaged, where people don’t trust each other or the state’s institutions, and where social cohesion and solidarity is weak. And they are probably fearful in general terms; migrants are only a perfect target to express their fears, especially if they have little personal experience with them.”* We concluded that *“widespread and homogenizing anti-migrant attitudes in some countries have little to do with migrants; they are rather a consequence and*

¹ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2018/nov/20/revealed-one-in-four-europeans-vote-populist>

² Messing and Ságvári (2018) *‘Looking behind the culture of fear. Cross-national analysis of attitudes towards migration in Europe’* Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Budapest. <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/budapest/14181-20180815.pdf>

expression of people's lack of safety and security, and a symptom of deep-rooted problems in the society."

It is common sense that the inflow of refugees into Europe in 2015 caused deep political fractures within the EU and is still one of the key issues along which debates and ideological clashes in European politics crystalize. The mass arrival of people from the Middle-East and Africa has triggered a rise in political populism and became a key topic for populist political powers. The Economist, in a lead article, states that *"The fear of migration is poisoning Western politics. Donald Trump owes his job to it. Brexit would not be happening without it. Strident nationalists wield power in Italy, Hungary, Poland and Austria and have gained influence elsewhere"*³. Populist anti-migrant voices in politics spread rapidly, despite the fact that most European countries in the main benefit from migration: the bulk of economic literature demonstrates that migration is advantageous for the receiving country's economy, because it provides flexibility to its labour markets and economy, which is a key precondition to global competitiveness. (Zimmermann and Kahanec 2009)

However, mass immigration also makes many people anxious; many are afraid of the crowds arriving from predominantly Islamic countries, who have left their homes amid horrible conditions of war, armed conflict and hopeless economic prospects, and have been on the move for many years. These fears are both honestly held and deep-rooted. But this is not the first time Europeans have experienced a mass inflow of asylum seekers. If we look at mass refugee flows historically, we find that the most recent peak in the number of asylum seekers, which took place in the 1990s (triggered by the war on the Balkan and armed conflicts in the Middle East Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa [Somalia]), was of a similar size and composition. *"...when we look at the total numbers per half a decade and compare the 1990s with the first half of the 2010s then the number and origin in recent years do not deviate from what Western Europe experienced two decades ago. On the contrary, the total numbers in the years 2011-15 are lower than those in the first half of the 1990s. Furthermore, the sudden increase in numbers in 2014 and especially 2015 had a clear cause, the civil war in Syria, and there were no signs that indifferent masses of poor migrants from the Global South had been unleashed."* (Lucassen 2018:385) Still, the reception of this new wave of asylum seekers was met with an apocalyptic tone from mainstream politicians, and rising, untrammelled fear in public and political discourse that had never before been experienced.

It is vital therefore that we understand what triggers the fear of migration, and whether social attitudes towards migrants and migration are actually supporting the rise of anti-migrant discourses and political powers in Europe. It is also essential to see which social groups are more likely to perceive migrants as a threat and which may see migration as a potential gain to society. We would like to find individual and societal factors that are likely to play a role in modifying fear of migrants, and consequently feed into policies towards a calmer environment in this respect.

We will draw a longitudinal picture of how attitudes have changed during the last 15 years in Europe. Based on academic literature, we presumed that *"attitudes are very stable social constructions that change only very slightly and very slowly."* (Messing-Ságvári 2018:3) And, by and large, they do seem to be quite stable. However, deep shocks to societies, such as the economic crisis of 2008 in countries that were hit hard, or the refugee crisis in countries which lie along the EU border, can and have changed those attitudes. We will show that although attitudes towards migrants are very stable and

³ The way forward on immigration to the West (25th August, 2018) The Economist, p. 10.

have become slightly more favourable in the past one and a half decades in several European countries, profound crises or traumatic events may have an effect on attitudes towards migrants and migration in the short term.

We also want to address a critical view on the role of countries. In our earlier analysis we presumed that countries are the primary domains for analysing differences in attitudes. This is a well-attested method in cross-national survey research, since the country's social, political and historical context is a major determinant of citizens' attitudes. But this may be a mistake: it is plausible that differences may be greater, for instance, between certain regions of the same country than between countries. Or country affiliation may be less significant in determining attitudes towards migration than other characteristics of the individual.

Linking basic human values to attitudes towards migrants and migration is a novelty in our current analysis. We attempt to demonstrate that the prevalence of certain values is in connection with pro- and anti-migration attitudes, and is therefore – not exclusively, but to a large extent – deeply rooted in our basic personal characteristics.

We also provide a brief overview of how political orientation is echoed in the perception of migration in various countries. We show that personal political orientation, party preferences and openness to right-wing populism are important factors in understanding polarization when it comes to the perception of migration.

2 CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Measuring attitudes towards migration or migrants across many countries, languages and cultures is a complex task, for the simple reason that people may have very different perceptions of the core concepts of '*migrant*' and '*migration*'. (Rustenbach 2010) Also, there may be a variety of forces driving such attitudes. Avoiding a lengthy explanation of the extensive academic and methodological discourses surrounding the problems of measuring attitudes, we will describe four aspects here and argue for the use of three of them in this report.

2.1 CONSTRUCTION OF ATTITUDES

Academic literature discussing the construction of attitudes differentiates between affective (A), behavioural (B) and cognitive (C) components of attitudes (The ABC model). (Berg 2006, Eagly and Chaiken 1998) Although attitudes incorporate these three components, any particular attitude can be based more on one component than another.

The **affective** component refers to the emotional reaction one exhibits toward migrants. Attitudes about hot-button issues – such as politics, sex, and religion – tend to be affectively-based, as they usually come from a person's values.

The **behavioural** component refers to the way one behaves when exposed to migrants. For example, how would someone decide whether to allow or forbid migrants to come and settle in his/her country?

The **cognitive** component refers to the beliefs, knowledge, and thoughts that we have about migrants. Whether we are aware of the number and diversity of migrants in our societies, and also of how their presence affects the country's economy, culture or society. Moreover, the cognitive component of attitudes includes two further elements: **symbolic and material** factors. Material factors refer to the part of an attitude that considers its consequences on material life, such as the economy and welfare of the country. For example, people may have negative attitudes towards migrants because they think migrants pose unfair competition and negatively affect the labour market (pose greater competition for jobs) or the welfare system (larger number of people applying for the same welfare provisions). On the other hand, symbolic components of attitudes are about the intangible consequences of the presence of migrants, reflected in different belief systems, moral values and worldviews. People may feel negatively about migration because they think that migrants may pose a threat to the majority's culture or religious traditions. People who are positive about migrants may think that migration has a positive effect on the country's culture as it fosters diversity and multiculturalism.

2.2 HOW DO WE MEASURE ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION AND MIGRANTS?

In this study we **will analyse the cognitive and the behavioural elements** of attitudes. (Due to a lack of empirical data we are not able to measure the affective element of attitudes.) The individual level survey data is derived from all eight consecutive rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS). ESS is considered one of the most trusted international datasets, and therefore we believe that currently there is no better publicly-available, comparative and time-series dataset by which to measure the cognitive and behavioural component of attitudes in Europe.

For the analysis, we crafted two separate indexes:

1. **The behavioural component** will be indicated by the *Rejection Index (RI)* which denotes the share of those who would *reject any migrants coming from poorer countries outside Europe* without consideration.⁴ We argue that by using only the extreme response to migration as a single indicator we are able to capture the radicalization of attitudes.
2. **The cognitive component** of attitudes will consider both symbolic and material elements. The perception of the consequences of migration on material life is gauged by the following question: *Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?* Symbolic elements of attitudes will be measured by the following question: *"Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?"* Both questions allow the respondent to answer on a scale of 0 to 10 where 0 represents the negative extreme in terms of the perceived effect of migration on the country.

⁴ This index is constructed from a single question: "To what extent do you think [country] should allow people from the poorer countries outside Europe?" (1: Allow many to come and live here; 2: Allow some; 3: Allow a few; 4: Allow none; 8: Don't know) We recoded responses into a binary variable at individual level, summarizing those answering 'allow none' as a percentage of all responses.


FIGURE 1 DISTRIBUTION OF PERCEPTION-INDEX (COGNITIVE ATTITUDES)

Figure 1 demonstrates the composite index we created by using the above two questions, supplemented by a third one inquiring about the *general evaluation* of the impact of migration.⁵ The *Perception Index (PI)* ranging from 0 to 100 describes the overall cognitive evaluation of migration. The values of the index could also be grouped hypothetically into three basic categories, representing people with (1) rather positive, (2) neutral, or (3) rather negative overall perceptions of migration. (Figure 1.)

