



A Project of the Migration Policy Institute

IN SEARCH OF A NEW EQUILIBRIUM: IMMIGRATION POLICYMAKING IN THE NEWEST ERA OF NATIVIST POPULISM

By Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Kate Hooper, and
Meghan Benton

IN SEARCH OF A NEW EQUILIBRIUM

Immigration Policymaking in the Newest Era of Nativist Populism

By Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Kate Hooper, and Meghan Benton

November 2018

Acknowledgments

This research was commissioned for the eighteenth plenary meeting of the Transatlantic Council on Migration, an initiative of the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), held in Stockholm in November 2017. The meeting's theme was "The Future of Migration Policy in a Volatile Political Landscape," and this report was one of several that informed the Council's discussions. The authors are grateful for Lauren Shaw's helpful edits and for research assistance from Brian Salant, Gonzaga Mbalungu, Jeffrey Hallock, and Jae June Lee.

The Council is a unique deliberative body that examines vital policy issues and informs migration policymaking processes in North America and Europe. The Council's work is generously supported by the following foundations and governments: the Open Society Foundations, Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Barrow Cadbury Trust, the Luso-American Development Foundation, the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, and the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.

For more on the Transatlantic Council on Migration, please visit: www.migrationpolicy.org/transatlantic.

© 2018 Migration Policy Institute.
All Rights Reserved.

Cover Design: April Siruno, MPI
Layout: Sara Staedicke, MPI

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Migration Policy Institute. A full-text PDF of this document is available for free download from www.migrationpolicy.org.

Information for reproducing excerpts from this report can be found at www.migrationpolicy.org/about/copyright-policy. Inquiries can also be directed to communications@migrationpolicy.org.

Suggested citation: Papademetriou, Demetrios G., Kate Hooper, and Meghan Benton. 2018. *In Search of a New Equilibrium: Immigration Policymaking in the Newest Era of Nativist Populism*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.



Table of Contents

Executive Summary	I
I. Introduction	2
II. What Is Driving Public Anxiety about Immigration?	5
A. The Pace of Social and Cultural Change	6
B. Political Fragmentation, Polarization, and the Rise of Anti-Elitism	7
C. Growing Inequality and Competition for Scarce Public Resources	8
D. Why Now?	12
III. Assessing the Influence of Radical-Right Populism	14
A. Tracking the Influence of Populists: From Disruptors, to Shapers of Policy, to Governors	14
B. Responding to Populism	17
IV. Principles for Accepting Difference and Building a New Consensus on Immigration	18
A. Running a Rules-Based Immigration System	20
B. Communicating Complexity and Managing Crises Well	21
C. Redressing Adverse Effects and Inequality	23
V. Conclusion	24
Appendix. Electoral Record of Right-Wing Populist Parties in Europe	27
Works Cited	28
About the Authors	34



Executive Summary

Since 2015, the political landscape in many Western democracies has become fragmented and extremely volatile. A string of successes for populists of all stripes has upended the status quo, ranging from the United Kingdom's unexpected vote to leave the European Union and the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president, to the dramatic ascent of the Alternative for Germany and the far right entering government in Austria and Italy. Analysts have had to rethink their explanations of the causes and consequences of populism, moving away from the conventional wisdom that viewed the successes of politicians touting such views as one-off events with a natural ceiling of support and towards acknowledgment that populism is becoming a more permanent—and mainstream—feature of politics.

Anxiety about immigration, and the changes it brings about, has helped fuel nativist populism.¹ This anxiety is difficult to unravel from broader concerns about globalization writ large, including its uneven economic effects and deep social, cultural, and demographic changes. It is also closely linked to a burgeoning crisis of confidence in government, where increasing numbers of voters are skeptical about whether mainstream parties and politicians really represent their interests on a range of issues, including immigration, creating an opening for self-proclaimed political outsiders who promise to shake things up. Many of the politicians who run on populist platforms have called for deep cuts to immigration and either rejected the premise of integration altogether (for example, by dismissing Islam as incompatible with European values) or set impossibly high standards for successful integration. These actors have capitalized on chaotic scenes at borders, whether during the 2015–16 migration and refugee crisis in Europe or the surge in arrivals of Central American families and unaccompanied children at the U.S. southern border that began in 2014, as well as a spate of terrorist plots and events, arguing that only they are willing and able to control borders, curtail immigration, and impose law and order.

Many of the politicians who run on populist platforms have called for deep cuts to immigration and either rejected the premise of integration altogether ... or set impossibly high standards.

The rise of nativist populism has far-reaching consequences for immigration and integration policy. As more politicians with radical-right populist views enter office, they can push for more restrictive immigration and integration policies, although many struggle to deliver on their ambitious campaign platforms while in office as they confront the realities of governing. In practice, the influence of populism and nativism can be felt more indirectly in how these actors help frame the debate on immigration and integration issues from outside the government. Many mainstream political actors, especially those of the center right, have moved further to the right on these issues, in large part in response to the rise of radical-right populist opponents. The result is that radical-right narratives about immigration, such as the (largely unsubstantiated) link between immigration and crime, or the supposed “incompatibility” of immigrants’ religious or cultural norms with host-country national values, have moved from the fringe into the political mainstream.

When faced with the growth of radical-right populism, mainstream political actors face a dilemma: respecting the democratic mandate of populists and treating them like any other political actor, or drawing a line in the sand by ostracizing and refusing to cooperate with them. Regardless, mainstream politicians need to reckon with how to respond to the forces driving support for nativist populism in the first place—deep concerns about cultural identity, rising inequality, pressure on limited public resources, deepening

¹ This report uses the term “nativist populism” to refer to an ideology espoused by far-right and radical-right politicians and parties with a core opposition to immigration, whether driven by sociocultural, identity, ethnoreligious, or labor-market and social-welfare concerns. These actors also typically share anti-establishment, anti-elite, and (in Europe) Euroskeptical views.



political polarization, and the politics of fear and resentment. In doing so, they will also need to grapple with how to build a new consensus on immigration. Points of reflection include:

- ***The many benefits of running a tight ship on immigration policies.*** Governments need to rebuild public trust in the integrity and fairness of their migration-management system. Doing so will require minimizing immigration disorder and ensuring effective and orderly return procedures, while tipping the balance towards a more selective system that is better aligned with national economic and labor-market needs.
- ***The challenges and crucial importance of communicating complexity.*** Policymakers need to think carefully about how to communicate their policy priorities and decisions, and the evidence that underpins them, to a concerned public. This includes speaking candidly about what the evidence does—and does not or cannot—say about hot-button issues such as immigration. This must be done in terms that can be readily understood by a wide audience of nonexperts and, when it comes to immigration, include an honest discussion of the benefits of a well-managed immigration system and the tradeoffs such a system can entail. These communications must also include concrete actions to address these emotive issues, especially in times of crisis.
- ***The need to redress inequality by investing in communities.*** The rise of populism and nativism should serve as a wake-up call for mainstream policymakers on the importance of acknowledging and targeting disadvantage by adopting policies to redress the uneven costs of immigration, globalization, and economic crises. In striving to revitalize neglected regions, governments face tough decisions about whether to invest in costly social and economic development policies to help people stay—and attract new residents, especially immigrants—or to help people relocate to areas with more economic opportunities (at the risk of further shrinking the fiscal base of struggling regions).
- ***The promise of employing a whole-of-society approach to immigration and integration issues.*** In an era of growing “welfare chauvinism,” with populists calling to limit access to welfare benefits to citizens, policymakers should confront head on the perception that immigrants benefit disproportionately from government programs and services. Research has also demonstrated the advantages of moving away from programs that target certain groups, such as immigrants, and towards robust services available to and flexible enough to meet the needs of all who qualify.

Ultimately, the rise of nativist populism should be understood both as a symptom and driver of political turmoil in Europe and the United States. Its rise is rooted in longstanding social and economic grievances and divisions that have been overlooked by mainstream politicians for far too long. Governments need to learn from their mistakes and respond much more proactively to manage these divisions—or risk seeing societies drift further apart and create a breeding ground for nativism and populism.

I. Introduction

The political landscape in many Western democracies has become extremely volatile, with populism both a cause and a symptom of this volatility. The 2016 UK vote to leave the European Union and the unexpected election later that year of President Donald Trump in the United States stopped many commentators in their tracks and, in retrospect, surprised the winners themselves, who were not entirely prepared to govern. These two seismic events are part of an ongoing string of successes for populists of all stripes that have disrupted and transformed Western politics.



While populist politicians seem to defy strict ideological definition in terms of the classic left/right political continuum, most analyses focus on those on the right and far right, with little attention paid to their left-wing or radical-left counterparts. The reason for this imbalance is fairly simple: in recent years, populist actors on the (radical) right have made historic electoral gains in a number of countries, including in Austria and Italy where 2017 and 2018 elections produced government coalitions involving the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the far-right League, respectively. In other countries, mainstream parties have adopted nativist positions, ranging from the two main parties in the Netherlands adopting a much harsher tone on immigration and embracing far-right calls for a burqa ban in the run-up to the March 2017 election, to the upending of the U.S. Republican Party's traditional pro-immigration stance under Trump.

The resulting political upheaval has forced analysts to fundamentally rethink how to account for populism's dynamism and resilience. Instead of treating populist electoral gains as either cyclical (but short-lived) phenomena or as one-off events, it is essential to recognize that populism and the nativism that fuels much of it are increasingly established fixtures of today's (and likely tomorrow's) political landscape. Moreover, observers have had to rethink their assessment of both the causes and consequences of populism. Instead of viewing populist politicians as the faces of temporary "protest" movements that exploit the policy failures of mainstream actors, analysts are starting to pay attention to the central role of immigration and complex grievances arising from globalization and its widely felt economic and social changes.

It is essential to recognize that populism and the nativism that fuels much of it are increasingly established fixtures of today's (and likely tomorrow's) political landscape.

Populism has clearly moved from the political fringes into the political mainstream, threatening traditional players on both the center left and center right. The Dutch and French elections in 2017 seemed to suggest the existence of a ceiling on how much support far-right populists could muster, a natural limit that would generally keep such parties from entering government. But subsequent elections in Germany, Austria, Italy, and Latvia, as well as the growing power of formerly center-right parties that have adopted parts of nativist platforms in some eastern and southeastern EU Member States, suggest that the Dutch and French elections may have been the outliers. At the same time, the successes of some populist parties on the political left (such as Syriza in Greece and the Five Star Movement in Italy), and the rapid emergence of new parties (such as Emmanuel Macron's En Marche in France), have shown that challenges to the mainstream can arise from across the political spectrum. As a result, while the direction of travel for the latest wave of nativism-fueled populism may not yet be set in stone, one thing is certain: these challenges have made political systems volatile, and this instability is likely to define the social and political landscape in the years ahead.

One of the many challenges of properly understanding these events is that political commentators tend to interpret elections in binary terms—as "wins" or "losses" for mainstream politicians and their populist competitors—and to attribute these outcomes to recent political events. In reality, the grievances driving both electoral outcomes and other political events have much deeper roots. The rise of nativist populism is inextricably bound up with anxiety about the rate, form, and manner in which immigration has grown in recent years, particularly following uncontrolled surges in the arrival of asylum seekers and migrants. But these trends cannot be understood in isolation. They reflect much more long-term social phenomena: rising concerns about livelihoods and a loss of socioeconomic status; the decline of "community" (however defined); perceived threats to social norms around equality and religion; and deep social, cultural, and demographic changes that are reshaping society.



At the same time, the political vehicles for expressing these grievances have, to many, felt out of reach and unfit for purpose—something that is not helped by the tendency among many politicians and elites to dismiss such concerns as ignorant, parochial, xenophobic, or backward. While divisions between elite and “man-on-the-street” perspectives are nothing new, in the past several years they have laid the groundwork for a swell in anti-establishment sentiment, triggered by events ranging from migration crises and terrorist incidents to the lingering after-effects of the fiscal and economic crisis of the past decade. Against this backdrop, politicians who exploit these fears and present themselves as offering authenticity and “telling it like it is” have gained the support of the discontented, fearful, and angry.

While divisions between elite and “man-on-the-street” perspectives are nothing new, in the past several years they have laid the groundwork for a swell in anti-establishment sentiment.

And as the dust settles on recent elections, the big question is where to go from here: where does this shift take liberal democracies and how should mainstream parties and politicians respond? This report analyzes both the long-term drivers of public anxiety about immigration and the more immediate triggers of the past several years, and assesses how well these factors explain the recent increase in support for nativist or populist agendas. It examines the different forms of influence wielded by populist actors and the potential implications of these seismic shifts for political systems. Finally, it discusses the key elements that should inform thoughtful, strategic immigration policymaking in this radically changed context, and the prospects that such a rethink will happen. In doing so, it lays out a roadmap to reclaim a new “center”—a new equilibrium, as it were, on how to understand, speak about, and fashion common ground around immigration—and to forge more responsive policies that serve the interests of the broader society going forward.



Box 1. Populism: An Increasingly Multifaceted Concept

In its broadest form, populism claims to represent the “ordinary people” against the “elites.” Radical-right populism, the focus of this report, encompasses several strands of political ideology. These include authoritarianism (e.g., an emphasis on stricter law-and-order policies, and greater intolerance of noncompliance) and nationalism or nativism, which seek to protect the “nation” from perceived external threats (e.g., defending “Western culture” from immigration or Islam). Many radical-right populists have made opposition to different forms of immigration a central policy priority in recent years, and to a lesser extent, a “welfare chauvinism” platform that supports the welfare state for citizens but bars immigrants from accessing benefits.

The most prominent examples of radical-right populist parties in Europe include the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), the Danish People’s Party (DPP), the National Front (FN) in France, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), Jobbik in Hungary, the League in Italy, the Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands, and the Sweden Democrats (SD) (see the Appendix for a full breakdown). This definition excludes populist parties with less of a nativist agenda, such as Norway’s Progress Party, Poland’s Law and Justice Party, and the UK Independence Party.