In this report, Perception Index (PI) and Rejection Index (RI) will be used as the main indicators of attitudes towards migration.

2.3 WHO ARE THE ‘MIGRANTS’ IN OUR STUDY?

Migration is a very complex phenomenon involving a large variety of categories. Although the term ‘migrant’ is well defined in legal and policy contexts, still it is used in many senses, especially in the non-scholarly public discourse. When talking about migrants, people may think about significantly different groups of people: some may think of labour migrants working in the service sector or in factories, others may think of the Turkish neighbour or shopkeeper next door, some might think of second+ generation youth in marginalized neighbourhoods of large metropolitan areas, some may picture refugees fleeing from the war in Syria, and still others may think of Africans trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea in dinghies.


⁵ The following question was also asked of respondents: “*Is your country made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?*” The 0 to 10 scale responses given to the three questions on the impact of migration were summed up and converted into a 0-100 scale in order to be harmonized and thus comparable with the values of the *Rejection Index*. *Technically, scores above 50 indicate a positive perception of migration, while scores below 50 suggest an overall negative perception.*

In this report we do not define the term migration, but use responses provided by ESS survey respondents. Questions which measure the cognitive element of attitudes refer to “*people coming to live here from other countries*”. It understands ‘migrants’ in the widest possible sense. Thus, we have no idea what image people had about migrants when answering this question, and it is very likely that a person in Berlin or London will have a different image to one in Athens, a little English village, an Italian harbor town or a Czech township. The question measuring the behavioral element of attitudes is somewhat more specific: It inquires about “*people from the poorer countries outside Europe*”. Here again, though, respondents may respond to the question with quite different conceptions in mind, whether they visualise South-East Asian IT workers, Syrian/Afghani war refugees or desperate North Africans fleeing across the sea. This is definitely a significant weakness in measuring attitudes towards migrants with surveys and questionnaires. But, as of today, no better method of measurement has been developed which is comparative across countries, regions and time.

2.4 FACTORS LIKELY TO INFLUENCE ATTITUDES

In order to identify factors which potentially influence attitudes we must briefly turn to some theoretical literature. Fortunately, there is a rich academic literature discussing and testing potential triggers of anti- or pro-migrant attitudes. This also means, however, that we are forced to select a few theories from among many; those which we think are applicable to Europe (or some of its regions) and the present.

The following figure summarizes the theoretical concepts we use in this analysis: on the left it presents those attitude components which we aim to measure (2.2), and on the right it lists various predictors of attitudes based on the most significant theories described below.

FIGURE 2 THEORETICAL CONCEPT OF THE ANALYSIS

One of the most applied and tested theories considers the economic rationale behind attitudes about migration. **Conflict or Competition Theory** (Levine and Campbell 1972) postulates that negative attitudes are essentially rooted in perceived competition for scarce goods. Anti-immigrant attitudes stem from the perception that immigrants pose a threat to the host society's economy, labour market or welfare systems. The perceived economic threat is related to the view that majority and minority groups are locked in a zero-sum competition for economic resources. Thus, in times of economic hardship, anti-immigrant attitudes are likely to surge. Using the ESS dataset we will be able to check whether current economic distress and fear of financial troubles in the near future on an individual level, or economic hardship on a macro level (such as the economic crisis in 2008/09) have marked people's attitudes.

Another significant theory explains attitudes in terms of actual experience with migrants. **Intergroup Contact Theory** (Allport 1954) suggests that a lack of knowledge and experience with a group is likely to increase fear of that group, while direct contact (friends, colleagues, neighbours, schoolmates etc.) is likely to dismantle negative attitudes. However, intergroup contact has a positive effect on attitudes only if both groups have equal status, there is cooperation, a common goal, and support by social and institutional authorities. We have provided evidence in our previous study that one of the most important predictors of anti-migrant attitudes is actually the lack of migrants in the country, as well as a lack of direct relationships with migrants.

Yet another theory explains attitudes towards migrants in terms of **political participation and political leaning**. (Espenshade and Hemstead 1996) and suggests that left versus right political leaning is also associated with pro-/anti-immigrant attitudes, meaning that the more right-wing a political leaning one has, the more likely one is to reject the idea of migrants coming and settling in one's country. The

main drive behind this linkage is the value system of the individual. Our data provides rich information on political participation and affiliation.

And finally, a recent theory explains pro- and anti-migrant attitudes in terms of the **perception of control**. Harell et al (2017) argue that the feeling of control is one of the most important explanatory factors for attitudes towards and acceptance of migrants. They use the concept of *locus of control*, which refers to a set of beliefs about the causes of events (for example losing one's job) or conditions (for example being poor) to either internal or external sources (Lefcourt, 1991; Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982; Rotter, 1966). The argument is as follows: Citizens who believe they are personally responsible for what happens in their lives, and are thus capable of effecting change in their lives and the wider society they live in, are less hostile towards immigrants. These citizens are less likely to feel threatened by the changing social milieu surrounding them. The feeling of being "in control" of one's own economic or social situation, in contrast to feelings of insecurity and unpredictability, leads to less fear of the unknown and thus more open attitudes around immigration.

Another level of the perception of control relates to the wider community: people who feel that the government is in control of the social and economic processes in the country, including migration – both its inflow and migrant's inclusion – are likely to feel less threatened about migration. And the third level of control refers to migrants themselves: if someone feels that migrants are agents of their social inclusion and (have the potential to) become contributing members of society, s/he will be less likely to feel threatened by migration and thus reject migrants in general.

In short, perceptions of control – as applied to citizens, the government and immigrants – have an important impact on attitudes toward immigrants. Based on this theory, we use ESS data to analyse the impact of how much respondents perceive themselves to be in control of their lives, and the perception of the degree to which government is in control of major societal and economic processes, on attitudes towards migrants. This will be measured indirectly, using various indicators of satisfaction. We also employ information on basic individual human values: open to change vs. conservative, humanitarian vs. security-focused. Unfortunately, we will not be able to examine the role of the perception of migrants as agents of their inclusion in the development of anti-/pro-migrant attitudes, as ESS does not collect such data.


3 RESULTS

3.1 SNAPSHOT ON ATTITUDES. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERCEPTION AND REJECTION

Firstly, we give an overview of the most recent data (2016/17) concerning attitudes towards migrants in Europe, and its two components by country. The Perception Index (PI) represents the cognitive component of attitudes, namely how people feel about the consequences of migration and migrants for their countries, while the Rejection Index (RI) embodies the behavioural element of attitudes and represents a kind of policy approach: whether respondents would reject the arrival and settling of migrants in their countries (for details see Chapter 2.2.). The figure below summarizes the scores of the two indexes by countries, as measured in the latest round of the ESS survey.

FIGURE 3

REJECTION AND PERCEPTION INDEXES BY COUNTRY
ESS R8 (2016/17)




We see that the overall perception of migration in Europe (green dotted line on the right), is on average neutral (53). That is, people see as many advantages as disadvantages to worldwide mobility. We may say that, based on the sole values of the indicator, more countries have a positive (55+) perception of migration (ten countries altogether) than those which are, on average, negative (four countries score below 45). As to how people would behave – concerning the Rejection Index – the large-scale picture is that 12% of surveyed Europeans would unconditionally reject migrants arriving from poorer countries outside Europe (see blue dotted line on the left). Again, acceptance is a more common attitude than rejection: in ten countries out of twenty, less than 10% of the population would forbid migrants to settle in their countries while, in only four countries is this share higher than 20%.

Another noteworthy fact about the chart is how distinct the cognitive and behavioural attitude components are. To put it simply: how much do negative perceptions transform into negative policy expectations for individuals?

While the cognitive element of attitudes (PI) fluctuates only moderately between countries, its behavioural element (i.e. the rejection of migrants) does show very significant outliers, such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Lithuania. Countries with similar levels on the Perception Index may have quite different levels of rejection (i.e. Lithuania and France, Slovenia and Estonia, Norway and Ireland or Hungary and the Czech Republic). According to Figure 3, general attitudes towards migrants in Italy, Austria and Slovenia are rather negative, but still the upfront rejection of migrants and migration is less widespread than in, for example, post-communist Baltic countries. On the other hand, although in Hungary and the Czech Republic attitudes are slightly more negative than in Austria and Italy, rejection of migrants (from poorer countries outside Europe) differs significantly in these countries. **We suspect that the strength of norms as set by political and public discourse is decisive in determining the degree to which negative attitudes are transformed into explicit rejection and exclusion.** Also, the relationship between RI and PI does not follow similar patterns in old and new EU member states. **Compared to long-term democracies like Germany, Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland, in countries such as Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, and Lithuania, negative attitudes are more likely to be turned into negative policy expectations.** It is also important to note that overall country-level perception and rejection has no direct connection to the actual share of non-EU28 migrants. In most European countries their share varies from less than 1% to 6-8%, but this is not reflected in the level of perception and rejection. (Figure 4)

FIGURE 4 PERCEPTION AND REJECTION INDEX VS. SHARE OF NON-EU28 MIGRANT POPULATION
ESS R8 (2016/17)




3.2 ATTITUDES BEFORE AND AFTER THE 2015 MASS INFLOW OF REFUGEES

Change in the rejection of migrants

Considering the events of the 2015 migration crisis, the following question arises: How did the inflow of asylum seekers affect attitudes towards migration? Based on the last two consecutive rounds of ESS data from 19 countries, **the level of rejection between 2014/15 (before the flow of mass migration to Europe occurred) and 2016/17 (after the migration shock) has significantly decreased in Europe: from 15% to 10% of the population rejecting the arrival and settling of migrants from poorer countries outside Europe.** Certainly, there are important differences between countries, but the actual exposure to the inflow of asylum seekers in 2015-16 has limited explanatory power. Results show that out of 19 countries, nine saw no significant change in the share of people unconditionally rejecting the idea of migrants settling in their countries. These countries include post-communist states such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland, where anti-migrant attitudes had been relatively strong earlier, and countries in the centre of the continent such as Germany, Austria and Switzerland and the Nordic countries (Norway and Sweden) where rejection was already very low (making it almost impossible to decrease further).

FIGURE 5

**CHANGE OF REJECTION INDEX (RI)
BETWEEN ESS R7 (2014/15) AND ESS R8 (2016/17)**



In another nine countries out of 19 there has been a considerable decrease in the share of those who unconditionally reject migrants arriving from poorer countries outside Europe and settling in their countries. These include Spain, Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands and France. Remarkably, the largest drops in rejection were recorded in the United Kingdom and Ireland (13% and 10% respectively), countries where immigration, especially from Eastern European countries, was substantial from 2004 on, and later became a critical issue in domestic politics.

Among all countries surveyed there is only one in which the share of those who reject migrants has increased significantly. This is Hungary, where rejection was by far the highest even before 2015 (48%). Now, uniquely in Europe, almost two thirds of the population would reject without further consideration the settling of all migrants from poorer countries outside Europe.

Change in perception of migration

As for the cognitive component of attitudes, we see very similar changes, though with smaller amplitudes. The Perception Index (PI) shows a similar sequence of countries. Changes from 2014/15 to 2016/17 have a similar direction, though with less intensity than the Rejection Index: significant (over 5%) increases in the level of fear are recorded only in Hungary and Estonia, while in the UK, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Belgium, a considerable increase in positive attitudes are observed.

FIGURE 6 CHANGE OF PERCEPTION INDEX (PI)
BETWEEN ESS R7 (2014/15) AND ESS R8 (2016/17)





FIGURE 7 CHANGE IN PERCEPTION (PI) & REJECTION (RI) INDEXES
BETWEEN ESS R7 (2014/15) AND ESS R8 (2016/17)



The numbers refer to the absolute change of PI and RI between R7 and R8. Statistically significant changes are marked with frames.


Whose attitudes have changed? Drivers of attitude change

Looking into the profiles of those countries where a significant change in attitudes towards migrants has occurred since 2014/15, we may be able to identify some of the potential factors that might have contributed to quick and sharp changes of attitudes. **Portugal and Spain** are countries in which the population, on average, became significantly more favourable towards migrants, in terms of both the cognitive and behavioural components of their attitudes. We see that although all demographic groups became more accepting of migrants, still **the change is larger among older, less-well educated, rural people** who are on the lowest ladder of the income scale. (Figure 8)

Exploring subjective measures of the society's state of welfare, we see very important variations that could explain changes of attitudes. Feelings of both the Spanish and Portuguese population have become more favourable: people have a somewhat higher level of trust and are somewhat more satisfied with public services such as education and the health system. The greatest improvement, however, relates to the evaluation of the government, the economy and democracy in general. Compared to 2014/15, people in Spain are 25% more satisfied with the working of the economy and 21% more satisfied with the government, while 36% of Portuguese are more satisfied with how the economy and democracy performs and 67% are more satisfied with the government. Thus, based on the **theory of control**, people in these countries feel that they have – to certain extent – regained control over their country's political and economic operation.

FIGURE 8


CHANGES IN REJECTION INDEX (RI) BY DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS BETWEEN ESS R7 (2014/15) AND ESS R8 (2016/17) IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN



In Ireland we see a similar phenomenon (Figure 9): although all demographic groups became more accepting of migrants, the largest change is observed among the are most vulnerable groups in society: retired, elderly people reporting everyday financial difficulties.

FIGURE 9

CHANGES IN REJECTION INDEX (RI) BY DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS BETWEEN ESS R7 (2014/15) AND ESS R8 (2016/17) IN THE UK AND IRELAND



A somewhat different picture emerges of the UK: the largest change is measured among rural, working age people who are no longer young, who possess moderate education and experience financial difficulties on a daily basis; this is the demographic that voted for Brexit to the largest extent. (Alabrese et al 2018; or Economist 23.02.2019⁶) In these two countries, however, we do not see a similar increase in satisfaction with the economy or governmental performance as we do in Spain and Portugal, nor any societal or governance factor that could explain the change in attitudes. We therefore tend to agree with interpretations that this massive change in attitudes towards migrants may be at least partially down to what we refer to as post-Brexit vote sobering: Namely that although the Brexit vote was to a great degree triggered by fear of migrants (also emphasized and sensationalized by the mass media⁷), many realized the potentially grave consequences of the UK's exit from the EU and gathered over the course of the lengthy and painful course of the Brexit negotiations that migration alone cannot be blamed for the UK's problems.


As for Hungary, where already very negative attitudes towards migrants have become even more hostile, we see that all demographic groups may be characterized by a homogeneously high and increasing levels of fear and rejection.

⁶ <https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2019/02/23/british-voters-are-unimpressed-by-theresa-mays-brexite-deal>

⁷ Clarke, H. D., Goodwin, M., & Whiteley, P. (2017). Why Britain voted for Brexit: an individual-level analysis of the 2016 referendum vote. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 70(3), pp. 439-464.

Sogelola, D. (2018). Brexit, Agenda Setting and Framing of Immigration in the Media: The Case of the Daily Mail. *LSE Undergraduate Political Review*, 1, pp. 128-142

FIGURE 10 CHANGES IN REJECTION INDEX (RI) BY DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS
BETWEEN ESS R7 (2014/15) AND ESS R8 (2016/17) IN AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY



However, the change is alarming as the homogeneously extreme level of rejection and fear in Hungary is a result of increasing hostility among groups which had earlier been more accepting of migrants, and which form the most able part of the society and its future: the young (20-29 years old), upper middle class, metropolitan citizens. Thus, the increase in hostility is difficult to explain in terms of economic hardship or competition theory. Also, if we check subjective factors that might influence acceptance of migrants according to theories described in Chapter 2.4, we see that the generally low level of trust and very low level of social embeddedness (low number of personal connections and activities) may explain some of the differences of attitudes compared to other European countries. However, the differences in these characteristics from other EU member-states are not large enough to explain the extremely large gap in attitudes towards migrants between Hungary and the rest of Europe.


As we postulated in our previous research, the hostile attitudes towards migrants in Hungary may be attributed to several intersecting factors: low number of migrants and consequently a lack of contact, personal experience and knowledge about migrants, together with the generally low levels of trust and social cohesion which characterise Hungarian society. A society in such a state has proved an extremely fertile terrain for the manipulative, anti-migrant propaganda that the Hungarian government put into action in early 2015 and has kept operating since then. This propaganda includes elements of false public consultation with manipulative questions supporting widespread negative beliefs, multiple and extensive publicity campaigns explicitly raising fear of migrants, and biased, extremely intense and hostile government discourse and media coverage of migrants by pro-government media. By now (as of 2018) the government has succeeded in presenting migrants as the preeminent threat to the Hungarian nation, and convinced a large share of the population that rejecting migrants and migration in general is not only morally acceptable but also a patriotic and advantageous act. (Cantat and Rajajam 2018, Bernáth and Messing 2015 and 2016; Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017)

3.3 BIRDS' EYE VIEW: ANALYSIS OF THE CHANGES ATTITUDES ACROSS TIME

In order to understand longer-term trends in attitude change we increased the time span of our analysis to capture the transformations that might have taken place in the last decade and a half. Figure 11 below shows the overall results for the populations of 15 countries participating in all eight rounds of the survey between 2002/3 and 2016/17.⁸

Figures 11 indicate a great deal of stability in the Perception Index (PI) (cognitive element of attitudes) ranging between 51 and 55 points on a 100-point scale. This score shows that, in general, people in Europe have judged migration to have advantages and disadvantages in roughly equal measure, and there are no significant changes in terms of how attitudes are formed by symbolic and existential elements. Both the 2008 economic crisis and the mass arrival of refugees in 2015 have not changed the generally stable and neutral attitudes to migrants and migration in 15 European countries from a macro perspective. Similarly, the direction of attitudes in terms of material versus symbolic elements (see page 7) shows meaningful differences only between the first and last rounds of the survey, suggesting no evidence of any major or rapid shift. Furthermore, the Rejection Index (RI) varies across a limited range, reaching its maximum (15%) in 2014/15, and its minimum (10%) in 2002/3 and in 2016/17.