Complicating this discussion, mainstream parties in many Western democracies have been moving to the right on immigration and integration issues, and some have adopted nativist rhetoric and policy positions. Arguably the most extreme example is Hungary’s Fidesz party, which has moved from the center right to run on an anti-immigrant, anti-Islam, explicitly illiberal platform—in the process, achieving far more of the nativist agenda on immigration than its radical-right populist counterpart Jobbik. Another notable example is the call by Germany’s center-right Christian Social Union (CSU) for a ban on burqas and dual citizenship and its interest in prioritizing Christian, Western migrants. And in the two-party system of the United States, nativist populism has emerged within the Republican Party, rather than as a distinct party. This has created tension between more center-right Republicans and the growing share of their party colleagues who have taken up Trump’s “America First” rhetoric and championed his administration’s efforts to curb admissions from some Muslim-majority countries, reduce overall immigration levels, and reduce opportunities to lodge asylum claims. Understanding the real roots and impact of populism thus requires a wide lens, one that looks beyond electoral outcomes to understand how these ideologies are transforming the political landscape.

Sources: Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Tjitske Akkerman, *The Impact of Populist Radical-Right Parties on Immigration Policy Agendas: A Look at the Netherlands* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2018), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/populist-radical-right-parties-immigration-netherlands; Deutsche Presse-Agentur, “Bavarian CSU Calls for Dramatic Tightening of Immigration Laws,” *The Local*, September 8, 2016, www.thelocal.de/20160908/bavarian-csu-call-for-dramatic-tightening-of-immigration-laws.

II. What Is Driving Public Anxiety about Immigration?

It is now a truism that governments face publics that are increasingly skeptical about immigration and its benefits. This skepticism is deeply connected to—and difficult to separate from—broader concerns about globalization writ large, including its unevenly distributed economic benefits and costs, and the deep social, cultural, and demographic changes to which it contributes.

Concerns about the distribution and quality of jobs and limited public resources often lurk beneath narratives about change. In recent years, growing regional economic disparities within countries have deepened the sense that many people are being left behind as national economies become more integrated in the global economy. Meanwhile, long-term economic trends, such as the hollowing out of



middle-skilled work and the rise of insecure, short-term forms of employment have tightened competition for both jobs and public resources.

However, the economic explanation for the rise of populism can be overstated. Simply pointing to voters' apprehensions about their future economic wellbeing invites questions about why much larger swaths of society have not been driven to vote for populists.² Anxieties about changes to the demographic makeup of communities are equally salient for many people, independently of whether these changes reduce their access to or share of public goods. Indeed, the argument that anxiety about immigration is primarily, even *solely*, about economics risks downplaying genuine concerns about social and cultural change, especially when elites and advocates are prone to dismissing such concerns as illegitimate, uninformed, xenophobic, or racist.³

Analysis of the drivers of anxiety about immigration and related social and cultural changes must thus take account of the interplay between political, economic, social, and cultural drivers, and the role that charismatic populists play in articulating and building on people's concerns. In turn, analyzing the recent ascent of populism requires distinguishing between long-term drivers and short-term catalysts to understand both *why* and *why now*.

A. The Pace of Social and Cultural Change

Growing ethnic and religious diversity often sparks broader concerns about identity and belonging, particularly when change is large in scale and happens quickly. In recent years, debates about cultural change in Europe and elsewhere have focused on Muslim immigrants (and their children) and on visible religious and cultural practices, such as wearing the burqa or hijab. The question of how to balance tolerance for minority practices with the promotion of national norms and values—which some feel are under threat—continues to vex policymakers.⁴

Some populists on the radical right have seized on this underlying discomfort and successfully positioned themselves as guardians of traditional values.⁵ They present immigration, and related social and cultural changes, as an existential threat: Marine Le Pen, for example, called for France to be made “more French” in the 2017 presidential elections, casting immigrants and the demographic change they help bring about as threatening to the French way of life.⁶ This line of argument often focuses on Muslim immigration, emphasizing its supposed undermining and gradual replacement of Western culture, religion, norms, and even institutions (such as the legal system). Such a focus often plays itself out in the integration realm, by either setting impossibly high standards for minorities (such as dropping key cultural and religious practices, even if the same rules do not apply to other religious groups), or by rejecting the premise of integration altogether (for example, by dismissing Islam as incompatible with European values).

2 Political sociologist Rogers Brubaker argues that an account of social, economic, cultural, and demographic trends explains why anti-immigrant populist parties are on the rise, but that it “explains too much” because it does not explain why populism is not *more* ubiquitous. See Rogers Brubaker, “Why Populism?” *Theory and Society* 46, no. 5 (November 2017): 357–85.

3 Sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild notes that the sense of anger among left-behind groups is driven not just by the sense that they are losing their place in line, but also by the fact that the people overtaking them are immigrants and other ethnic or religious minorities. See Arlie Russell Hochschild, *Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right* (New York: The New Press, 2016).

4 Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan and Meghan Benton, *In Search of Common Values amid Large-Scale Immigrant Integration Pressures* (Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2017), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/search-common-values-amid-large-scale-immigrant-integration-pressures.

5 This underlying discomfort about navigating cultural and religious differences, and the fear that Islam poses a threat to a host country's norms or values, particularly applies to Europe; in the United States, where religion plays a more central role in society, hostility toward Islam is framed more in terms of national security. See Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Richard Alba, Nancy Foner, and Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan, *Managing Religious Difference in North America and Europe in an Era of Mass Migration* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2016), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/managing-religious-difference-north-america-and-europe-era-mass-migration.

6 Adam Nossiter, “Marine Le Pen Leads Far-Right Fight to Make France ‘More French,’” *The New York Times*, April 30, 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/world/europe/france-election-marine-le-pen.html.



B. Political Fragmentation, Polarization, and the Rise of Anti-Elitism

A growing sense of disconnect between members of the public and the political and economic elites who claim to represent their interests⁷ has left many voters looking for alternatives to “business as usual.” In large numbers, they have begun to desert mainstream parties, politicians, and ideologies in favor of new or previously fringe actors across the political spectrum, including populists of the radical left and right.

While most of the recent election coverage in Europe has focused on the fortunes of the radical right, the fate of mainstream parties is equally noteworthy—initially, those on the center left, but increasingly those in the center as well (e.g., Germany’s Cristian Democratic Union). In the March 2018 Italian general election, the far-right League and the anti-establishment Five-Star Movement routed their mainstream opponents, capturing more than half of the vote at the expense of the ruling center-left Democratic Party and the center-right Forza Italia.⁸ This fits into a recent pattern of deeply disappointing results for center-left parties in other European countries, including the Social Democrats (SPD) in Germany,⁹ the Labor Party in the Netherlands,¹⁰ the Social Democrats in Sweden,¹¹ and the Socialists in France.¹² Although the shift away from mainstream parties is particularly pronounced in countries with proportional representation, such as the Netherlands and Sweden, the latter of which is still struggling to form a government following the September 9, 2018 election, the effects of this political fragmentation are being felt even in countries with electoral systems that tend to favor established parties, such as France.¹³

*A growing sense of disconnect between members of the public
and the political and economic elites ... has left many voters
looking for alternatives to “business as usual.”*

7 Similar pushback has emerged against economic elites who assert that trade accords, openness, and globalization benefit all.

8 Support for the center-left Democratic Party collapsed in the March 2018 election, with the ruling center-left coalition (headed by the Democratic Party) coming third behind the center-right coalition (which included the far-right League and Brothers of Italy) and the anti-establishment Five Star Movement.

9 Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) won 20.5 percent of the vote in 2017, its worst results since World War II, and in the October 2018 Bavaria state election, the SPD secured just less than 10 percent of the vote. See German Federal Returning Officer, “Bundestag Election 2017: Results,” accessed October 11, 2018, www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/bundestagswahlen/2017/ergebnisse.html; Tobias Buck, “How Social Democracy Lost Its Way: A Report from Germany,” *Financial Times*, October 16, 2018, www.ft.com/content/a1f88c3c-d154-11e8-a9f2-7574db66bcd5.

10 In the 2017 Dutch elections, the center-left Labor Party went from being part of the ruling coalition, with 38 members of parliament, to just nine seats. See Kiesraad, “Uitslag van de verkiezing van de leden van de Tweede Kamer van 15 maart 2017,” updated March 21, 2017, www.kiesraad.nl/adviezen-en-publicaties/rapporten/2017/3/kerngegevens-tweede-kamerverkiezing-2017/kerngegevens-tweede-kamerverkiezing-2017.

11 In Sweden’s September 2018 election, the Social Democrats received their lowest vote share in a century. See Election Resources on the Internet, “September 9, 2018 General Election Results – Sweden Totals,” accessed October 10, 2018, <http://electionresources.org/se/riksdag.php?election=2018>.

12 In France, the Socialists’ vote share in the presidential elections fell from 28.6 percent in 2012 to 6.4 percent in 2017. See French Constitutional Council, “Déclaration du 25 avril 2012 relative aux résultats du premier tour de scrutin de l’élection du Président de la République” (declaration, April 25, 2012), www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/decisions-depuis-1959/2012/2012-152-pdr/decision-n-2012-152-pdr-du-25-avril-2012.108521.html.

13 Proportional representation awards seats to parties based on their total vote share, provided they meet a certain threshold. Other electoral systems, such as France’s two-round voting system (where if no candidate wins an absolute majority, the top two candidates proceed to a second-round vote to decide who is elected) and the United Kingdom’s first-past-the-post system (where the electorate votes for people who are “standing” in their local constituency, and the candidate who wins the most votes becomes a member of parliament), are seen as favoring large parties.



Many of the voters who have made this switch feel mainstream parties and political institutions no longer share their worldviews or represent their interests.¹⁴ Their loss of trust in government is often accompanied by a backlash against experts and resentment about being talked down to by elites of all types. The United States is a particularly strong example of that reaction. And polls in the run-up to the UK referendum on whether to leave the European Union revealed a wide distrust of experts among prospective Leave voters.¹⁵ In some cases, mainstream politicians have exacerbated this divide by dismissing concerns about immigration, diversity, and multiculturalism as backward, xenophobic, or bigoted.¹⁶ This polarization, therefore, can be largely traced back to policymakers' persistent acts of commission and omission in managing the vast social and economic changes of the past few decades.

The combination of a lack of trust in government,¹⁷ rising anti-elitism, and movement away from mainstream political parties and politicians creates a pool of support for new actors, including on the radical right. Part of the appeal of populists is their claim to represent "ordinary people" instead of elites,¹⁸ and a number appear to benefit from their direct communication styles. Unlike mainstream politicians, who typically have focused on the benefits of immigration while shying away from difficult conversations about its costs, the politicians on the populist right reject what they see as "political correctness" and openly disparage expert opinions and appeals to abstract concepts, such as inclusion or human rights.


C. Growing Inequality and Competition for Scarce Public Resources

Another powerful driver of anxiety about immigration is the perceived lack of opportunities for certain groups of people. Economic growth is increasingly concentrated in large metropolitan areas and top-performing economic sectors and industries that employ large numbers of skilled workers. Meanwhile, other sectors, industries, and regions lag behind. And while regional disparities date back many decades, they were exacerbated by the economic crisis that began in 2008.¹⁹ In turn, recovery from the crisis has not been felt evenly across groups. For example, while overall employment rates have improved across Europe, youth unemployment in several countries remains extremely high, and a growing share of young people are working in temporary roles in lieu of more stable, long-term employment (see Figures 1 and 2).

- 14 Pew's Global Attitudes Survey from Spring 2017 found trust in national governments was particularly low in the countries hardest hit by the economic crisis, such as Greece, Italy, and Spain. Across most countries surveyed, people who felt the economic situation was good had much higher levels of trust in their national governments than supporters of populist parties. See Richard Wike, Katie Simmons, Bruce Stokes, and Janell Fetterolf, "Few Worldwide Have a Lot of Trust in Their Government," Pew Research Center, October 16, 2017, www.pewglobal.org/2017/10/16/many-unhappy-with-current-political-system/pg_2017-10-16_global-democracy_1-03/.
- 15 A mid-June 2016 YouGov poll found more than half of UK voters planning to vote to leave the European Union said they did not trust advice on the referendum from academics, economists, politicians, the Bank of England, international organizations, think tanks, or well-known businesses. Meanwhile, among those planning to vote to remain, politicians were the only group that a majority did not trust. See YouGov, "YouGov/Today Programme Survey Results" (survey data, June 14, 2016), https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/x4iynd1mn7/TodayResults_160614_EUReferendum_W.pdf.
- 16 For instance, former UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown was recorded when he thought his microphone was turned off referring to a voter he had just met as a "bigoted woman," while Hilary Clinton said: "you could put half of Trump's supporters into what I call the basket of deplorables." See Polly Curtis, "Gordon Brown Calls Labour Supporter a 'Bigoted Woman,'" *The Guardian*, April 28, 2010, www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/apr/28/gordon-brown-bigoted-woman; Domenico Montanaro, "Hillary Clinton's 'Basket of Deplorables,' in Full Context of This Ugly Campaign," NPR, September 10, 2016, www.npr.org/2016/09/10/493427601/hillary-clintons-basket-of-deplorables-in-full-context-of-this-ugly-campaign.
- 17 See Demetrios G. Papademetriou, *Maintaining Public Trust in the Governance of Migration* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2016), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/maintaining-public-trust-governance-migration; Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan, *Understanding and Addressing Public Anxiety about Immigration* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2016), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/understanding-and-addressing-public-anxiety-about-immigration.
- 18 The UK Independence Party (UKIP) claimed that the vote to leave the European Union was a victory for "real," "decent," and "ordinary" people, for example. See Peter Walker, "Nigel Farage Basks in the Triumph of His New Dawn," *The Guardian*, June 24, 2016, www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/nigel-farage-basks-in-the-triumph-of-his-new-dawn.
- 19 Over the past two decades, the average productivity gap between the top performing regions (top 10 percent) and the bottom 75 percent of regions has grown by nearly 60 percent. The labor productivity gap measures volume of labor output over number of hours worked. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *OECD Regional Outlook 2016* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2016), 27–31, <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264260245-en>.




Figure 1. Youth Unemployment Rates (ages 15 to 24), Select European Countries, 2006–17



Note: These data count unemployed people as those who report that they are without work, are available for work, and have taken active steps to find work in the last four weeks. Students who described their situation in these terms may be counted as unemployed.

Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “Youth Unemployment Rate—Total, % of Youth Labour Force, 2006 – 2017,” accessed October 8, 2018, <https://data.oecd.org/unemp/youth-unemployment-rate.htm>.

Figure 2. Temporary Employment as Share of Total Youth Employment (ages 15 to 24), Select European Countries, 2006–17



Notes: These data on temporary employment includes wage and salary workers whose jobs have a predetermined termination date. National definitions may vary slightly. This indicator is broken down by age group and it is measured as percentage of dependent employees (i.e., wage and salary workers).

Source: OECD, “Temporary Employment—Total, % of Dependent Employment 2006 – 2017,” accessed on October 8, 2018, <https://data.oecd.org/emp/temporary-employment.htm>.



Consequently, talk of a *national* recovery from the economic crisis or evidence of sustained economic growth often overlooks those regions and groups left behind. In some Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, the income gap between the highest and lowest earners widened further during the crisis, whose effects—in terms both of duration and intensity—were felt most acutely in poorer and more remote regions (see Box 2).

Box 2. An Uneven Recovery from the Economic Crisis

Many rural and former industrial regions were hit disproportionately hard by the economic crisis, and while some have since recovered, others continue to struggle with high unemployment and crippled industries. In England, for example, 85 percent of job losses between 2007 and 2010 occurred in former industrial regions in the north and west, while employment in the Greater London region actually increased. In France, the recession struck most forcefully in the north, where the economy relied on automotive manufacturing and industrial employment. As of 2013, the GDP of some parts of this region had yet to return to 2008 levels. Germany was similarly affected in manufacturing regions, though in contrast to France, most of these areas were prosperous prior to the recession and able to recover quickly. In Italy, the crisis exacerbated existing divisions between the poorer south and the wealthier north. The south's economy contracted at nearly twice the rate of the north's, and 70 percent of all job losses occurred in the south. Even as Italy recovers from the recession, these gaps are still keenly felt; in 2015, poverty was four times more prevalent in the south than in the northeast and more than twice as common as in northwestern or central Italy.

Meanwhile, in the United States, recovery from the crisis was mainly concentrated in large cities, with smaller cities and rural areas left behind. Between 2010 and 2014, counties with more than 1 million residents saw job growth of nearly 10 percent—double the rate for counties with fewer than 100,000 people. Over the same period, half of new businesses in the country were established in just 20 counties, which included the ten most populous in the country. Many of these urban areas are on the coasts or in energy hubs such as Houston, Texas, and offer high-skill jobs linked to the tech and energy sectors and have benefitted from an agglomeration of talent. By contrast, many areas affected by stagnating production and job growth are smaller cities in the South, Midwest, and Sun Belt (Georgia, Indiana, Nevada, Ohio, South Carolina, and Wisconsin), where the collapse of the housing bubble sharply reduced employment opportunities linked to real estate, finance, construction, and manufacturing. On the whole, while large metro areas such as Los Angeles, New York, and Chicago grew in both employment and population over the 2010–14 period, seven mainly rural states (Alabama, West Virginia, Mississippi, New Mexico, Connecticut, Wyoming, and Illinois) had fewer jobs in 2018 than prior to the recession.

Sources: Alan Berube, “Five Maps Show Progress Made, but Mostly Lost, on Middle-Class Incomes in America,” Brookings Institution, October 12, 2017, www.brookings.edu/research/five-maps-show-progress-made-but-mostly-lost-on-middle-class-incomes-in-america/; Sara Davies, Stefan Kah, and Charlie Woods, *Regional Dimensions of the Financial and Economic Crisis* (Glasgow: European Policies Research Centre, 2010), 31, www.eprc-strath.eu/uploads/eprc/documents/PDF_files/EPRP_70_RegionalDimensionsoftheFinancialandEconomicCrisis.pdf; Economic Innovation Group, *The New Map of Economic Growth and Recovery* (Washington, DC: Economic Innovation Group, 2016), <https://eig.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/recoverygrowthreport.pdf>; Ismail Ertürk et al., “City State against National Settlement: UK Economic Policy and Politics after the Financial Crisis” (working paper no. 101, Centre for Research on Sociocultural Change, Milton Keynes, UK, June 2011), 5, <http://hummedia.manchester.ac.uk/institutes/cresc/workingpapers/wp101.pdf>; Eurostat, “Severe Material Deprivation Rate by NUTS 2 Regions [ilc_mddd21],” updated October 20, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/ilc_mddd21; Les Echos, “Les régions françaises inégales face à la crise,” Les Echos, July 12, 2016, www.lesechos.fr/12/07/2016/LesEchos/22232-006-ECH_les-regions-francaises-inegales-face-a-la-crise.htm; Annie Lowrey, “2016: A Year Defined by America’s Diverging Economies,” *The Atlantic*, December 30, 2016, www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/12/2016-diverging-economies/511838/; Joachim Möller, “The German Labor Market Response in the World Recession: Demystifying a Miracle,” *Journal of Labor Market Research* 42 (2010): 325–36, http://doku.iab.de/zaf/2009/2009_4_zaf_moeller.pdf; *The Economist*, “A Tale of Two Economies,” *The Economist*, May 16, 2015, www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21651261-north-limps-ahead-south-swoons-tale-two-economies; Jacob Passy, “These 7 States Still Have Fewer Jobs Than before the Recession,” Market Watch, March 12, 2018, www.marketwatch.com/story/these-7-states-still-have-fewer-jobs-than-before-the-recession-2018-03-10.



Efforts to help residents of these areas catch up have had mixed success. When industries decline and jobs disappear, there is little to replace them. The result is a downward spiral of economic and population decline as those who can leave (often, younger professionals) seek opportunities elsewhere. The continued dearth of economic opportunities in such regions, even as national economic data point to overall growth, widens the gulf between these communities and more cosmopolitan centers.

Conversations about income and living standards need to be situated in the context of people's relative standing. A narrow focus on the national picture overlooks those who have become poorer as their wages stagnate while the cost of living continues to rise. Although this phenomenon dates back decades, it was felt keenly during the crisis, when incomes fell sharply and public benefits and services in some of the worst affected countries were slashed. Yet even as wages stagnated for many, they continued to rise for the highest earners, increasing income inequality in most OECD countries.²⁰

The decline of family-sustaining, middle-skilled jobs and the growth of insecure, part-time, and contract work has exacerbated this anxiety. The number of traditional middle-skilled jobs has steadily declined in some countries, driven both by outsourcing and technological developments.²¹ In the next two decades, trends that are already transforming labor markets (e.g., advances in robotics and artificial intelligence) are expected to further shrink the number of low- and middle-skilled jobs.

Economic hardship and losses of relative socioeconomic standing have provided fertile ground for populists. These personal frustrations about lost economic status easily translate into a sense of grievance, whether against those who are clear economic "winners," such as high earners and big businesses, or those seen as competing for the same jobs and public benefits. In an environment of even relative scarcity, immigrants are often viewed as unfairly competing for scarce resources of all types—a tendency that reinforces the underlying wariness of social and cultural change and that fuels resentment of the government elites who set immigration policies.

*Economic hardship and losses of relative socioeconomic standing
have provided fertile ground for populists.*

Beyond touting restrictive immigration policies, many radical-right populists have also targeted neoliberal economic policies. Some European populist parties have stated their support for a robust welfare system for citizens and a belief that immigrants should be excluded from receiving benefits (at least for a period of time)—a position sometimes referred to as "welfare chauvinism."²² For example, the populist Danish People's Party that emerged in the mid-1990s was founded by breakaway members of the Progress Party who opposed its low-tax, reduced-government-spending stance and instead favored welfare for citizens (but not foreigners).²³ Others, such as France's National Front (FN), have gone further, moving away from neoliberal, open-market positions to express their skepticism of free trade and call for

20 In the United States, for example, the incomes of the top 1 percent of earners rose by 300 percent between 1979 and 2007, but just 40 percent for the bottom 20 percent of earners—and since the recession, the lion's share of income growth has been concentrated in the top 1 percent. See OECD, *OECD Regional Outlook 2016*, 31; Congressional Budget Office data cited in *The Economist*, "The Rich and the Rest," *The Economist*, October 13, 2012, www.economist.com/node/21564418.

21 For a discussion of the U.S. example, see Federica Cocco, "Most US Manufacturing Jobs Lost to Technology, Not Trade," *Financial Times*, December 2, 2016, www.ft.com/content/dec677c0-b7e6-11e6-ba85-95d1533d9a62.

22 See Jørgen Goul Andersen and Tor Bjørklund, "Structural Changes and New Cleavages: The Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway," *Acta Sociologica* 33, no. 3 (1990): 195–217.

23 Anders Widfeldt, *The Growth of the Radical Right in Nordic Countries: Observations from the Past 20 Years* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2018), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/growth-radical-right-nordic-countries.



protectionist measures such as tariffs that they claim will reinvigorate their national economies.²⁴ This shift towards a more protectionist, pro-welfare (for citizens only) platform has allowed populists on the right to broaden their appeal to people who feel like they are losing ground in the global economy, including traditional left-leaning voters. A similar trend can be seen in the United States, where the Trump administration has proposed a new “public charge” rule that would prevent immigrants from entering the country, adjusting their temporary legal status, or becoming a legal permanent resident if they or their dependents are deemed likely to access an array of welfare benefits (ranging from food stamps to Medicaid, a program that provides health coverage for low-income individuals).²⁵

D. Why Now?

While many of the factors driving anxiety about immigration are not new, several forces have helped magnify public concerns and foster support for populist politicians and the radical right. These include the rapid influx of asylum seekers and migrants into towns and cities in Europe and the United States (and, most recently, Canada), and the large expenditures required to support newcomers;²⁶ the threat and fear of terror at home; and the rapid spread of unvetted information through new media platforms.

Chaotic scenes at European and U.S. borders in recent years have helped undermine public confidence in the systems in place to protect these borders and deter illegal entries, to screen new arrivals fairly and efficiently, and to return those without legal grounds to remain.²⁷ For example, the surge in arrivals of Central American families and unaccompanied children at the U.S. southern border that began in 2014,²⁸ and the formation in 2018 of “caravans” of Central American migrants intent on reaching the U.S. border, have fueled public perceptions that the government is unable to control its borders, despite overall illegal entries being at 40-year lows, and encouraged the Trump administration to push for ever more radical control measures.²⁹

While many of the factors driving anxiety about immigration are not new, several forces have helped magnify public concerns.

24 Alanna Petroff, “French Elections: Why Investors Are Very Afraid of Marine Le Pen,” CNN Business, February 6, 2017, <https://money.cnn.com/2017/02/06/investing/france-marine-le-pen-investing/index.html>.

25 U.S. policy already permits the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to deny noncitizens admission or adjustment of immigration status (e.g., acquisition of legal permanent residence) if they are likely to rely on government cash benefits or long-term institutional care. The proposed change to this “public charge” rule would expand its scope to include other cash and noncash benefits accessed either by the applicant or by their dependents (including children who may be U.S. citizens). See DHS, “Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds,” *Federal Register* 83, no. 196 (October 10, 2018): 51114–296, www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/10/10/2018-21106/inadmissibility-on-public-charge-grounds.

26 This includes both asylum seekers and other spontaneous arrivals, but also immigrants who arrive through legal migration channels (e.g., family reunification).

27 Extended delays in screening undermine the integrity of immigration systems and invite abuse. For a discussion of the origins and implications of the current backlog in the U.S. asylum system, see Doris Meissner, Faye Hipsman, and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, *The U.S. Asylum System in Crisis: Charting a Way Forward* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2018), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/us-asylum-system-crisis-charting-way-forward.

28 Apprehensions of nationals from Northern Triangle countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) at the U.S. southwest border exceeded the number of Mexican nationals apprehended in fiscal years (FYs) 2014, 2016, and 2017. See U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), *CBP Border Security Report, Fiscal Year 2017* (Washington, DC: DHS, 2017), www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2017-Dec/cbp-border-security-report-fy2017.pdf; CBP, *CBP Border Security Report, Fiscal Year 2016* (Washington, DC: DHS, 2016), www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2018-Mar/CBP-fy2016-border-security-report.pdf.

29 In recent years, border apprehensions have declined to levels comparable to those seen in the mid-1970s. See Jessica Bolter and Doris Meissner, “Crisis at the Border? Not by the Numbers” (commentary, Migration Policy Institute, June 2018), www.migrationpolicy.org/news/crisis-border-not-numbers.



Populists have tapped into this perceived loss of control and made it a central element of their anti-immigration platforms. In the United States, for example, building a wall across the U.S.-Mexico border to prevent illegal immigration was one of Trump's most fervent (and popular) campaign pledges.³⁰ Since 2015, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has made curtailing immigration of all forms and opposition to EU relocation quotas key campaign issues for his ruling Fidesz party. And in the United Kingdom—a country largely unaffected by the on-the-ground effects of the European migration crisis—the UK Independence Party (UKIP) capitalized on anxiety about the crisis during the campaign to leave the European Union, even using an image of refugees and migrants crossing the Croatia-Slovenia border in a campaign poster calling for the United Kingdom to “break free of the EU and take back control of our borders.”³¹ Among radical-right populists, the FN in France and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) have both called for ending Schengen and deep cuts to most forms of immigration in the run up to recent elections.