FIGURE 11 CHANGE IN PERCEPTION AND REJECTION
BETWEEN ESS R7 (2014/15) AND ESS R8 (2016/17)



Looking at the overall change of the behavioural component of attitudes (Rejection Index) we see a somewhat smaller but still significant level of stability, with a 5% increase in refusal from 2002 to 2004 and a 5% increase of acceptance around Europe from 2014/15 to 2016/17. The lowest share of refusal

⁸ The countries include Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia. Any indicators calculated for these 15 countries are far from an "European average," and as such, any generalizing conclusions describing the European situation have to be formulated with caution.

was measured in 2002 (10,4% of the population rejected migrants from poorer countries outside Europe) which has increased to 15% by 2004/05, triggered most likely by the enlargement of the European Union in 2004 with ten new – relatively poor, mostly post-communist – countries. It is likely that insecurities attached to the enlargement and its effect on migration flows, as well as unclear consequences for the economy, labour market and general European norms, had an important role in the slightly rising rejection of migration. Between 2004 and 2012 the share of those rejecting migration remained stable. Looking into this index we may find again that the refugee crisis of 2015 has not brought about increasing refusal within Europe, while in contrast the share of people who would accept migrants from poorer countries from outside Europe increased somewhat from 2014/15 to 2016/17.


Based on the overall data for 15 European countries over a period of 15 years, we argue that the overall perception of migration, and also the proportion of those supporting the explicit rejection of migrants coming from poorer countries outside Europe, has not changed radically.

In addition to the overall European picture, it is also important to look at how attitudes have fluctuated in each country. Based on the levels and changes in the behavioural component of attitudes (Rejection-Index) we distinguished between four groups of countries: **(1)** *those countries in which the acceptance of migrants has always been high and has not changed significantly over the course of the examined time period;* **(2)** *those countries in which the level of rejection was modest with some fluctuation;* **(3)** *countries where acceptance towards migrants has been relatively low but has very significantly increased after 2014/15;* **(4)** *countries with increasing levels of refusal.*

In the first group of countries, the general attitude towards migrants has, by European standards, been continuously very positive since 2002, independently of whether we look at behavioural or cognitive components. (Figure 12) The common characteristic of these countries is that they are the wealthiest societies on the continent, with a relatively high share of immigrants (16,5% in Sweden, 12% in Norway, and 18% in Switzerland), although in contrast to Norway and Sweden, Switzerland is not a welfare state, and their migration policies also differ to a great extent: Switzerland is among those countries which score low on the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), while Nordic countries typically offer a great deal of services and inclusion support to newcomers.


FIGURE 12

COUNTRIES WITH STABLE POSITIVE ATTITUDES AND ACCEPTING MIGRANTS
REJECTION-INDEX BETWEEN ESS R1 (2002/2003) AND ESS R8 (2016/2017)



The second group of countries are those in which attitudes towards migrants have been moderate, and have fluctuated over the past 15 years. This group includes such traditional destination countries as Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium or France,⁹ as well as Slovenia, Poland and Finland.

FIGURE 13 COUNTRIES WITH MODEST LEVEL OF REJECTION WITH SOME FLUCTUATION
REJECTION-INDEX BETWEEN ESS R1 (2002/2003) AND ESS R8 (2016/2017)



The rejection index in these countries has fluctuated, ranging between approximately 7% and 20%, but with the exception of Poland it has decreased since the 2015 refugee crisis. By and large we see three small peaks in the curves representing attitudes. One peak is in 2004 (extended to 2006), the second in 2008-10 and a third in 2014. Fluctuations may be explained by country-specific and Europe-level factors. The increase in the refusal of migration and migrants in 2004 is probably due to the fear and uncertainty resulting from the massive enlargement of the European Union and its consequences for domestic labour markets. The increase in refusal was especially sharp in Germany, where it doubled within two years (from 8% to 18%). We see several intersecting factors that might explain this increase.

On the one hand increasing economic problems (the rising indebtedness of the state) and peaking unemployment rates in the first half of the 2000s may have influenced attitudes towards migrants. On the other hand, this time period was characterized by a surge in popularity of the nationalistic far-right NPD party which was covered extensively by the media. Also, uncertainties about the management of migration seemed to play a role, though these were settled by the Immigration Act, which entered into force in January 2005.¹⁰ Since then there has been a constantly-increasing trend towards the acceptance of migrants in Germany; even the arrival and integration of over a million refugees in Germany in 2015/16, placing burdens upon Germany's politics, institutions and society, has not altered this trend. This very clear trend supports to a great extent the theory about the significance of the perception of control. Many Germans became fearful of migrants when they expected a large rise in

⁹ In these countries the share of migrants is also moderate, with the highest in Germany (12,5%) and lowest in France (5,7%) [ES (9%) , B (11%), SI (8%), D (12,5%) FI (6,5%), Fr (5,7%), NL (11%)].

¹⁰ The law (The Immigration Act entered into force on January 1, 2005.) allows highly qualified non-EU-workers such as scientists or top-level managers to obtain a residence permit of unlimited duration at the outset. (<https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/germany-immigration-transition>)

arrivals from CEE countries and as soon as the government introduced a new regulatory and management system for migration, these fears abated.


The increase in anxiety around migration in the 2008-2010 period in several countries (Spain, Finland and France) may probably be explained by economic hardship and rising unemployment following the 2008 financial crisis (this phenomenon is especially salient in Spain and France, and to some extent in Finland by 2009.)

Poland is an interesting case, atypical of Central East European countries with a history of communism: although there has been an increase in the rejection of migrants after 2012, the general level of the RI stayed rather moderate, in line with several old EU member-states.

The third group of countries include Ireland, the UK and Portugal. In these countries the level of refusal of migrants has been somewhat higher than in the countries of group 2, but what makes them distinct is the fact that a very explicit increase in acceptance occurred between 2014/15 and 2016/17.

FIGURE 14

COUNTRIES WITH THE LARGEST DROP IN REJECTION AFTER 2014/15
REJECTION INDEX BETWEEN ESS R1 (2002/2003) AND ESS R8 (2016/2017)




We believe that the change in attitudes in the UK and Ireland may be explained by different factors than in Portugal. The population of Portugal suffered the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis, which extended from 2009 to 2012. The increase in the proportion of the population rejecting migrants coming from poorer countries outside Europe from 2010 to 2012 may be attributed to the economic hardship people experienced as a direct consequence of the crisis. The diminishing RI in Portugal goes hand in hand with changes in major economic indicators, such as the growth of GDP and the decreasing rates of unemployment from 2012 on. Here the theory explaining attitudes in terms of economic competition may provide a reasonable explanation. This is hardly the case for the UK, however, since although it experienced an economic recession similar to Portugal's, it only lasted one year (2009). As explained in the previous chapter, the UK has not suffered dramatic and extended economic or social turmoil in the past 16 years in a way comparable to Portugal or Spain. The decrease in the share of population that is open to migrants between 2006 and 2016/17 may rather be attributed to the extremely negative media portrayal of migrants, especially those arriving from post-communist EU member states such as Romania, Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria. This was one of the factors that served as a trigger for the majority of Britons voting for the UK to leave the EU. After 2014/15, however, in

the course of the debate over the consequences of Brexit, British people may have realized that migration is not the most important cause of the problems they experience, and become more aware of the advantages it brings to British economy and society.

The fourth group of countries are those in which the population has become more negative towards migrants and migration. This group includes four countries: Austria, Czech Republic, Lithuania and Hungary. In fact, Hungary is in a category of its own: its already high refusal rates have rocketed since 2014. With 62% of the population rejecting migrants unconditionally, Hungary is even more hostile to migrants than non-EU countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Turkey or Israel, where the category of “migrants from poorer countries, outside Europe” certainly has a different and quite acute meaning. We have discussed the possible reasons for this extreme level of hostility earlier.

FIGURE 15 COUNTRIES WITH INCREASING LEVELS OF REJECTION
REJECTION INDEX BETWEEN ESS R1 (2002/2003) AND ESS R8 (2016/2017)




Both the Czech Republic and Lithuania have a relatively high rejection index by European standards, but again, in these countries TCN migrants from poorer countries may trigger historic fears of an inflow of Russian and post-USSR migrants. However, the rejection of migrants has increased somewhat since 2012. And finally Austria (being the only non-post-communist country) is quite unique in this group of countries: a relatively high share (20%) of its population rejects TCN migrants coming from poorer countries, and this share has increased since 2002/03 (although ESS data was not collected during the period from 2008 to 2014). Unfortunately, we don't have time-series data for Italy, just individual time-points: 2002, 2012 and 2016. Despite this, we recognize that besides Austria, Italy is the other non-CEE country where attitudes are significantly more negative than in the rest of the old EU member-states. We suspect, but cannot establish using ESS data, that the high level of rejection in 2016/17 is a temporary situation brought about by the 2015 refugee crisis (and its mismanagement by the EU, which hit Italy hardest in Europe). *“Negative sentiment about immigration has been heightened by concerns about security, the perceived loss of control of Italy’s borders, and the failure of authorities to manage migration effectively.”* (Dixon et. al. 2018)

3.4 THE ROLE OF REGIONS

In the introduction we promised to investigate the role of nation states in explaining differences of attitude in Europe. In this section we present geographic attitude patterns at a sub-national level. The following charts show the distribution of the Perception and Rejection Indexes in Europe at the level of regions (NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 where sample sizes allowed).

FIGURE 16 REGIONAL AVERAGES OF PERCEPTION AND REJECTION INDEX
NUTS2 OR NUTS3 LEVELS DEPENDING ON AVAILABLE SAMPLE SIZES, ESS R8 (2016/2017)



The big picture tells us that, by and large, boundaries of nation states – the political community of a country – have the largest impact on how people think about migrants and migration in general. The differences between countries are more explicit than those between regions. There are some significant lessons, however, if we look more closely at the map. In certain countries, differences in attitudes, even if modest, seem to crystalize along lines of capital metropolitan areas and the rest of the country. Examples of this are France, Spain, and to some extent the UK and the Czech Republic. In other countries, differences of attitudes draw a south-north (Italy or the UK) or east-west line (Austria and Germany). The forth group of countries are those where attitudes towards migrants are, in a geographical sense, rather homogeneously distributed, meaning people share similar attitudes irrespective of which part of the country they live in. This pattern is typical for countries on the extreme: Sweden, Norway and Finland being the most accepting of migrants and Hungary being the most unaccepting, along with Estonia and Lithuania.

The following table includes a list of 20 regions where people are on average most accepting or unaccepting of migrants:

FIGURE 17 REJECTION BY REGIONS OF EUROPE
MEAN OF REJECTION INDEX FOR TOP20 AND LAST 20 NUTS-2/NUTS-3 REGIONS IN EUROPE
ESS R8 (2016/17)

TOP 20			LAST 20		
No.	Region	Rejection	No.	Region	Rejection
1	Dél-Dunántúl (HU)	76%	105	Lisboa (PT)	3%
2	Nyugat-Dunántúl (HU)	71%	106	Nord-Norge (NO)	3%
3	Észak-Magyarország (HU)	68%	107	Vestlandet (NO)	3%
4	Közép-Dunántúl (HU)	67%	108	Agder Og Rogaland (NO)	3%
5	Közép-Magyarország (HU)	59%	109	Rheinland-Pfalz (DE)	3%
6	Dél-Alföld (HU)	58%	110	Oslo Og Akershus (NO)	2%
7	Észak-Alföld (HU)	52%	111	Niedersachsen (DE)	2%
8	Kirde-Eesti (EE)	51%	112	Canarias (ES)	2%
9	Taurages apskritis (LT)	50%	113	Sør-Østlandet (NO)	2%
10	Moravskoslezsko (CZ)	43%	114	Hedmark Og Oppland (NO)	2%
11	Telšiu apskritis (LT)	42%	115	Stockholm (SE)	1%
12	Strední Morava (CZ)	38%	116	Västsverige (SE)	1%
13	Vilniaus apskritis (LT)	37%	117	Övre Norrland (SE)	1%
14	Praha (CZ)	35%	118	Mellersta Norrland (SE)	1%
15	Oberösterreich (AT)	34%	119	Norra Mellansverige (SE)	1%
16	Jihovýchod (CZ)	31%	120	Trøndelag (NO)	1%
17	Severozápad (CZ)	28%	121	Åland (FI)	0%
18	Estonia (EE)	27%	122	Hamburg (DE)	0%
19	Jihozápad (CZ)	27%	123	Bremen (DE)	0%
20	Kesk-Eesti (EE)	27%	124	Saarland (DE)	0%

For small countries due to the insufficient sample size of NUTS-2 level data was used instead of NUTS-3.

The most important lesson to be drawn from this list is that the top and last 20 regions cover no more than five or six countries each. There is little else here to surprise us: the seven most migrant-rejecting regions in Europe are all in Hungary, and are followed by Estonian, Lithuanian, Czech and Austrian regions. The list of the most accepting regions includes a number of Norwegian, Swedish, and German regions, as well as one region from Portugal (Lisboa) and Spain (Canarias).


3.5 PERSONAL VALUES THAT FEED PRO- AND ANTI-MIGRANT ATTITUDES

The European Social Survey provides an excellent opportunity to study basic human values which feed, among many other things, attitudes towards migration. Values are broad, abstract principles that guide individuals' behaviour and opinions (such as honesty, freedom, equality, beauty, wisdom etc.). *"In using the term values, we mean something similar to conceptions of the desirable that influence the ways people select action and evaluate events."* (Schwartz and Bisky 1987) Values stem from primary agents of socialization: first and foremost from family, but also from peers and school. We create our values – what is important to us – based on what we learn from our parents and family, and from peers who are important to us. The ESS includes an entire questionnaire block which maps individual human values based on a carefully-developed, complex methodology, tested and accepted by the scholarly community. We will use this set of questions to find out what kind of values influence attitudes towards migration and migrants.

The figure below shows how strongly attitudes about migration (PI) correlate with the complex set of questions mapping various aspect of basic human values.

FIGURE 18

CORRELATION OF BASIC HUMAN VALUES AND PERCEPTION INDEX ESS R8 (2016/17), SPEARMAN CORRELATION COEFFICIENT



Two types of values crystalize very explicitly at the two ends of the correlation list: security and humanitarianism. Agreement with the first two statements – the importance of secure surroundings, the importance of a strong government ensuring safety – signals a strong value attributed to stability and externally-provided physical safety. The two statements at the bottom of the list signal a strong value attributed to humanitarian values, such as understanding, respecting and treating one another equally. This means that these two types of values have the strongest (statistically significant) relationship with attitudes towards migration, but in a contrary direction: those who attribute great significance to security tend to be the most negative towards migration, while those who value equality


and respect of other people are the least fearful of migrants. In addition to these two types of values, we see that valuing traditions and societal behavioural rules and norms also relatively strongly correlate with the rejection of migrants. These values incorporate the wish for strong societal rules, hierarchy and authority. Other basic values, such as wealth, enjoying life, competition and competence, do not seem to have a meaningful relationship with how people think about migration and migrants.

The following chart shows the relationship of attitudes towards migration (both its cognitive and behavioural elements) and the significance attributed to two distinguished types of basic human values: security¹¹ and humanitarianism¹².

FIGURE 19

SECURITY/HUMANITARIANISM VALUES VS. REJECTION AND PERCEPTION

ESS R8, 2016/17



The chart demonstrates clearly the direct and almost linear relationship between these two sets of values and the rejection versus acceptance of migrants. The more people yearn for security the more negative their perception of the consequences of migration is, and hence the more they reject the idea

¹¹ The composite measure for security is constructed by the mean value of answers to the following two questions:

Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you.

- It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his safety.
- It is important to him that the government ensures his safety against all threats. He wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens.