A spate of terrorist attacks perpetrated by cells of ISIS and, increasingly, self-radicalized native-born individuals, have provided further fodder for populists to position themselves as law-and-order actors, often explicitly linking immigration to security concerns. Cracking down on crime, and specifically crimes committed by immigrants or people with a migrant background, is a central theme of many radical-right platforms. The call by Netherlands' Party for Freedom (PVV) for “more safety, less immigration” in the 2017 election is one of many examples.³² But these calls have also been echoed by more mainstream parties that have urged greater restrictions on immigration in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. Following the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, Poland's ruling Law and Justice party announced it would not accept any refugees through the European Union's relocation program without “security guarantees.”³³ And following the December 2015 terrorist attacks committed in San Bernardino, California by a radicalized couple of Pakistani descent, then-candidate Donald Trump called for a ban on all Muslims entering the United States.³⁴ Since his inauguration, Trump has dramatically reduced refugee admissions and issued a series of executive orders increasing security screenings for and restricting entries of nationals from certain countries, including several that are Muslim majority.³⁵

A final factor in the recent rise of populism is the growing polarization of public opinion on immigration, exacerbated by the heightened fragmentation and partisanship of the media landscape, and rising

30 Over the past three decades, there has been bipartisan support for greater enforcement of the U.S.-Mexico border, with measures including more fencing and physical barriers, more border enforcement agents, and even a “virtual fence” enforced by sensors and, more recently, drones. President Trump's proposal to build a wall across the entire southern border has had a much more mixed reception, with questions raised about its potential returns on investment, given both its high costs and the fact that illegal crossings have been at near-historic lows for nearly a decade. Moreover, in recent years, these restrictive border controls have become less of a factor as an increased share of arrivals have been presenting themselves at the border to seek asylum—commencing a process that will likely enable the asylum seeker (and many accompanying minor children) to stay in the United States for extended periods due to backlogs in the asylum adjudication system. The lesson: in order to be effective, border controls must reflect shifting migration patterns and be supported by quick adjudications and efficient removals.

31 Josh Lowe, “Brexit: UKIP Launches ‘Breaking Point’ Immigration Poster,” *Newsweek*, June 16, 2016, www.newsweek.com/brexit-eu-immigration-ukip-poster-breaking-point-471081.

32 Cas Mudde, ed., *The Populist Radical Right: A Reader* (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), 4–5.

33 Reuters, “Poland Tells EU: No More Migrants without Security Assurances,” *CNBC*, November 14, 2015, www.cnbc.com/2015/11/14/poland-tells-eu-no-more-migrants-without-security-assurances.html.

34 Patrick Healy and Michael Barbaro, “Donald Trump Calls for Barring Muslims From Entering U.S.,” *The New York Times*, December 7, 2015, www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-banning-muslims-from-entering-u-s/.

35 The Trump administration revised its travel ban several times following legal challenges. The third version of the ban, which has been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court, imposes entry restrictions on several Muslim-majority countries (Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen) and two non-Muslim-majority countries (North Korea and Venezuela) until they address information-sharing and other security concerns. See Sarah Pierce, Jessica Bolter, and Andrew Selee, *U.S. Immigration Policy under Trump: Deep Changes and Lasting Impacts* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2018), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/us-immigration-policy-trump-deep-changes-impacts; Muzaffar Chishti, Sarah Pierce, and Laura Plata, “In Upholding Travel Ban, Supreme Court Endorses Presidential Authority While Leaving Door Open for Future Challenges,” *Migration Information Source*, June 29, 2018, www.migrationpolicy.org/article/upholding-travel-ban-supreme-court-endorses-presidential-authority-while-leaving-door-open.



public confusion about which experts or sources to trust. New media sources (as well as several existing ones) provide radical-right and other fringe voices an opportunity to disseminate their views widely and reach new audiences.³⁶ More broadly, as new media sources and partisan voices proliferate, and social media provides new ways to quickly access and share information, it is becoming easier for people to select sources of information that reinforce their beliefs on immigration and other issues, creating an echo-chamber effect.³⁷ Considering that many of these new media platforms skip traditional forms of fact-checking, this can lead to the rapid spread of false or misleading information about immigration that is then very difficult for experts or policymakers to challenge effectively. Underpinning this trend is both a growing skepticism about the ideological independence of experts—and in the United States, the mainstream media—and people’s tendency to favor information that bolsters their existing views and to be drawn to more emotive narratives over dispassionate factual arguments.

III. Assessing the Influence of Radical-Right Populism

The recent electoral successes of politicians with populist views should be understood as both symptom and driver of the political turmoil in Europe and the United States. Such actors, most of whom make immigration a central campaign issue, have made gains in a number of recent national and local elections, and in the case of Austria and Italy, they have entered government. (For an overview of recent election results of right-wing populist parties in Europe, see the Appendix.) But the greatest influence of radical-right populism may be its role in compelling mainstream actors in some Western democracies to move sharply to the right on immigration and integration issues—at times, even adopting nativist rhetoric and policy positions as their own.

A. Tracking the Influence of Populists: From Disruptors, to Shapers of Policy, to Governors

Distilling the influence of radical-right populism on the broad canvas of immigration policymaking remains a challenge. When radical-right populists enter government and push for more restrictive immigration and integration policies, their impact is easy to identify. But relatively few such parties have entered office in Europe. Typically, these parties encounter a “ceiling” of support that either precludes them from entering government entirely or forces them to enter a coalition with more centrist parties, almost always as the junior partner in these arrangements.³⁸ In that regard, their most important influence is as *disruptors*. But the entry of the FPÖ and the League into office in Austria and Italy, respectively, marks a notable departure from this trend, suggesting that some populists have the power to pierce this ceiling of support and become *governors*. In this regard, Italy’s League–Five Star Movement government, comprised of two populist parties with different political agendas and voter bases, is a notable development.

36 The online following of populist parties such as UKIP, Alternative for Germany (AfD), and the Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands outstrips that of mainstream political parties. See Clara Hendrickson and William A. Galston, “Why Are Populists Winning Online? Social Media Reinforces Their Anti-Establishment Message,” Brookings Institution, April 28, 2017, www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2017/04/28/why-are-populists-winning-online-social-media-reinforces-their-anti-establishment-message/.

37 Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan, *When Facts Don’t Matter: How to Communicate More Effectively about Immigration’s Costs and Benefits* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, forthcoming).

38 For a discussion, see Tjitske Akkerman, *The Impact of Populist Radical-Right Parties on Immigration Policy Agendas: A Look at the Netherlands* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2018), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/populist-radical-right-parties-immigration-netherlands; Martin A. Schain, *Shifting Tides: Radical-Right Populism and Immigration Policy in Europe and the United States* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2018), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/radical-right-immigration-europe-united-states; Widfeldt, *The Growth of the Radical Right in Nordic Countries*.



To date, the impact of European radical-right parties on policy while in office has been mixed. While such parties have sought to extract policy concessions as part of coalition agreements, they have sometimes struggled to translate campaign slogans into concrete and actionable political proposals.³⁹ Governing can also challenge their anti-establishment identity by forcing them to agree to compromises that are unpalatable to many of their supporters.⁴⁰ And as radical-right parties moderate some of their more hardline (and unrealistic) positions once in office, many have succumbed to internal dissent about the party's direction or priorities⁴¹ and suffered in subsequent elections as voters become disillusioned with the party's ability to deliver.⁴² Indeed, it is striking that it is in the U.S. context, which lacks a dedicated populist party, where immigration policies most strongly influenced by this ideology are being implemented under the Trump administration—though even there, not without challenges (see Box 3).

Box 3. Checks and Balances on Changes to Immigration Policy

The nativist, populist agenda can be thwarted by the various checks and balances built into governance systems. While these are highly country specific, they can include:

- the role of public servants in designing, delivering, and often adjusting policy (in countries with deeply rooted traditions of public-service independence, such as the United Kingdom and several continental European countries);
- the role of the legislature in passing laws and exercising oversight over the executive branch (as in the United States);
- the role of the judicial system in adjudicating legal challenges to policies or legislation (the United States is a prime example); and
- the role of regional and local government in interpreting or implementing national policies—particularly where federalism is part of the constitutional order or where devolution has, over time, strengthened subnational units' ability and willingness to challenge national policy (as in the United States, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland).

Note: In the United States, the judicial system's role in shaping immigration policy has expanded dramatically, enjoining and delaying a number of the Trump administration's immigration initiatives. These processes add to judicial backlogs and fuel an unprecedented near-constitutional crisis whereby immigration policy is made by the courts. Other Trump administration proposals have been stymied by Congress' inability to pass immigration legislation and the resistance of some states and local jurisdictions to implementing federal government policies. For a discussion of these dynamics in recent U.S. immigration policy, see Sarah Pierce, Jessica Bolter, and Andrew Selee, *U.S. Immigration Policy under Trump: Deep Changes and Lasting Impacts* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2018), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/us-immigration-policy-trump-deep-changes-impacts.

But even when radical-right populists do not enter office, they can wield outside political influence, particularly in countries with multiparty systems that may turn to populists to support their ruling coalitions. Examples from Europe illustrate how populists can help frame the debate on immigration issues or build support for certain policies from outside government.

- **Framing an issue and setting the policy agenda.** Whether in or outside government, politicians with radical-right populist views have proven themselves adept at framing the debate

39 For example, the PVV proposed reforms to dual citizenship that would have been incompatible with EU law, demonstrating that populist parties have not always worked out how their policy proposals could be implemented—or how to balance appeals to their often Euroskeptic base with the realities of governing. See Akkerman, *The Impact of Populist Radical-Right Parties*.

40 The Danish People's Party has retained much of its populist rhetoric and still shapes the government's immigration and integration agenda, but its long periods of supporting the governing coalition have tarnished its anti-establishment status. See Widfeldt, *The Growth of the Radical Right in Nordic Countries*.

41 For example, the Finns Party split while in government, with its more radical members leaving government.

42 Examples include the splits in the Pim Fortuyn List in the Netherlands and in the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) after they entered government as part of coalitions.



on immigration in a way that appeals to a broader section of the electorate. This is a smart strategy as it peels off voters from more mainstream opponents, while also influencing their actions—especially as other politicians or parties may adapt their tone and policy proposals in an attempt to reach out to these voters. For example, the two main parties in the Netherlands both proposed restrictions on Muslim practices (related to foreign financing of mosques and the burqa) in the run-up to the March 2017 election in response to polls predicting the populist PVV would win 25 percent of the vote.⁴³ Similarly, the German government under Chancellor Merkel, faced with growing support for the AfD and its anti-immigration platform, has slowly walked back its welcoming policy towards asylum seekers, introducing curbs on family reunification for non-Convention refugees, stepping up efforts to return those without legal grounds to remain, and pursuing Dublin Regulation-based return agreements with Spain, Italy, and Greece.⁴⁴

- **Changing policy or legislation.** Pressure from radical-right or other right-wing populists, whether from inside or outside government, can lead to concrete changes to immigration, refugee, and integration policy. This could include reductions in different types of immigration (e.g., family reunification), tightened criteria for those seeking protected status, stronger removal policies for illegally resident immigrants and failed asylum seekers, or new integration requirements. The influence that the Swiss People's Party (SVP) exerts on all immigration matters is a case in point, as is that of the Danish People's Party (DPP). The latter is responsible for a series of restrictive immigration policies introduced while they were supporting the governing coalition between 2001 and 2011, including stricter conditions for refugee status and family reunification, stepped-up removals of failed asylum seekers, and restricted access to welfare for asylum seekers.⁴⁵ Since 2015, the DPP is again in the position of supporting the governing coalition, and this record has continued, including new curbs on family reunification for those granted temporary protection, a controversial plan to seize assets from asylum seekers to cover the costs of their stay, a suspension of refugee resettlement, and most recently, a burqa ban and revised integration policies targeting so-called ghettos (which the government defines as low-income, immigrant-dense neighborhoods).⁴⁶

Measuring this type of indirect impact and disentangling the role of radical-right populism from other economic, social, or political factors remains extremely challenging. What is undeniable, however, is that as mainstream actors in many Western democracies have moved to the right on immigration and integration issues, radical-right themes (such as the overly simplified link between immigration and crime, and the insinuation that newcomers' religious or cultural values are incompatible with national norms) have moved from the fringe into the political bloodstream. The key successes of populist "political entrepreneurs" thus may lie not in what they achieve while in government, but in how the landscape evolves and adjusts around them as their ideas become part of "mainstream" politics.

43 See Akkerman, *The Impact of Populist Radical-Right Parties*; Schain, *Shifting Tides*.

44 Deutsche Welle, "Germany Ready to Sign Migrant Return Deal with Italy," Deutsche Welle, September 14, 2018, www.dw.com/en/germany-ready-to-sign-migrant-return-deal-with-italy/a-45477852.

45 For a full discussion, including the challenges of attributing influence, see Widfeldt, *The Growth of the Radical Right in Nordic Countries*.

46 Denmark defines "ghettos" as deprived residential areas that meet three of the following five criteria: (1) high unemployment rate (more than 40 percent); (2) immigrants or their descendants from non-Western countries comprise a majority of the population; (3) high crime levels; (4) low educational attainment; and (5) low incomes. Policies targeting these "ghettos" range from 30 hours of free daycare each week that teaches Danish language and "values" to financial incentives rewarding municipalities that help immigrants find work to more punitive measures, such as reduced benefits for immigrants that live in these areas and harsher punishments for crimes committed there. See Government of Denmark, "Regeringen vil gøre op med parallelsamfund," updated March 1, 2018, www.regeringen.dk/nyheder/ghettoudspil/; Billy Perrigo, "What to Know about Denmark's Controversial Plan to Eradicate Immigrant 'Ghettos,'" *Time*, July 2, 2018, <http://time.com/5328347/denmark-ghettos-policies/>.



B. Responding to Populism

When politicians with radical-right populist platforms start winning votes, they become a political force that cannot be ignored. This poses a dilemma for mainstream actors. Should they treat them like any other opponent and respect their democratic mandate? Or should they draw a line in the sand and take a stance against their divisive rhetoric and policy positions?

These questions are most acute in Europe, where governing often hinges on forming coalitions, and thus requires decisions about how—or if—to work with populists. To date, the responses of mainstream political actors in Europe have fallen into four categories:⁴⁷

- **Ostracizing politicians on the radical right and refusing to work with them.** This approach has been used by mainstream parties in Europe in an attempt to block those on the radical right from entering government coalitions. For example, in the run-up to the 2017 Dutch election, both parties in the ruling government coalition (the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy and the Labor Party) stated they would not form a government with the PVV, effectively blocking the party from gaining executive power. Similarly, in Sweden both the center-left and center-right coalitions in the September 2018 election pledged that they would not cooperate with the Sweden Democrats. As most European populist parties have to rely on forming coalitions with mainstream parties to join government, this is an effective approach for limiting their direct political influence. But by rejecting *a priori* cooperation with a party supported by a significant part of the electorate, mainstream parties deny these voters a voice. Doing so may strengthen the appeal of populist parties down the road by conveying to voters that mainstream parties view their choices and concerns as illegitimate.
- **Denying the radical right political space.** Another approach some mainstream parties have adopted is to co-opt some of the more resonating rhetoric and policy positions of their radical-right opponents in an effort to deny them political space on key issues. In Austria's most recent election, the conservative People's Party (ÖVP), the highest-polling party, adopted increasingly restrictive stances on immigration⁴⁸ while employing rhetoric similar to that of the radical-right populist FPÖ on issues such as Muslim integration—to the extent that members of the FPÖ complained that the ÖVP had co-opted their platform.⁴⁹ Moving to the right on issues that resonate with the electorate without adopting the radical right's more odious rhetoric—as fine as a balancing act as exists in politics—can allow mainstream parties to reach out to voters who feel their concerns are not being taken seriously enough. But reducing the space between mainstream and radical-right parties on these issues also carries risks: it may alienate more moderate voters and make it more difficult to speak with moral authority if these more extreme voters make demands that are contrary to a society's fundamental values.

47 For a discussion of the first three dynamics, see Akkerman, *The Impact of Populist Radical-Right Parties*; Schain, *Shifting Tides*.

48 The Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) stance on migrants and asylum seekers had been hardening for nearly two years before the election and before Chancellor Sebastian Kurz was even the party leader. Kurz was foreign minister, EU minister, and integration minister during that time, and became determined in the fall of 2015 not to allow a repeat of the European migration and refugee crisis to affect his country. As a result, in the spring of 2016, Kurz, working closely with European Council President Donald Tusk, was instrumental in efforts to close the Western Balkan route to Europe.

49 The ÖVP overtook the FPÖ in the polls and won 31.5 percent of the vote in the October 2017 election, compared to the FPÖ's 26.0 percent, before the two parties formed a coalition government. See Griff Witte, "Win or Lose in Austrian Vote, the Far Right Triumphs as Rivals Back Policies Once Deemed Fringe," *Washington Post*, October 13, 2017, www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/win-or-lose-in-austrian-vote-the-far-right-triumphs-as-rivals-back-policies-once-deemed-fringe/2017/10/13/7905468e-adc5-11e7-9b93-b97043e57a22_story.html; Justin Huggler and Balazs Csekö, "Austrian Election Results: Conservative Sebastian Kurz on Course to Become Europe's Youngest Leader," *The Telegraph*, October 15, 2017, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/10/15/austrian-election-conservative-sebastian-kurz-course-become/.



- **Cooperating formally with populist parties.** A third approach is to work with the radical right as part of a coalition government, as Austria's ÖVP has agreed to do with the FPÖ, and in Italy, the Five Star Movement with the League. The results of these types of coalitions have been mixed. In some cases, cooperation can be successful, particularly when less radical populist parties (such as Norway's Progress Party and Greece's Independent Greeks) are involved, or where there is more common ground between coalition partners. In other cases, these arrangements can be very unstable, as populists struggle to reconcile their policy priorities and agree to a plan for governing. For example, an earlier coalition between the ÖVP and FPÖ fell apart in 2005 having been hobbled by the FPÖ's internal divisions between its more moderate leadership and more radical base.
- **Cooperating with populists on an ad-hoc basis.** Some mainstream parties cooperate with the radical right on a less formalized basis, for example when a minority government seeks the support of populists on specific issues, such as budget resolutions.⁵⁰ For example, the Danish People's Party provided support to the Liberal-Conservative minority government between 2001 and 2011, and subsequently the Venstre (2015–16) and Venstre-Liberal-Conservative (2016 to present) minority governments, in exchange for more restrictive immigration policies and welfare reforms. With more minority governments likely on the horizon as European political systems become more fragmented, mainstream parties may end up seeking support from different constellations of smaller parties across the political spectrum on an issue-by-issue basis.

Broadly speaking, mainstream political players have begun to accept (if reluctantly) the idea of working with the radical right. The example of Austria illustrates this shift in attitudes well. While 14 EU Member States sanctioned the country in 2000 after the FPÖ joined government for the first time, when it did the same in 2017, European reactions were far more muted.

IV. Principles for Accepting Difference and Building a New Consensus on Immigration

Mainstream political actors face the challenge of responding to, without either pandering to or ignoring, radical-right populism. It is not always easy to draw a bright line between these two approaches. Responding to the forces driving support for nativist populism is a complex task that goes far beyond a pragmatic decision about whether and how to work with, or in sharp opposition to, populist opponents. Mainstream political actors (including elected officials, public servants, and thought leaders) must find a way to address the difficult economic, political, and social realities discussed above. What's more, for responses to these challenges to bear fruit, they must do so with sensitivity and respect for the diversity of viewpoints that are subsumed under the "populist" label—a listening skill that far too many elites seem to have forgotten or simply lack.

Responding to some of the grievances—real or imagined—that drive nativism and populism is often outside of the direct control of decisionmakers and officials.⁵¹ Moreover, crafting and executing an appropriate response is highly context specific, depending as it does on the type of political system, the point in the policymaking process where interventions can be most effective, the timing of electoral cycles, and local economic and social conditions. Despite these caveats, a number of points

50 In many European countries, failure to agree on a budget usually leads to the fall of a government and new elections—an outcome that populist parties may strategically not be prepared to support.

51 In addition, building support for diversity, inclusion, and acceptance and respect of other cultures and religions takes a long time and plenty of wisdom on the part of policymakers.



for reflection would serve immigration and integration policymakers, and civil society writ large, well as they seek to address public concerns on these issues while offering a plausible alternative to nativist agendas:

- **Whom to target.** Many analysts and observers believe that the greatest gains in restoring public trust in immigration policy can be made within the “malleable middle.”⁵² But ignoring radical-right politicians and their supporters is not a sustainable strategy, given the shifting political landscape in which the “fringes” are growing and threaten to become part of the mainstream. Given the depth of the societal divisions that immigration and integration policy debates have exposed in many countries, the biggest challenge facing mainstream actors and their supporters is that a “malleable middle” may no longer exist—a vacuum that may require them to forge a new middle ground. Moreover, mainstream politicians and parties must consider whether it is possible, and if so how, to reach out to a much broader constituency without alienating their base or compromising on their core principles. And finally and more fundamentally, given how polarizing a topic immigration has become for many Western democracies, they must ask what the “center ground” of tomorrow will look like.

Ignoring radical-right politicians and their supporters is not a sustainable strategy, given the shifting political landscape.

- **How to brand and message core values.** Mainstream actors face the challenge of defending a core set of liberal democratic values, such as equality and the protection of ethnic or religious minorities, from an energized radical right that openly questions their merits.⁵³ In doing so, mainstream figures need to engage honestly with people’s concerns about the pace of cultural and social changes associated with immigration, while making the case for an inclusive national identity.⁵⁴ This includes setting out the rights and responsibilities of both immigrants and native-born communities. Mainstream political actors must also carefully consider how to best connect their appeals to common values (such as equality) to people’s everyday concerns and experiences, avoiding undue reliance on abstract or intangible concepts such as human rights.
- **How to deepen public engagement without upending institutions.** Populists and democrats of all stripes have called for greater efforts to engage the public in democratic processes, a call that is made all the more compelling by declining voter turnout and broader evidence of popular discontent with politicians and even public institutions. But policymakers need to be wary of reflexively heeding calls for greater use of direct-democracy tools such as referenda, especially on subjects that do not lend themselves easily to a clean binary choice. There are more sophisticated tools for public engagement, including large-scale digital democracy platforms, such as those pioneered in Spain by the left-wing

52 See Sunder Katwala and Will Somerville, *Engaging the Anxious Middle on Immigration Reform: Evidence from the UK Debate* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2016), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/engaging-anxious-middle-immigration-reform-evidence-uk-debate.

53 More broadly, liberal democratic values have come under pressure, with policymakers struggling to balance their obligations under international law while responding to public concerns about immigration and integration. One example of this challenge is balancing respect for immigrants’ cultural and religious practices with the destination country’s laws, customs, and overall ethos. See Banulescu-Bogdan and Benton, *In Search of Common Values*.

54 Part of this defense may be rooted in pragmatism, such as acknowledgment that societal values evolve over time, requiring community input instead of implementing a rigid set of values imposed from above (or put forward by well-organized activists). For a discussion of how to make the case for shared values, see *ibid*.



populist party Podemos,⁵⁵ and citizens' assemblies, as piloted in the United Kingdom by the Constitution Unit following the Brexit referendum. Yet these tools, too, are not a panacea: they often suffer from similar problems as other forms of direct democracy, most notably by appealing to people who are already politically engaged instead of drawing in new voices, including those who are skeptical about the political process or simply too busy to participate.⁵⁶ Policymakers should reflect on what steps they might take to engage citizens meaningfully in democratic processes and create political systems that citizens feel invested in, including by broadening engagement beyond their usual constituencies to include a wider range of perspectives and views.

At the end of the day, the new political landscape makes clear that established politicians and parties can neither take their traditional voters for granted nor ignore the opportunity to reach out to some voters whose support for populists is the result of their frustration with mainstream actors. Nowhere is this clearer than in the United States, where a combination of demographic and social shifts, increasing inequality, and longer-term economic stagnation in many parts of the country mean that both Republicans and Democrats have to appeal to constituencies beyond their usual base.⁵⁷ The silver lining of this political upheaval is that everything is up for grabs. Political parties cannot afford to miss this opportunity to reach out to new audiences by fashioning a new consensus on immigration and other pressing socioeconomic issues.

A. Running a Rules-Based Immigration System

As noted above, skepticism about, and opposition to, immigration is often fueled by the perception that the system is “broken” and that governments are unable or unwilling to control who enters the country.⁵⁸ It is no coincidence that countries that actively select many of their immigrants⁵⁹ in accordance with clearly articulated economic, family, and humanitarian criteria tend to maintain a larger degree of public confidence in the governance of migration.⁶⁰ By contrast, countries where large

55 Populist parties on the left such as Podemos in Spain and the Icelandic Pirate Party are using digital democracy tools to enable members of the public to deliberate on and amend policy proposals, rank policy ideas, or offer input on how to allocate resources. However, these efforts face the challenge of overcoming the digital divide to ensure that people with limited digital skills or access to the internet can also participate. See Julie Simon, Theo Bass, Victoria Boelman, and Geoff Mulgan, *Digital Democracy: The Tools Transforming Political Engagement* (London: Nesta, 2017) www.nesta.org.uk/report/digital-democracy-the-tools-transforming-political-engagement/. In addition, in large countries engaging and retaining the attention of broader publics is an impossibly heavy burden.

56 The Citizens' Assembly on Brexit recruited members of the public through a process of stratified random selection (to reflect the electorate in terms of age, sex, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, geography, and vote in the referendum) and engaged in a deep process of learning about and deliberating on the United Kingdom's future relationship with the European Union. The organizers argued that such a process yielded much more sophisticated views on what the public wants—and more consensus—than the binary results of a referendum. See Alan Renwick, “Citizens' Assembly on Brexit: Results and Initial Reflections,” The Constitution Unit, October 2, 2017, <https://constitution-unit.com/2017/10/02/citizens-assembly-on-brexit-results-and-initial-reflections/>.

57 For example, the Democrats have gradually lost much of their working-class base, exemplified by the November 2016 presidential election in which Donald Trump won the vote of White voters without a college degree by 31 points. See Ruy Teixeira, “The Math Is Clear: Democrats Need to Win More Working-Class White Votes,” Vox, January 29, 2018, www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/1/29/16945106/democrats-white-working-class-demographics-alabama-clinton-obama-base.

58 Papademetriou, *Maintaining Public Trust*; Papademetriou and Banulescu-Bogdan, *Understanding and Addressing Public Anxiety*.

59 Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Kate Hooper, *Competing Approaches for Selecting Economic-Stream Immigrants: Points Selection vs. Demand Driven Systems* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, forthcoming).

60 For example, a 2017 Lowy Institute poll found that a majority of Australians were positive about the benefits of immigration and globalization writ large, although opinion was more divided on levels of immigration, with 53 percent in support of current or higher levels, and 40 percent in favor of lower levels. See Alex Oliver, “2017 Lowy Institute Poll,” Lowy Institute, June 21, 2017, www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/2017-lowy-institute-poll. See also sustained support by the Canadian public for immigration and the government's approach to multiculturalism. See Daniel Hiebert, *What's So Special about Canada? Understanding the Resilience of Immigration and Multiculturalism* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2016), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/whats-so-special-about-canada-understanding-resilience-immigration-and-multiculturalism.



numbers of people enter through channels over which governments have limited or no control—whether unauthorized entries of people seeking work or asylum, generous family reunification policies in countries such as the United States, or the European Union’s free movement regime—can struggle to persuade their publics that they can manage immigration effectively. In addition to undermining public confidence, the optics of a lack of control over who enters the country, why, and under what circumstances also makes it harder to enact needed migration and asylum reforms, creating vicious cycles that deepen the public’s mistrust.

To respond to nativist populism, policymakers face the daunting challenge of managing robust immigration systems that respect and enforce the law and that prioritize a country’s economic interests, while demonstrating commitment to legal obligations and deeply held principles and values, such as offering humanitarian protection to those in need. These actions, applied consistently and with appropriate vigor, also minimize the sense of disorder and chaos.