¹² The composite measure for humanitarianism is constructed by the mean value of answers to the following two questions:

- He thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. He believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.
- It is important to him to listen to people who are different from him. Even when he disagrees with them, he still wants to understand them.

of any migrant coming and settling in their country. The more people find respect for others and equality between people important, the more positive their attitudes towards migrants are.

Individual values build value systems that drive people's action and behaviour. Thus, we need to study values in relation to one another. Therefore, we constructed an index that shows the value attributed to humanitarianism and security in juxtaposition. We deduced the mean value of answers given to questions measuring security and those measuring humanitarianism. As such, we were able to categorize people into three cohorts: (1) those who attribute a significantly higher value to security than to humanitarian values (purple); (2) those who attribute significantly higher value to humanitarian values than to security (yellow) and (3) those who attribute similar importance to both values (not shown on the chart).

The following chart gives us an idea of the presence and importance of these two sets of values in ESS countries:



We see that in most countries (with four exceptions) humanitarian values are more dominant than security. Especially in the Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway and Finland), the Netherlands, France, Germany, Switzerland and Belgium, humanitarian values are – in general – valued more highly than security. These are likewise the European countries in which attitudes towards migration and migrants are most positive. There are, however, a few countries in which people attribute more value to security than to equality and respect for others. These countries include some post-communist societies such as Hungary, the Czech Republic and Lithuania, but also Italy (and in Austria the values are almost even). These are precisely the countries in which the rejection of migrant is strongest in Europe. We may conclude that the appreciation of these two sets of values is an important explanation for why people either reject or are open to migrants.

In real life, of course, these values are not mutually exclusive. It is not the case that in certain countries security is less important than humanitarianism or vice versa. We suggest that security is one of our basic needs, and is also reflected in our values. When somebody feels secure in his/her life, he/she

might devalue its importance because it is taken more or less for granted. In such circumstances, humanitarian values may come to the fore. However, in those countries where people feel more insecure, security appears as an important human need that is also manifested in values, giving security priority over humanitarianism.

The question, however, is where these values stem from. In our previous analysis we showed that out of many demographic, societal, economic and subjective factors, the perception of safety and the level of trust (both trust in institutions and individuals) proved to have the strongest relationship with attitudes towards migrants, both on an individual level and on the level of countries. It is to be expected that in countries where people do not feel safe – either in terms of direct physical safety or in a broader feeling that stability is lacking – the value of security becomes more important than in countries where people feel safe.

3.6 ANTI-MIGRANT ATTITUDES AND POLITICAL POPULISM: WHICH IS THE CHICKEN AND WHICH THE EGG?

In our introduction we connected attitudes towards migration with rising populism on the continent. In this chapter we offer a closer look into how political orientation and populism feed into anti-migrant attitudes, and contrast this with left-wing party support. The political landscape in Europe is changing rapidly, with diverging world-views and polarization of voter groups. Fears and frustrations linked to migration have become symbols for this general feeling of uncertainty. We live in a world of highly unpredictable futures, in which tectonic shifts in global power relations, political crises, armed conflicts, revolutionary developments in technology and environmental challenges are confusing enough to make citizens more receptive to simplistic explanations. According to recent research *“Populist parties have more than tripled their support in Europe in the last 20 years. ... two decades ago, populist parties were largely a marginal force, accounting for just 7% of votes across the continent; in the most recent national elections, one in four votes cast was for a populist party.”*¹³ Using recent research on populism in Europe¹⁴ to categorize populist parties across the continent, we tried to establish the degree to which anti-migrant feelings are linked to support for political populism¹⁵. The analysis of the connection between voting for a populist party and attitudes towards migrants resulted in a very obvious conclusion: those with negative attitudes towards migrants and migration are much more likely to vote for right-wing populist parties.

But first, let us establish a general overview of how support for left- and right-wing politics correlates with attitudes towards migrants and migration. Figure 21 (next page) demonstrates the association between attitudes towards migrants (Rejection and Perception Indexes) and the subjective evaluation of one's political orientation for all countries participating in the ESS in its eighth round (2016/17). The question we employed here asked the respondents to place themselves on a scale of 'right' and 'left' wing political orientation. We understand that the concept of 'left' and 'right' may have quite different connotations in different countries. (Aspelund et al 2013) Nevertheless, even if the actual meaning of right and left is not the same, the relative position on such a scale is rooted in similar predispositions and values. (Piurko et al 2011)

¹³ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2018/nov/20/revealed-one-in-four-europeans-vote-populist>


¹⁴ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/20/measuring-populism-how-guardian-charted-rise-methodology>

¹⁵ The following definition was used for the concept of populist parties *“Parties that endorse the set of ideas that society is ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argue that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale, or general will, of the people.”* (Mudde 2014)

FIGURE 21


REJECTION AND PERCEPTION INDEXES BY POLITICAL ORIENTATION MEASURED ON A LEFT-RIGHT SCALE

ESS R8, 2016/2017, ALL COUNTRIES (WITH POPULATION WEIGHT)



The chart shows a very clear pattern: those who self-identify as left-wing have a generally positive attitude towards migration, those in the centre of the political scale are relatively neutral, and those on the right have a generally negative attitude towards migrants. This is no surprise. **However, the gradient of the curve is notable: those self-identifying with the left are equally positive about migration, irrespective of how left-oriented they feel; i.e. people who position themselves to the extreme of the scale have very similar attitudes to those who think of themselves as moderately left-wing.** At the right-wing end of the scale we see a very different picture: the gradient of the curve is steep, meaning that political right-wing extremism correlates with extreme anti-migrant attitudes.

The next chart shows attitudes towards migrants (perception and rejection indexes) among supporters of centre-left and populist right-wing parties in nine countries:



In each country, supporters of centre-left parties evaluate migration more positively, while supporters of populist right-wing parties hold very negative views. Data on the attitudes of all party supporters (see Appendix Chart 5.2) show very clearly that supporters of right-wing populist parties (such as AfD in Germany, Front National in France¹⁶, the League in Italy, and the Swedish Democrats) have significantly more negative and exclusionary attitudes towards migrants than supporters of any other parties on a national level. To put it plainly, these parties gather and feed that part of the population which is very negative towards migrants and migration in general. Right-wing populist parties seem to provide a terrain on which to openly express the rage fuelled by uncertainty, and to blame migrants. In almost all countries one or two such parties exist, the difference lies rather in how powerful they are. They are tiny in Sweden and Norway, small but significant in Germany and France, large in Italy and Austria and even hold a super-majority government in Hungary.

There is also a significant cross-country difference between attitudes towards migration among supporters of left-wing parties: while in most countries left-wing party supporters are supportive of migration, in Austria and Italy they are at most neutral, and in Hungary even the supporters of left-wing parties (MSZP and DK) reject migrants at a level characteristic of supporters of right-wing populist parties in other countries.


¹⁶ Rassemblement National (National Rally) since June 2018

The chart of attitudes towards migration of supporters of right-wing populist parties also (Figure 23) demonstrates another notable phenomenon: although their perceptions of the consequences of migration (PI) are quite similar (very negative) in different countries, the rejection of migrants is very different: rejecting any kind of migration is most explicit in Hungary, while in other countries even the more negative perception of migration by supporters of right wing populist parties (FPÖ, FN, LN) results in a smaller share of those rejecting migrants. **This data shows the degree to which dominant norms, set by mainstream politics, matter in terms of transforming aversion into an extreme rejection of migrants.** In Hungary, where FIDESZ gained a super majority in the parliament (with less than half of the popular vote) and initiated an open anti-migrant hate campaign and policies in 2015, anti-migrant attitudes have become the overwhelming norm. **We would argue that the political power such parties wield, whether in government or in opposition, plays a critical role in determining the degree to which anti-migrant narratives are allowed to become the norm within a society.**

FIGURE 23

REJECTION AND PERCEPTION INDEXES BY SUPPORTERS OF POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES

PARTY PREFERENCES BASED ON THE ITEM "WHICH PARTY DO YOU FEEL CLOSER TO" OF THE ESS R8 (2016/17)




Extreme negative attitudes on migration

A noteworthy finding of our research is that in certain countries there are a considerable number of individuals whose attitudes towards migration are extremely and homogeneously negative. To understand more closely who these people are, we tried to identify their demographic and attitudinal profiles. With this in mind, we narrowed in on those respondents who selected solely the value 0, on a 0 to 10 scale, to all three questions evaluating the effect of migration (on the economy, on cultural life and on the country in general), and constitute the Perception Index we used throughout the report.