In pursuing this course, policymakers need to consider the following:

- ***How to address immigration disorder directly and recalibrate immigration systems to advance national economic priorities.*** Selection systems that clearly respond to a country’s economic and labor-market needs are the gold standard in successful immigration—and integration—management. But not all countries have the luxury of natural buffers, such as the vast sea that surrounds Australia, or borders shared with a developed country (e.g., Canada with the United States), that until recently limited opportunities for illegal entry and allowed policymakers to focus on carefully crafted selection mechanisms.⁶¹ The top policy objective of successful migration management is nonetheless clear: governments should strive to insulate migration systems from instability. Doing so will require building systems that are flexible enough to respond to fast-changing events, always learning from their own—and others’—experiences, and explaining to the public the concrete steps taken to minimize chaos at the border and disorder in the interior.
- ***How to build public trust in the integrity (and fairness) of migration-management systems.*** Public trust depends on migration-management systems that are transparent, robust, and fair.⁶² An essential component of such systems is effective return procedures. Specifically, policymakers should work both to return people without grounds to stay to their origin countries in a timely manner, and to cooperate with regional partners and the private and nonprofit sectors to create conditions that offer returnees and would-be migrants in these countries greater security and economic opportunities.

B. Communicating Complexity and Managing Crises Well

A second component of the response to nativist populism centers on the need for policymakers to communicate complex policy decisions clearly and to demonstrate their ability to manage migration crises effectively.⁶³ In doing so, policymakers must realistically convey to the public both the benefits

61 Things can change, however. Since 2017, Canada has been experiencing an influx of asylum seekers crossing the Canadian-U.S. border illegally, instead of applying for protection at ports of entry where they are likely to be returned to the United States under the terms of the Safe Third Country Agreement between the two countries. This new reality has compelled Canada to appoint a former Toronto police chief to a newly created cabinet position to take responsibility for the issue: the Minister of Border Security and Organized Crime Reduction. This creation of what amounts to a “border czar” to show the public that the government is taking the matter seriously echoes a U.S. action in the late 1990s that appointed a U.S. attorney with responsibility over the U.S. southern border with Mexico.

62 For example, ensuring that misuse of asylum systems by economic migrants is minimal, and minimizing opportunities for people to “jump the queue” in migration systems (e.g., family migrants faced with long waits or limited opportunities for reunification opting to enter and stay illegally or enter legally but stay illegally).

63 The U.S. decision to separate young children from their parents and keep these children in unacceptable conditions, all while failing to establish a workable system to reunify all of them with their parents or guardians when ordered by the courts is a perfect example of how *not* to handle a crisis.



of a well-managed immigration system and the unavoidable tradeoffs such management requires. In a political climate where emotional appeals resonate while evidence-driven arguments often fall flat, and where all sides of the debate routinely cherry-pick facts, policymakers need to acknowledge both the costs and benefits of immigration to maintain their credibility. These challenges are particularly acute in times of crisis. Careful analysis of recent trends offers some guidance for policymakers seeking to communicate more effectively with the public:

- ***Make the case for the benefits of responsible and well-calibrated policy.*** Talking about immigration is a potential minefield for politicians and policymakers. They must walk a fine line between overplaying the positives (and risk being seen as overpromising, naïve, or dismissive of public concerns) or overplaying the drawbacks (and risk stoking public anxieties). While emotional rhetoric on immigration and integration can gain traction with one's base, whether pro- or anti-immigrant, it invariably oversimplifies complex issues—and risks alienating more moderate voters. Efforts by established politicians to cater to populist voters by pivoting to the right on certain issues may also ring hollow or fuel concerns among ethnic and religious minorities and their allies. Successful arguments require a certain degree of authenticity and balance. In short, policymakers should seek to articulate messages that speak clearly about what the evidence says—and even more importantly, what it does not and cannot say—and what concrete actions can be taken to address these highly emotive issues.⁶⁴

While emotional rhetoric on immigration and integration can gain traction with one's base, whether pro- or anti-immigrant, it invariably oversimplifies complex issues.

- ***Craft an accessible communication style to connect more effectively with the public.*** While facts alone may win an argument when passions about the issue run low or when the debate is a technical one, experts often struggle to translate this information smartly for a wide audience of nonexperts or policymakers. Among the wealth of studies about the benefits and costs of immigration, for example, many are theoretical or extremely technical in nature and are typically addressed to other specialists. Moreover, discussing the benefits and costs of issues such as immigration at a national level alone risks overlooking the local experiences that are integral to modern immigration politics. Advocates both for and against immigration have long understood the power of storytelling and soundbites to win hearts and minds. As far-right populists gain experience in government and in opposition, their communication strategies are also likely to become more refined. Mainstream policymakers thus need to step beyond restating the evidence that they think supports their policy positions to communicate what it all means to a concerned public. This includes making better use of techniques such as user-focused design, videos, and storyboards⁶⁵ to communicate key messages and constantly test what resonates with the public.

64 Papademetriou and Banulescu-Bogdan, *Understanding and Addressing Public Anxiety*; Papademetriou, *Maintaining Public Trust*; Banulescu-Bogdan, *When Facts Don't Matter*.

65 For example, the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) used storyboard techniques to redesign its webpages to more clearly explain the asylum process. A similar approach could be used to explain other immigration policy processes to the broader population as a trust exercise. See BAMF, "Asylum and Refugee Protection," accessed November 2, 2018, www.bamf.de/EN/Fluechtlingsschutz/fluechtlingsschutz-node.html.



C. Redressing Adverse Effects and Inequality

Populists across the political spectrum have capitalized on the social and regional divides laid bare by the Great Recession, advocating hardline protectionist policies and making promises that, however unrealistic, appeal to people experiencing hardship and fearing the future. Most mainstream policymakers have fallen headfirst into the trap of talking about the economic recovery in terms of national averages, while overlooking the fact that there are many regions and people who genuinely feel—and are—left behind by globalization. Large-scale immigration exacerbates this disadvantage and the resulting fears and grievances. Acknowledging candidly that globalization has contributed to pain and distress in some quarters, and adopting robust policies designed to rectify disadvantage by investing in people and infrastructure in affected areas is a critical part of the effort to rebuild a middle ground on these issues. Key elements to consider include the need to:

- **Address regional disparities, including a focus on smaller towns and rural areas in decline.** Governments face a difficult choice: whether to support people likely to leave regions where economic opportunities are in freefall, or to invest in social and economic development policies that might entice them to stay and revive local communities. What's more, governments cannot succeed in either effort without the full-throated cooperation of the business community. The first approach may be less costly in financial terms, but only mitigates (and in fact, only masks) the larger problem. Since not everyone will or should leave declining areas, promoting mobility will still leave many people behind who will then become even more impoverished, placing an even greater burden on public services while the fiscal base shrinks. The second approach is both costly and yields mixed results, at least in the short-to-medium term. Choosing the best—and most cost effective—approach for revitalizing neglected regions is an enormous challenge, especially when the repopulation of such regions is likely to rely to a significant degree on their ability to attract new residents, especially immigrants.⁶⁶
- **Redress the costs of immigration.** Virtually all evidence suggests that while immigration's benefits broadly outweigh its costs, these costs fall disproportionately on a few groups, including less-educated native-born workers in low-wage jobs and previous cohorts of immigrants.⁶⁷ But given that much anxiety about immigration comes from people who are not the most directly or deeply affected by its economic and labor-market drawbacks, questions remain about how to design fair “compensatory” policies that effectively address these anxieties.
- **Employ a more whole-of-society approach to managing both immigration and immigrant integration.** Being able to demonstrate that newcomers are successfully settling into their new society is often at the heart of regaining public trust on immigration.

66 Detroit, Michigan is one example of a city where immigrants have fueled recent population growth following a prolonged period of economic decline, job losses, and depopulation. In an effort to attract (or simply retain) more people, several U.S. towns and cities are getting creative and offering incentives such as assistance to prospective homeowners; New Haven, Connecticut offers up to U.S. \$10,000 for a house mortgage down payment, while Harmony, Minnesota offers a cash rebate of up to U.S. \$12,000 to people building a new home, and New Richland, Minnesota and Curtis, Nebraska both offer a free lot of land to people who will build a house there within a specific timeframe. Other towns and cities, such as Niagara Falls, New York and counties in Kansas' Rural Opportunity Zones offer assistance with student loan repayments. See *The Economist*, “How Immigrants Are Helping Detroit's Recovery,” *The Economist*, February 16, 2017, www.economist.com/united-states/2017/02/16/how-immigrants-are-helping-detroits-recovery; Sarah Berger, “These Towns Will Help Pay off Your Student Loan Debt If You Move There,” CNBC, January 4, 2018, www.cnbc.com/2018/01/03/us-towns-that-offer-financial-incentives-to-live-there.html.

67 In the case of the United States, economist George Borjas has found that immigration has a disproportionate (if relatively small) negative effect on the wages of less-educated native-born workers, and that this is especially pronounced among African American workers. See George Borjas, “Wage Trends among Disadvantaged Minorities,” in *Working and Poor: How Economic and Policy Changes Are Affecting Low-Wage Workers*, eds. Rebecca M. Blank, Sheldon H. Danziger, and Robert F. Schoeni (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006).



Yet integration is a complex and cross-cutting cluster of intersecting policy areas that cannot be addressed successfully in isolation—or by integration departments alone. Research supports the value of policies that move away from targeted programs towards a more whole-of-society approach that cuts across immigration, integration, employment, education and training, and social policy.⁶⁸ At the very least, and with an eye to the issue’s manipulation by populist politicians, this means avoiding the perception that immigrants and their children are benefitting disproportionately from targeted programs and services by taking a “mainstreaming” approach to ensure that public services are available to all native- and foreign-born residents who qualify. Policymakers thus need to focus on developing, sharing good practices, and investing in education and skills-development policies to equip all workers to compete in a changing labor market and that no group or region gets left behind.

V. Conclusion

The political landscape in many Western democracies has shifted and become more fragmented and polarized. Parties and political movements that were previously on the fringe have moved closer or even into the political mainstream not because they have toned down their rhetoric or political agenda, but because politics has shifted toward them. In Europe, mainstream political actors are in flux: the major parties of the center left (and, in some cases, the center) can no longer rely on the voting blocs that have traditionally supported them, in large part due to their liberal views on inclusion, equality, and immigration issues. Some parties of the center right, under pressure from the right, are starting to adopt aspects of the language and policies on immigration and related issues that have long been the hallmark of the radical right. Meanwhile, in the United States the nativist populism and economic nationalism of the Trump administration has transformed the Republican Party’s policy platform on immigration and other issues (such as trade), widening rifts between populists and centrists within the party, and increasing polarization between Republicans and Democrats in turn. The imperative for mainstream political actors has become clear: adapt smartly to the changing political environment or pay a hefty penalty.

Both contributing to and underlying all of this is mistrust in governments’ ability and willingness to manage these challenges.

At the heart of this transformation lies a deep and growing skepticism among voters about whether governments really represent their interests on issues important to them, many of which relate to changes brought about by immigration and globalization.⁶⁹ Many voters are fearful about what the future holds for them and their children for an array of reasons, including changing demographics, the

68 See Meghan Benton, Helen McCarthy, and Elizabeth Collett, *Into the Mainstream: Rethinking Public Services for Diverse and Mobile Populations* (Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2015), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/mainstream-rethinking-public-services-diverse-and-mobile-populations; Elizabeth Collett and Milica Petrovic, *The Future of Immigrant Integration in Europe: Mainstreaming Approaches for Inclusion* (Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2014), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/future-immigrant-integration-europe-mainstreaming-approaches-inclusion; Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Meghan Benton, *Towards a Whole-of-Society Approach to Receiving and Settling Newcomers in Europe* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2016), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/towards-whole-society-approach-receiving-and-settling-newcomers-europe.

69 Wike, Simmons, Stokes, and Fetterolf, “Few Worldwide Have a Lot of Trust in Their Government.”



evolving world of work, rising economic inequality, growing pressures on social protection systems, and social and cultural changes that prompt questions about shared values and identities. Both contributing to and underlying all of this is mistrust in governments' ability and willingness to manage these challenges.

This gulf between politicians and the people they represent has led to the reappearance of, and fueled support for, many of the “-isms” of darker pasts—nativism, tribalism (ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic, or regional), and authoritarianism⁷⁰—espoused by self-proclaimed apostles promising to upend the status quo and return to an idyllic and largely fictional past.⁷¹ As the events of the last couple of years have shown, some of these “apostles” have exhibited the political instincts and honed the dystopian imagery and language capable of capturing people's sense of abandonment by mainstream parties, translating that frustration into political advantage.⁷²

Mainstream political figures find themselves having to defend policies and values on which there had appeared to be a long-established consensus: protecting refugees; being open to legal immigration and treating all migrants (almost regardless of legal status) with dignity; and respect for rights, difference, and equality. In this changed environment, making a pitch for moderation and compromise can be a minefield. Moreover, the space for the “middle ground” on these difficult issues is almost impossible to find, especially as almost any stance taken up by mainstream actors is quickly contested either as dismissing public concerns or, conversely, as pandering to the radical right. Finding a new equilibrium that takes seriously the concerns of people who feel that they have been left behind, while resisting the lure of reactive policy responses, risks becoming a Sisyphean task.

To make a compelling case to their publics that they have sharpened their listening skills and are serious about addressing legitimate concerns, policymakers should consider several steps:

- ***On immigration, they must demonstrate that they are committed to building a robust and well-managed system.*** This should be one that treats people with dignity and gives claims proper and timely attention, contributes to economic growth and supports labor-market success for all, follows the rule of law assiduously (including returning those without the right to stay), and adapts well to emerging needs. Other hallmarks of good immigration management include ensuring that policy decisions are both transparent and informed by evidence, especially on immigrant-integration outcomes and how immigration affects vulnerable resident populations, and maintaining a constant dialogue with the public about the aims and effects of policy.
- ***On helping people find new livelihoods, policymakers need to invest in economic and social policies that can help communities stem economic decline and rebuild hope.*** Focusing on helping people affected adversely by globalization and the Great Recession rebuild their lives through education and training, and using incentives to support the growth of small businesses, is a good start. Serious attention must also be paid to integrating immigrant populations successfully—including opportunities to regularize the status of long-term unauthorized immigrants who are contributing to their communities. At the

70 This also includes “identitarianism,” a far-right, White-nationalist ideology growing both in Europe and North America.

71 In the United States, for example, President Trump's agitation about the “deep state” and political and economic elites systematically ignoring and even undermining people's interests and needs in favor of a liberal agenda resonates deeply with his supporters.

72 Brazil has become the latest poster child in the lurch toward right-wing populism. Jair Bolsonaro won 55.2 percent of the vote in the October 2018 presidential election, having run a campaign against corruption and soaring crime rates, and promises to shore up the waning economic prospects of Brazil's middle classes—a “Brazil first” set of policies now common in countries from the United States and China, to Italy, Hungary, and elsewhere. Bolsonaro's election marks both the embrace of Trump-like political and policy postures in South America's largest economy and the “contagion effect” that the radical-right populism seen in Europe and the United States is having on the region; shifts to the political right have also taken place in Argentina, Chile, and Colombia amidst the unraveling of Venezuela that is fueling a migration crisis similar in size and breadth to the one unleashed by the Syrian civil war. See BBC News, “Jair Bolsonaro: Far-Right Candidate Wins Brazil Poll,” BBC News, October 29, 2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-46013408.



end of the day, successful integration requires addressing broader economic and social challenges in a way that is mindful of the needs of the entire community, including on thorny issues such as labor-market change, social and economic inequality, regional disparities, and growing pressures on health and welfare systems.

- ***On preparing communities to weather future challenges, a whole-of-government approach will be instrumental.*** As governments eye the prospects of deep transformations in the labor market, which seem primed to hit residents who already feel “left behind” and immigrant groups the hardest,⁷³ cross-cutting approaches will be ever more important. But long-term strategic thinking on such challenges—to the extent that it happens—is often driven by people whose portfolios includes neither immigration nor integration responsibilities. Governments will thus need to adopt a more whole-of-government approach to economic and social policy, and design mainstreamed services capable of meeting the needs of all vulnerable groups, if troubled communities are to navigate economic and social changes with a decent prospect for success.

To address the many centrifugal forces at play on the largest issues facing many Western democracies, societies will need to understand the sources of these forces and respond to them early and thoughtfully. A lack of attention to the social and economic divisions of recent decades has allowed them to fester and grow. Whether governments learn from these mistakes and are proactive about managing divisions will make the difference between strengthening the bonds that bind societies together or allowing them to become threadbare and drift apart—an environment in which nativism and populism thrive. Only time will tell which way the future will be written.

Whether governments learn from these mistakes ... will make the difference between strengthening the bonds that bind societies together or allowing them to become threadbare.

⁷³ For example, the replacement of family-sustaining, full-time jobs with more insecure forms of work and increasingly unaffordable welfare systems that foster the politics of “undeservingness,” both of which carry deep ramifications for immigration and integration policy. See Papademetriou and Hooper, *Competing Approaches for Selecting Economic-Stream Immigrants*; Meghan Benton and Demetrios G. Papademetriou, *Building Competitive Migration Systems in a Fast-Changing World of Work* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, forthcoming).



Appendix. Electoral Record of Right-Wing Populist Parties in Europe

Country	Party	Year Founded	Highest Result to Date (%)	Most Recent Parliamentary Result (%)	Current Position in National Politics
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	1956	26.9 (1999)	26.0 (2017)	Part of the ruling coalition government (with the Austrian People's Party, or ÖVP)
Belgium	Vlaams Belang	2004	12.0 (2007)	3.7 (2014)	Not part of the ruling government
Bulgaria	Attack	2005	9.4 (2009)	9.3 (2017)	Not part of the ruling government
Denmark	Danish People's Party (DPP)	1995	21.1 (2015)	21.1 (2015)	Provides parliamentary support to (but is not in a formal coalition with) the ruling government
Finland	Finns Party (PS)	1995	19.1 (2011)	17.7 (2015)	Not part of the coalition government (following a party split in 2017, a small group split off and rejoined the government as the New Alternative party)
France	National Front (FN)	1972	14.9 (1997)	13.2 (2017)	Not part of the ruling government
Germany	Alternative for Germany (AfD)	2013	11.5 (2017)	11.5 (2017)	Not part of the coalition government
Hungary	Fidesz	1988	53.4 (2010)	47.9 (2018)	The governing party
Hungary	Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)	2003	23.2 (2018)	23.2 (2018)	Largest opposition party in parliament
Italy	League	1991	17.4 (2018)	17.4 (2018)	Part of the ruling coalition government (with the Five Star Movement)
The Netherlands	Party for Freedom (PVV)	2006	15.5 (2010)	13.1 (2017)	Not part of the ruling coalition government
Norway	Progress Party	1973	22.9 (2009)	15.2 (2017)	Part of the ruling coalition government
Poland	Law and Justice	2001	37.6 (2015)	37.6 (2015)	The governing party
Slovakia	Slovak National Party (SNS)	1990	13.9 (1990)	8.6 (2016)	Part of the ruling coalition government
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	1988	17.5 (2018)	17.5 (2018)	Sweden is in the process of forming a new coalition government.
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party (SVP)	1971	29.4 (2015)	29.4 (2015)	The largest party in Switzerland's Federal Assembly, which has two out of seven members on the Federal Council
United Kingdom	UK Independence Party (UKIP)	1993	12.6 (2015)	1.8 (2017)	Not part of the ruling government

Notes: Bulgaria's Attack party ran as part of the United Patriots Coalition in the 2017 election; the election results shown here are for the whole coalition (which includes two other parties). In countries with two-round voting systems (e.g., France, Germany, and Hungary), the table shows data from the first round of voting.

Source: Election Resources on the Internet, "Home," accessed October 10, 2018, <http://electionresources.org/>; Bulgarian Central Election Commission, "Parliamentary Elections, March 26, 2017," accessed November 2, 2018, <http://results.cik.bg/pi2017/rezultati/index.html>; European Election Database, "Dataset: Bulgaria: Parliamentary Election 2009," accessed November 2, 2018, http://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?study=http://129.177.90.166:80/obj/fStudy/BGPA2009_Display&mode=cube&v=2&cube=http://129.177.90.166:80/obj/fCube/BGPA2009_Display_C1&top=yes; Finnish Ministry of Justice, "Eduskuntavaalit 2015—Tulos—Koko maa," updated June 2, 2017, https://tulospalvelu.vaalit.fi/E-2015/fi/tulos_kokomaa.html; French National Assembly, "Elections Held in 1997," accessed November 2, 2018, http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2113_97.htm; Slovak Republic Statistical Office, "Rate of Valid Votes for Political Parties in Elections to the Slovak National Council 1990," accessed November 2, 2018, http://volby.statistics.sk/nrsr/snr1990/volby90_a/php90_a.htm; Slovak Republic Statistical Office, "The Election to the National Council of SR 2016," accessed November 2, 2018, <http://volby.statistics.sk/nrsr/nrsr2016/en/data02.html>.



Works Cited

- Akkerman, Tjitske. 2018. *The Impact of Populist Radical-Right Parties on Immigration Policy Agendas: A Look at the Netherlands*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. www.migrationpolicy.org/research/populist-radical-right-parties-immigration-netherlands.
- Andersen, Jørgen Goul and Tor Bjørklund. 1990. Structural Changes and New Cleavages: The Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway. *Acta Sociologica* 33 (3): 195–217.
- Banulescu-Bogdan, Natalia. Forthcoming. *When Facts Don't Matter: How to Communicate More Effectively about Immigration's Costs and Benefits*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Banulescu-Bogdan, Natalia and Meghan Benton. 2017. *In Search of Common Values amid Large-Scale Immigrant Integration Pressures*. Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe. www.migrationpolicy.org/research/search-common-values-amid-large-scale-immigrant-integration-pressures.
- BBC News. 2018. Jair Bolsonaro: Far-Right Candidate Wins Brazil Poll. BBC News, October 29, 2018. www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-46013408.
- Benton, Meghan, Helen McCarthy, and Elizabeth Collett. 2016. *Into the Mainstream: Rethinking Public Services for Diverse and Mobile Populations*. Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe. www.migrationpolicy.org/research/mainstream-rethinking-public-services-diverse-and-mobile-populations.
- Benton, Meghan and Demetrios G. Papademetriou. Forthcoming. *Building Competitive Migration Systems in a Fast-Changing World of Work*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Berger, Sarah. 2018. These Towns Will Help Pay off Your Student Loan Debt If You Move There. CNBC, January 4, 2018. www.cnbc.com/2018/01/03/us-towns-that-offer-financial-incentives-to-live-there.html.
- Berube, Alan. 2017. Five Maps Show Progress Made, but Mostly Lost, on Middle-Class Incomes in America. Brookings Institution, October 12, 2017. www.brookings.edu/research/five-maps-show-progress-made-but-mostly-lost-on-middle-class-incomes-in-america/.
- Bolter, Jessica and Doris Meissner. 2018. Crisis at the Border? Not by the Numbers. Commentary, Migration Policy Institute, June 2018. www.migrationpolicy.org/news/crisis-border-not-numbers.
- Borjas, George. 2006. Wage Trends among Disadvantaged Minorities. In *Working and Poor: How Economic and Policy Changes Are Affecting Low-Wage Workers*, eds. Rebecca M. Blank, Sheldon H. Danziger, and Robert F. Schoeni. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Buck, Tobias. 2018. How Social Democracy Lost Its Way: A Report from Germany. *Financial Times*, October 16, 2018. www.ft.com/content/a1f88c3c-d154-11e8-a9f2-7574db66bcd5.
- Bulgarian Central Election Commission. N.d. Parliamentary Elections, March 26, 2017. Accessed November 2, 2018. <http://results.cik.bg/pi2017/rezultati/index.html>.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 2017. Why Populism? *Theory and Society*, 46 (5): 357–85.
- Chishti, Muzaffar, Sarah Pierce, and Laura Plata. 2018. In Upholding Travel Ban, Supreme Court Endorses Presidential Authority While Leaving Door Open for Future Challenges. *Migration Information Source*, June 29, 2018. www.migrationpolicy.org/article/upholding-travel-ban-supreme-court-endorses-presidential-authority-while-leaving-door-open.



- Cocco, Federica. 2016. Most US Manufacturing Jobs Lost to Technology, Not Trade. *Financial Times*, December 2, 2016. www.ft.com/content/dec677c0-b7e6-11e6-ba85-95d1533d9a62.
- Collett, Elizabeth and Milica Petrovic. 2014. *The Future of Immigrant Integration in Europe: Mainstreaming Approaches for Inclusion*. Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe. www.migrationpolicy.org/research/future-immigrant-integration-europe-mainstreaming-approaches-inclusion.
- Curtis, Polly. 2010. Gordon Brown Calls Labour Supporter a “Bigoted Woman.” *The Guardian*, April 28, 2010. www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/apr/28/gordon-brown-bigoted-woman.
- Davies, Sara, Stefan Kah, and Charlie Woods. 2010. *Regional Dimensions of the Financial and Economic Crisis*. Glasgow: European Policies Research Centre. www.eprc-strath.eu/uploads/eprc/documents/PDF_files/EPRP_70_RegionalDimensionsoftheFinancialandEconomicCrisis.pdf.
- Deutsche Presse-Agentur. 2016. Bavarian CSU Calls for Dramatic Tightening of Immigration Laws. *The Local*, September 8, 2016. www.thelocal.de/20160908/bavarian-csu-call-for-drastic-tightening-of-immigration-laws.
- Deutsche Welle. 2018. Germany Ready to Sign Migrant Return Deal with Italy. *Deutsche Welle*, September 14, 2018. www.dw.com/en/germany-ready-to-sign-migrant-return-deal-with-italy/a-45477852.
- Economic Innovation Group. 2016. *The New Map of Economic Growth and Recovery*. Washington, DC: Economic Innovation Group. <https://eig.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/recoverygrowthreport.pdf>.
- Economist, The*. 2012. The Rich and the Rest. *The Economist*, October 13, 2012. www.economist.com/node/21564418.
- . 2015. A Tale of Two Economies. *The Economist*, May 16, 2015. www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21651261-north-limps-ahead-south-swoons-tale-two-economies.
- . 2017. How Immigrants Are Helping Detroit’s Recovery. *The Economist*, February 16, 2017. www.economist.com/united-states/2017/02/16/how-immigrants-are-helping-detroits-recovery.
- Election Resources on the Internet. N.d. Home. Accessed October 10, 2018. <http://electionresources.org/>.
- . N.d. September 9, 2018 General Election Results – Sweden Totals. Accessed October 10, 2018. <http://electionresources.org/se/riksdag.php?election=2018>.
- Ertürk, Ismail, Julie Froud, Sukhdev Johal, Adam Leaver, Michael Moran, and Karel Williams. 2011. City State against National Settlement: UK Economic Policy and Politics after the Financial Crisis. Working paper no. 101, Centre for Research on Sociocultural Change, Milton Keynes, UK, June 2011. <http://hummedia.manchester.ac.uk/institutes/cresc/workingpapers/wp101.pdf>.
- European Election Database. N.d. Dataset: Bulgaria: Parliamentary Election 2009. Accessed November 2, 2018. http://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?study=http://129.177.90.166:80/obj/fStudy/BGPA2009_Display&mode=cube&v=2&cube=http://129.177.90.166:80/obj/fCube/BGPA2009_Display_C1&top=yes.
- Eurostat. 2017. Severe Material Deprivation Rate by NUTS 2 Regions [ilc_mddd21]. Updated October 20, 2017. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/ilc_mddd21.
- Finnish Ministry of Justice. 2017. Eduskuntavaalit 2015—Tulos—Koko maa. Updated June 2, 2017. https://tu-lospalvelu.vaalit.fi/E-2015/fi/tulos_kokomaa.html.