The number of people with such extreme anti-migrant attitudes reached 5% in four countries: Hungary, Austria, the Czech Republic and Italy. (Figure 24)

FIGURE 24**EXTREME PERCEPTION ON MIGRATION**

SHARE OF THOSE WITH THREE EXTREME NEGATIVE RESPONSES ON MIGRATION, PI=0
ESS R8 (2016/17)



So who are they, and how do they differ from the rest of the population? Using logistical regression and checking for hard (demographic) and subjective (attitudes and perceptions) factors, we see that interestingly it is not the basic demographic profile that makes them unique from the rest of the population. Although age (being younger) and obtaining tertiary education influence the chance (by greatly decreasing the likelihood) of having extreme anti-migrant attitudes (Figure 25). Where they differ very substantially from the rest of the population is in their subjective perceptions: To a much greater extent they feel alienated from politics, have a right-wing political orientation, lack trust, and hold individualistic, security-focused values rather than a humanitarian focus. Also, they describe themselves as having financial difficulties to a much greater extent than others in society. All in all, we may say that people who feel politically disempowered, financially insecure and without social support are the most likely to become extremely negative towards migration and migrants.

FIGURE 25**EXTREME PERCEPTION ON MIGRATION**

SHARE OF THOSE WITH THREE EXTREME NEGATIVE RESPONSES ON MIGRATION, PI=0

FACTORS THAT <u>INCREASE</u> THE LIKELIHOOD OF HAVING EXTREME NEGATIVE PERCEPTION ON MIGRATION	FACTORS THAT <u>DECREASE</u> THE LIKELIHOOD OF HAVING EXTREME NEGATIVE PERCEPTION ON MIGRATION
✓ Having severe financial difficulties ✓ Feeling unsafe at night in home surroundings ✓ Political alienation: no influence on politics at all ✓ Political orientation (right wing) ✓ Low level of interpersonal trust ✓ Feeling happy (+1 on 0-10 scale) ✓ Importance of security-focused personal values ✓ Older age	✓ Having tertiary level education ✓ Having foreign born ancestry ✓ Placing high importance on humanitarian personal values ✓ High level of trust ✓ Being younger

4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

Our study investigated cross-national differences in attitudes towards migration and migrants across European space and time, and aimed to discover factors that may lie behind the immense differences in the acceptance or rejection of migrants across European countries. This paper is a continuation of our previous study, entitled '*Looking Behind the Culture of Fear. Cross-National Analysis of Attitudes towards Migration in Europe*' (Messing and Ságvári 2018), which identified the most important macro- and micro-level factors influencing attitudes, based on 2015 data.

One important conclusion of the analysis is that attitudes towards migration in Europe have generally become more positive in most countries since the 2015 refugee crisis. **The level of rejection between 2014/15 (before the flow of mass migration to Europe occurred) and 2016/17 (after the migration shock) has decreased from 15% to 10%.** Thus, in general, popular attitudes do not support the flourishing anti-migrant populist political discourse, and by the same token, increasingly loud anti-migrant populist narratives have not boosted the rejection of migrants. People on the continent have not become more fearful of migrants; on the contrary, in most countries they have become slightly more positive about them. Outliers include Portugal, Belgium, the UK and Ireland, where people have become significantly more open and positive about migrants compared to the pre-migration crisis period, and Hungary, where general attitudes towards migrants have significantly deteriorated.

If we look at longer term trends we see a notable stability of attitudes: **over a period of 16 years, based on data from 15 European countries, the overall perception of migration, as well as the share of those supporting the explicit rejection of migrants coming from poorer countries outside Europe, have not changed radically.** Attitudes may have changed within shorter periods of time in certain countries, but in the longer run they have remained stable across the continent. Short-term changes in attitudes were brought about by the uncertainties of large-scale political changes, such as the enlargement of the EU in 2004, economic or labour market crises (2008), or traumatic events such as terrorist attacks. Comparing country-level data reveals that the greatest negative change in attitudes towards migration was caused by the overwhelming anti-migrant government campaign in Hungary. This is the only country in which a very significant increase in fear and rejection of migrants has taken place since 2015.

Referring to the most popular theories, our analysis found that the economic explanation for attitude change may apply only in some countries and at certain periods of time, such as in Spain, Portugal and Ireland, where attitudes changed hand in hand with the GDP decline and growth after the 2008 economic crisis. Still, **contact and control theories apply best to Europe's attitudinal map** and its changes. The conclusion of our previous study "*widespread and homogenizing anti-migrant attitudes in some countries have little to do with migrants*" has been further supported by the present analysis. Anti-migrant attitudes are strongest and are likely to increase further in countries where migrants are hardly present, where people don't have personal experiences with migrants but where they lack the feeling of safety and control. By control we are referring to two levels of control: the feeling people have of being in control of their own lives, and the feeling that the government is in control of migration. The importance of the latter is shown by the case of Germany, where anti-migrant attitudes increased significantly between 2002 and 2004, probably due to the combination of the uncertainties brought about by the 2004 enlargement of the EU and the feared mass inflow from new EU member-

states in the east, and the economic situation (high unemployment, increasing state debt and the rise of the far-right, ultranationalist NPD). However, as soon as the government introduced a set of legislation ensuring the controlled management of migration within the enlarged EU, anti-migrant attitudes abated. The same holds for Italy and Austria in 2015, which along with Germany took in the bulk of the incoming refugees in 2015. Austria and Italy are the only old-EU Member States where anti-migrant attitudes have increased significantly since 2015, most likely due to the feeling that the European Union mismanaged the refugee crisis and failed to ensure a fair distribution of refugees within Europe. Germany has probably forestalled the rise of anti-migrant attitudes by investing significant resources into managing and integrating newcomers, as well as receiving strong support from civil society in this respect.

However, **long-term attitudes towards migrants seem to be a function of the general feeling of safety and control people feel over their own lives and futures.** Our previous analysis, based on data from before the 2015 inflow of refugees – a calm moment for attitudes in Europe – concluded that attitudes *“are rather a consequence and expression of people’s lack of safety and security, and a symptom of deep-rooted problems in the society”*. This conclusion has been further supported by looking at individuals whose attitudes are extreme. We found that people who extremely and homogeneously reject migrants do not differ in their demographic characteristics from the rest of the population. However, they differ from the rest of the population in their subjective perceptions of control: to a much greater extent they feel that they have financial difficulties, are alienated from politics, lack trust, and hold security-focused, individualistic values. All in all, we may say **that people who feel politically disempowered, financially insecure and without social support are the most likely to become extremely negative towards migrants.** When analysing changing attitudes we find a similar pattern: Those countries in which people became more trusting of their country’s institutions, and more satisfied with the performance of their governments, democratic institutions and national economies, were the most likely to become more accepting of migrants.

Our analysis revealed that, by and large, **regional differences within countries are minor, and primarily the borders of national states – the political community of a country – frame the map of attitudes in Europe. Thus, our primary hypothesis about the greater role of regions than countries was disproved. The country context matters a lot also in terms of how the negative perception of migrants (PI) is turned into negative action expectations (RI).** With similar perceptions of migration and its consequences to the host society, people living in different countries develop radically different levels of rejection of migrants. We suggest that the level to which negative perceptions of migration result in (unconditional) rejection is a function of the general norms characteristic of the country, and are brought about by political and media discourses, historical experiences and dominant social values.

The analysis of how values influence attitudes proves that attitudes towards migration (PI) correlate very strongly with a complex set of questions mapping various aspect of basic human values, but there are **two sets of values that crystalize very explicitly: security and humanitarianism.** The more people yearn for security, the more negative their perception of the consequences of migration is, and hence the more they reject the idea of any migrant settling in their country. The more people find respect for others and equality between people important, the more positive their attitudes are. Values are also closely related to political preferences, so it is no surprise that **attitudes towards migrants and political preferences correlate strongly.** What is noteworthy in this respect is the difference at the two ends of the political scale: while those who self-identify with the left are equally positive about migration,

irrespective of how left-oriented they feel, those at the right-wing end of the scale show that more extreme identification with right wing ideology correlates with increasingly extreme anti-migrant attitudes. Projecting the map of political preferences and attitudes towards migrants tells us that **right-wing populist parties gather that part of the population which is very negative towards migrants and migration in general**. In almost all countries one or two such parties exist, the difference lies rather in how powerful they are. They are tiny in Norway, significant in Sweden, Germany and France, large in Italy and Austria and even hold a super-majority government in Hungary. The perception of the consequences of migration (PI) are quite similar (very negative) among voters of right wing populist countries across Europe. Still, the rejection of migrants is very alike: Rejecting any kind of migration is most explicit in Hungary, while in other countries, even the more negative perception of migration by supporters of right-wing populist parties (FPÖ, FN, LN) results in a smaller share of those unconditionally rejecting migrants. **This data again shows the degree to which dominant norms, set by mainstream politics, matter in terms of transforming aversion into an extreme rejection of migrants.**