- French Constitutional Council. 2012. Déclaration du 25 avril 2012 relative aux résultats du premier tour de scrutin de l'élection du Président de la République. Declaration, April 25, 2012. www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/decisions-depuis-1959/2012/2012-152-pdr/decision-n-2012-152-pdr-du-25-avril-2012.108521.html.
- French National Assembly. N.d. Elections Held in 1997. Accessed November 2, 2018. http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2113_97.htm.
- German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF). N.d. Asylum and Refugee Protection. Accessed November 2, 2018. www.bamf.de/EN/Fluechtlingsschutz/fluechtlingsschutz-node.html.
- German Federal Returning Officer. N.d. Bundestag Election 2017: Results. Accessed October 11, 2018. www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/bundestagswahlen/2017/ergebnisse.html.
- Government of Denmark. 2018. Regeringen vil gøre op med parallelsamfund. Updated March 1, 2018. www.regeringen.dk/nyheder/ghettoudspil/.
- Healy, Patrick and Michael Barbaro. 2015. Donald Trump Calls for Barring Muslims From Entering U.S. *The New York Times*, December 7, 2015. www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-banning-muslims-from-entering-u-s/.
- Hendrickson, Clara and William A. Galston. 2017. Why Are Populists Winning Online? Social Media Reinforces Their Anti-Establishment Message. Brookings Institution, April 28, 2017. www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2017/04/28/why-are-populists-winning-online-social-media-reinforces-their-anti-establishment-message/.
- Hiebert, Daniel. 2016. *What's So Special about Canada? Understanding the Resilience of Immigration and Multiculturalism*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. www.migrationpolicy.org/research/whats-so-special-about-canada-understanding-resilience-immigration-and-multiculturalism.
- Hochschild, Arlie Russell. 2016. *Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right*. New York: The New Press.
- Huggler, Justin and Balazs Csekö. 2017. Austrian Election Results: Conservative Sebastian Kurz on Course to Become Europe's Youngest Leader. *The Telegraph*, October 15, 2017. www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/10/15/austrian-election-conservative-sebastian-kurz-course-become/.
- Katwala, Sunder and Will Somerville. 2016. *Engaging the Anxious Middle on Immigration Reform: Evidence from the UK Debate*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. www.migrationpolicy.org/research/engaging-anxious-middle-immigration-reform-evidence-uk-debate.
- Kiesraad. 2017. Uitslag van de verkiezing van de leden van de Tweede Kamer van 15 maart 2017. Updated March 21, 2017. www.kiesraad.nl/adviezen-en-publicaties/rapporten/2017/3/kerngegevens-tweede-kamerverkiezing-2017/kerngegevens-tweede-kamerverkiezing-2017.
- Les Echos. 2016. Les régions françaises inégales face à la crise. Les Echos, July 12, 2016. www.lesechos.fr/12/07/2016/LesEchos/22232-006-ECH_les-regions-francaises-inegales-face-a-la-crise.htm.
- Lowe, Josh. 2016. Brexit: UKIP Launches "Breaking Point" Immigration Poster. *Newsweek*, June 16, 2016. www.newsweek.com/brexit-eu-immigration-ukip-poster-breaking-point-471081.
- Lowrey, Annie. 2016. 2016: A Year Defined by America's Diverging Economies. *The Atlantic*, December 30, 2016. www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/12/2016-diverging-economies/511838/.



- Meissner, Doris, Faye Hipsman, and T. Alexander Aleinikoff. 2018. *The U.S. Asylum System in Crisis: Charting a Way Forward*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. www.migrationpolicy.org/research/us-asylum-system-crisis-charting-way-forward.
- Möller, Joachim. 2010. The German Labor Market Response in the World Recession: De-Mystifying a Miracle. *Journal of Labor Market Research* 42: 325–36. http://doku.iab.de/zaf/2009/2009_4_zaf_moeller.pdf.
- Montanaro, Domenico. 2016. Hillary Clinton’s “Basket of Deplorables,” in Full Context of This Ugly Campaign. NPR, September 10, 2016. www.npr.org/2016/09/10/493427601/hillary-clintons-basket-of-deplorables-in-full-context-of-this-ugly-campaign.
- Mudde, Cas. 2007. *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mudde, Cas, ed. 2016. *The Populist Radical Right: A Reader*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Nossiter, Adam. 2017. Marine Le Pen Leads Far-Right Fight to Make France “More French.” *The New York Times*, April 30, 2017. www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/world/europe/france-election-marine-le-pen.html.
- Oliver, Alex. 2017. 2017 Lowy Institute Poll. Lowy Institute, June 21, 2017. www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/2017-lowy-institute-poll.
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 2016. *OECD Regional Outlook 2016*. Paris: OECD Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264260245-en>.
- . N.d. Temporary Employment—Total, % of Dependent Employment 2006 – 2017. Accessed on October 8, 2018. <https://data.oecd.org/emp/temporary-employment.htm>.
- . N.d. Youth Unemployment Rate—Total, % of Youth Labour Force, 2006 – 2017. Accessed October 8, 2018. <https://data.oecd.org/unemp/youth-unemployment-rate.htm>.
- Papademetriou, Demetrios G. 2016. *Maintaining Public Trust in the Governance of Migration*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. www.migrationpolicy.org/research/maintaining-public-trust-governance-migration.
- Papademetriou, Demetrios G., Richard Alba, Nancy Foner, and Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan. 2016. *Managing Religious Difference in North America and Europe in an Era of Mass Migration*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. www.migrationpolicy.org/research/managing-religious-difference-north-america-and-europe-era-mass-migration.
- Papademetriou, Demetrios G. and Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan. 2016. *Understanding and Addressing Public Anxiety about Immigration*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. www.migrationpolicy.org/research/understanding-and-addressing-public-anxiety-about-immigration.
- Papademetriou, Demetrios G. and Meghan Benton. 2016. *Towards a Whole-of-Society Approach to Receiving and Settling Newcomers in Europe*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. www.migrationpolicy.org/research/towards-whole-society-approach-receiving-and-settling-newcomers-europe.
- Papademetriou, Demetrios G. and Kate Hooper. Forthcoming. *Competing Approaches for Selecting Economic-Stream Immigrants: Points Selection vs. Demand Driven Systems*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Passy, Jacob. 2018. These 7 States Still Have Fewer Jobs Than before the Recession. Market Watch, March 12, 2018. www.marketwatch.com/story/these-7-states-still-have-fewer-jobs-than-before-the-recession-2018-03-10.




- Perrigo, Billy. 2018. What to Know about Denmark's Controversial Plan to Eradicate Immigrant "Ghettos." *Time*, July 2, 2018. <http://time.com/5328347/denmark-ghettos-policies/>.
- Petroff, Alanna. 2017. French Elections: Why Investors Are Very Afraid of Marine Le Pen. *CNN Business*, February 6, 2017. <https://money.cnn.com/2017/02/06/investing/france-marine-le-pen-investing/index.html>.
- Pierce, Sarah, Jessica Bolter, and Andrew Selee. 2018. *U.S. Immigration Policy Under Trump: Deep Changes and Lasting Impacts*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. www.migrationpolicy.org/research/us-immigration-policy-trump-deep-changes-impacts.
- Renwick, Alan. 2017. Citizens' Assembly on Brexit: Results and Initial Reflections. *The Constitution Unit*, October 2, 2017. <https://constitution-unit.com/2017/10/02/citizens-assembly-on-brexit-results-and-initial-reflections/>.
- Reuters. 2015. Poland Tells EU: No More Migrants without Security Assurances. *CNBC*, November 14, 2015. www.cnn.com/2015/11/14/poland-tells-eu-no-more-migrants-without-security-assurances.html.
- Schain, Martin. 2017. *Shifting Tides: Radical-Right Populism and Immigration Policy in Europe and the United States*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. www.migrationpolicy.org/research/radical-right-immigration-europe-united-states.
- Simon, Julie, Theo Bass, Victoria Boelman, and Geoff Mulgan. 2017. *Digital Democracy: The Tools Transforming Political Engagement*. London: Nesta. www.nesta.org.uk/report/digital-democracy-the-tools-transforming-political-engagement/.
- Slovak Republic Statistical Office. N.d. The Election to the National Council of SR 2016. Accessed November 2, 2018. <http://volby.statistics.sk/nrsr/nrsr2016/en/data02.html>.
- . N.d. Rate of Valid Votes for Political Parties in Elections to the Slovak National Council 1990. Accessed November 2, 2018. http://volby.statistics.sk/nrsr/snr1990/volby90_a/php90_a.htm.
- Teixeira, Ruy. 2018. The Math Is Clear: Democrats Need to Win More Working-Class White Votes. *Vox*, January 29, 2018. www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/1/29/16945106/democrats-white-working-class-demographics-alabama-clinton-obama-base.
- U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). 2016. *CBP Border Security Report, Fiscal Year 2016*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2018-Mar/CBP-fy2016-border-security-report.pdf.
- . 2017. *CBP Border Security Report, Fiscal Year 2017*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2017-Dec/cbp-border-security-report-fy2017.pdf.
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 2018. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds. *Federal Register* 83, no. 196 (October 10, 2018): 51114–296. www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/10/10/2018-21106/inadmissibility-on-public-charge-grounds.
- Walker, Peter. 2016. Nigel Farage Basks in the Triumph of His New Dawn. *The Guardian*, June 24, 2016. www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/nigel-farage-basks-in-the-triumph-of-his-new-dawn.
- Widfeldt, Anders. 2017. *The Growth of the Radical Right in Nordic Countries: Observations from the Past 20 Years*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. www.migrationpolicy.org/research/growth-radical-right-nordic-countries.



- Wike, Richard, Katie Simmons, Bruce Stokes, and Janell Fetterolf. 2017. Few Worldwide Have a Lot of Trust in Their Government. Pew Research Center, October 16, 2017. www.pewglobal.org/2017/10/16/may-unhappy-with-current-political-system/pg_2017-10-16_global-democracy_1-03/.
- Witte, Griff. 2017. Win or Lose in Austrian Vote, the Far Right Triumphs as Rivals Back Policies Once Deemed Fringe. *Washington Post*, October 13, 2017. www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/win-or-lose-in-austrian-vote-the-far-right-triumphs-as-rivals-back-policies-once-deemed-fringe/2017/10/13/7905468e-adc5-11e7-9b93-b97043e57a22_story.html.
- YouGov. 2016. YouGov/Today Programme Survey Results. Survey data, June 14, 2016. https://d25d2506s-fb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/x4iynd1mn7/TodayResults_160614_EUReferendum_W.pdf.



About the Authors



Demetrios G. Papademetriou is a Distinguished Transatlantic Fellow at the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), which he co-founded and led as its first President until 2014 and where he remains President Emeritus and a member of the Board of Trustees. He served until 2018 as the founding President of MPI Europe, a nonprofit, independent research institute in Brussels that aims to promote a better understanding of migration trends and effects within Europe; he remains on MPI Europe's Administrative Council and chairs its Advisory Board.

He is the convener of the Transatlantic Council on Migration, which is composed of senior public figures, business leaders, and public intellectuals from Europe, the United States, Canada, and Australia. He also convened the Regional Migration Study Group in 2011–15, an initiative that has proposed and is promoting multi-stakeholder support for new regional and collaborative approaches to migration, competitiveness, and human-capital development for the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Central America.

Dr. Papademetriou co-founded *Metropolis: An International Forum for Research and Policy on Migration and Cities* (which he led as International Chair for the initiative's first five years and where he continues to serve as International Chair Emeritus); and has served as Chair of the World Economic Forum's Global Agenda Council on Migration (2009–11); Founding Chair of the Advisory Board of the Open Society Foundations' International Migration Initiative (2010–15); Chair of the Migration Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); Director for Immigration Policy and Research at the U.S. Department of Labor and Chair of the Secretary of Labor's Immigration Policy Task Force; and Executive Editor of the *International Migration Review*.

He has published more than 270 books, articles, monographs, and research reports on a wide array of migration topics, lectures widely on all aspects of immigration and immigrant integration policy, and advises foundations and other grant-making organizations, civil-society groups, and senior government and political party officials, in dozens of countries (including numerous European Union Member States while they hold the rotating EU presidency).

Dr. Papademetriou holds a PhD in comparative public policy and international relations (1976) from the University of Maryland and has taught at the universities of Maryland, Duke, American, and New School for Social Research.



Kate Hooper is an Associate Policy Analyst with MPI's International Program, where she primarily works with the Transatlantic Council on Migration. Her research areas include labor migration, migration and development, and refugee and immigrant integration policies, with a focus on Europe and North America.

She holds a master's degree with honors from the University of Chicago's Committee on International Relations, and a bachelor of the arts degree in history from the University of Oxford. She also holds a certificate in international political economy from the London School of Economics.



Meghan Benton is a Senior Policy Analyst and Assistant Director for Research for the International Program at MPI. She is also a Nonresident Fellow with MPI Europe. Her areas of expertise include immigrant integration (especially labor-market integration and integration at the local level), free movement and Brexit, and the role of technological and social innovation in responses to the refugee and migration crisis in Europe.

Dr. Benton previously was a Senior Researcher at Nesta, the United Kingdom's innovation body, where she led projects on digital government and the future of local public services. Prior to joining Nesta, she was a policy analyst at MPI from 2012 to 2015, where she co-led an MPI-International Labor Organization six-country project on pathways to skilled work for newly arrived immigrants in Europe. She also worked on Project UPSTREAM, a four-country project on mainstreaming immigrant integration in the European Union. Previously, she worked for the Constitution Unit at University College London and the Institute for Public Policy Research.

Dr. Benton received her PhD in political science from University College London in 2010, where her PhD research focused on citizenship and the rights of noncitizens. She also holds a master's degree in legal and political theory (with distinction) from University College London, and a bachelor's degree in philosophy and literature from Warwick University.



The Migration Policy Institute is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank dedicated to the study of the movement of people worldwide. MPI provides analysis, development, and evaluation of migration and refugee policies at the local, national, and international levels. It aims to meet the rising demand for pragmatic and thoughtful responses to the challenges and opportunities that large-scale migration, whether voluntary or forced, presents to communities and institutions in an increasingly integrated world.

www.migrationpolicy.org

1400 16th Street NW
Suite 300
Washington, DC 20036

Tel: 001 202-266-1940
Fax: 001 202-266-1900