5 REFERENCES

- ALABRESE, E., BECKER, S. O., FETZER, T., & NOVY, D. (2018). Who voted for Brexit? Individual and regional data combined. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 56, 132-150.
- ALLPORT, G. W. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Oxford, England: Addison-Wesley.
- ASPELUND, A., LINDEMAN, M., & VERKASALO, M. (2013). Political Conservatism and Left–Right Orientation in 28 Eastern and Western European Countries. *Political Psychology*, 34(3), 409-417.
- VAN DEN BERG, H., MANSTEAD, A. S. R., VAN DER PLIGT, J., & WIGBOLDUS, D. H. J. (2006). The impact of affective and cognitive focus on attitude formation. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 42(3), 373-379.
- BERNÁTH, G., & MESSING, V. (2015). Bedarálva–A menekültekkel kapcsolatos kormányzati kampány és a tőle független megszólalás terepei (Grinded–Refugee-related government campaign and the opportunities for independent voices). *Médiakutató*, 16 (4): 7-17.
- BERNÁTH, G., & MESSING, V. (2016). Infiltration of political meaning-production: security threat or humanitarian crisis? The coverage of the refugee ‘crisis’ in the Austrian and Hungarian media in early autumn 2015. Center for Media, data and society: CEU School of public policy. Budapest.
- CANTAT, C., & RAJARAM, P. K. (2019). The Politics of Refugee Crisis in Hungary, in Menjívar, C., Ruiz, M., & Ness, I. (Eds.). (2018). *The Oxford Handbook of Migration Crises*.
- DIXON T., HAWKINS., HEIJBOEK L., JUAN-TORRES M., DEMOURES F. (2018) Attitudes towards National Identity, Immigration and Refugees in Italy. More in Common. ([link](#))
- EAGLY, A. H., & CHAIKEN, S. (1998). Attitude structure and function. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (pp. 269-322). New York, NY, US: McGraw-Hill.
- ESPENSHADE, T. J., & HEMPSTEAD, K. (1996). Contemporary American attitudes toward US immigration. *International Migration Review*, 30(2), 535-570.
- GEORGIU, M., & ZABOROWSKI, R. (2017). Media coverage of the “refugee crisis”: A cross-European perspective. Council of Europe.
- HARELL, A., SOROKA, S., & IYENGAR, S. (2017). Locus of Control and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. *Political Psychology*, 38(2), 245-260.
- KAHANEC, M., ZAICEVA, A., & ZIMMERMANN, K. F. (2009). Lessons from migration after EU enlargement. In *EU labor markets after post-enlargement migration* (pp. 3-45). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.
- LEVINE, R. A., CAMPBELL, D. T. (1972). "Realistic Group Conflict Theory," *Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes and Group Behavior*. John Wiley&Sons, Inc., New York-London-Sydney-Toronto, 29-43.

LUCASSEN, L. (2018) Peeling an onion: the “refugee crisis” from a historical perspective, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 41:3, pp. 383-410.

LEFCOURT, H. M. (1991). *Locus of control*. Academic Press.

MESSING, V., SÁGVÁRI, B. (2018) Looking Behind the Culture of Fear. Cross-national analysis of attitudes towards migration. Budapest: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/budapest/14181-20180815.pdf>

MUDDE, C. (2004), The Populist Zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition*, 39: 541-563.

PIURKO, Y., SCHWARTZ, S. H., & DAVIDOV, E. (2011). Basic personal values and the meaning of left-right political orientations in 20 countries. *Political Psychology*, 32(4), 537-561.

ROTHBAUM, F., WEISZ, J. R., & SNYDER, S. S. (1982). Changing the world and changing the self: A two-process model of perceived control. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 42(1), 5.

ROTTER, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. *Psychological monographs: General and applied*, 80(1), 1.

RUSTENBACH, E. (2010). Sources of Negative Attitudes toward Immigrants in Europe: A Multi-Level Analysis. *International Migration Review*, 44(1), 53–77. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2009.00798.x>

SCHWARTZ, S. H., & BILSKY, W. (1987). Toward a universal psychological structure of human values. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 53(3), 550.

ZIMMERMANN, K. F., & KAHANEC, M. (2009). International migration, ethnicity and economic inequality, in W. Salverda, B. Nolan and T. M. Smeeding (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality*. Oxford, pp. 455-490


6 APPENDIX

PERCEPTION AND REJECTION INDEXES BY PARTY PREFERENCES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES




AUSTRIA

Rejection Index (RI) | Perception Index (PI)




GERMANY

Rejection Index (RI) | Perception Index (PI)




FRANCE

Rejection Index (RI) | Perception Index (PI)




HUNGARY

Rejection Index (RI) | Perception Index (PI)




ITALY

Rejection Index (RI) | Perception Index (PI)




POLAND

Rejection Index (RI) | Perception Index (PI)




SWEDEN

Rejection Index (RI) | Perception Index (PI)



NETHERLANDS

Rejection Index (RI) | Perception Index (PI)



RESULTS OF THE LOGISTIC REGRESSION EXPLAINING EXTREME NEGATIVE PERCEPTION OF MIGRATION

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Age (each +1 year)	.080	.038	4.372	1	.037*	1.083
Having secondary education (compared to primary)	.060	.082	.545	1	.460	1.062
Having tertiary education (compared to primary)	-.691	.111	38.693	1	.000*	.501
Place of residence in metropolitan area (compared to mid-size town)	-.023	.094	.060	1	.807	.977
Place of residence in rural areas (compared to mid-size town)	-.085	.085	1.013	1	.314	.918
Having foreign-born ancestry	-.790	.139	32.179	1	.000*	.454
Belonging to any ethnic minority of the given country	.162	.173	.882	1	.348	1.176
Having severe financial difficulties	.356	.087	16.953	1	.000*	1.428
Feeling insecurity about personal future	.146	.110	1.784	1	.182	1.158
Social embeddedness: having frequent social connections	-.093	.082	1.284	1	.257	.911
Feeling unsafe at night in home surrounding	.443	.079	31.593	1	.000*	1.557
Political alienation: no influence on politics at all	.934	.077	147.930	1	.000*	2.544
Political orientation (left-centre-right, base: left)	.618	.079	60.680	1	.000*	1.855
Below average level of interpersonal trust	1.181	.077	234.860	1	.000*	3.257
Satisfaction with life (+1 on 0-10 scale)	-.030	.021	2.024	1	.155	.970
Feeling happy (+1 on 0-10 scale)	-.061	.023	7.312	1	.007*	.941
Dominance of conservative vs. open to change personal values	-.037	.096	.145	1	.703	.964
Dominance of self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence personal values	.516	.081	40.123	1	.000*	1.674
Constant	-4.109	.224	336.838	1	.000	.016

Variables with significant explanatory power are highlighted

7 ABOUT THE AUTHORS

VERA MESSING

sociologist, senior research fellow

Center of Social Sciences, HAS and CEU, Center for Policy Studies

Vera Messing is a senior research fellow at the Center of Social Sciences, HAS and a research fellow at CEU, Center for Policy Studies. She earned her PhD studies in Budapest, Corvinus University in 2000. She has over 15 years of experience in empirical research on ethnicity, minorities, social exclusion, media representation of vulnerable groups and ethnic conflicts. Her work focuses on comparative understanding of different forms and intersections of social inequalities and ethnicity and their consequences.

BENCE SÁGVÁRI

sociologist, senior research fellow

Center of Social Sciences, HAS and International Business School (IBS)

Bence Ságvári holds a PhD in Sociology. His interests lie in: youth and youth policy, empirical research methods on values and attitudes, social aspects of digital technology, use of big data and network analysis in social sciences, cross-national survey research methods. Currently, he is the national coordinator for the European Social Survey (ESS) in Hungary.

8 IMPRINT

© Copyright 2019, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Publisher: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Regional project "Flight, Migration, Integration in Europe"

H-1056 Budapest, Fővám tér 2-3, Hungary

Tel.: +36-1-461-60-11

Fax: +36-1-461-60-18

E-Mail: fesbp@fesbp.hu

<http://www.fes-budapest.org/en/topics/flight-migration-integration-in-europe/>

Responsible: Timo Rinke

Cover photo: www.istockphoto.com/Maica

Commercial use of all media published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is not permitted without the written consent of the FES.

The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or of the organization for which the author works.

ISBN 978-615-81071-2-9

ISBN 978-615-81071-2-9

